Enforcement Actions

Afghanistan

• The Taliban regime, as the de facto state, through a unified legal and enforcement system codified in the 2026 Criminal Procedural Regulations, with Da Afghanistan Bank’s directives integrated into a centralized enforcement mechanism rather than separate provincial police forces.
• Enforcement targets specific bad actors (e.g., sanctioned entities, scam networks) and imposes compliance obligations on businesses, not the general public broadly.
• Violation Type: Engaging in unauthorized and prohibited financial activity (trading cryptocurrency). The Taliban's acting central bank chief has called crypto "haram" (forbidden in Islam) and a form of "gambling.". Penalty Amount: No specific fine amount is publicly reported for this blanket ban. Penalties involve arrests, detention, closure of businesses, and confiscation of assets.
• Date: The ban was effectively implemented and widely publicized around August-September 2022, though reports of crackdowns started earlier.
• Outcome: Significant suppression of the cryptocurrency market in Afghanistan, forcing traders underground or to flee the country. Numerous arrests have been reported.
• Reuters: Afghanistan central bank bans online foreign currency trading, crypto (August 24, 2022) - https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/afghanistan-central-bank-bans-online-foreign-currency-trading-crypto-2022-08-24/ (2022-08-24)
• Al Jazeera: Taliban cracks down on crypto trading in Afghanistan (August 24, 2022) - https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/24/taliban-cracks-down-on-crypto-trading-in-afghanistan (2022-08-24)
• CoinDesk: Afghanistan’s Taliban Shuts Down 16 Crypto Exchanges, Arrests Dealers (August 23, 2022) - https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/08/23/afghanistans-taliban-shuts-down-16-crypto-exchanges-arrests-dealers/ (2022-08-23)
• Regulator Name (de facto): Herat provincial police, under the authority of the Taliban regime.
• Entity Targeted: At least 13 individuals involved in cryptocurrency exchanges and trading. Violation Type: Operating cryptocurrency exchanges and engaging in crypto trading, violating the nationwide ban imposed by the Taliban. Penalty Amount: Not specified as a monetary fine. The individuals were arrested, and the involved businesses were shut down. Further legal proceedings and outcomes (e.g., length of detention, confiscation of assets) are not publicly detailed by the regime.
• Date: Mid to late August 2022.
• Outcome: Arrests of key individuals, closure of an estimated 16 cryptocurrency exchanges in Herat alone, effectively dismantling the local crypto market.

9 further Afghanistan enforcement records

Albania

• Entity Targeted: Faruk Fatih Özer, founder and CEO of the Turkish cryptocurrency exchange Thodex. Violation Type: International fraud, money laundering (related to the collapse of the Thodex exchange, which defrauded hundreds of thousands of users of an estimated $2 billion). The Albanian action related to his illegal entry and residence, and the execution of the international arrest warrant. Penalty Amount (Albania): No specific "penalty amount" was imposed by Albanian authorities on Özer directly for the crypto fraud. The outcome in Albania was his arrest and successful extradition. Outcome: Faruk Fatih Özer was arrested in Vlora, Albania, following an international manhunt. After a period of legal appeals, he was extradited to Turkey, where he faced trial. In Turkey, he was subsequently sentenced to 11,196 years in prison in September 2023 for aggravated fraud, leading a criminal organization, and money laundering.

Algeria

• In Algeria, all forms of cryptocurrency ownership, use, and facilitation are criminalized under Law No. 25‑10 (2021), replacing earlier references to Article 117 of the 2018 Finance Law.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals or groups operating cryptocurrency mining farms. These operations are often targeted not only for the illicit use of cryptocurrency but also for illegal electricity consumption, which carries additional penalties. Violation Type: Illegal operation of virtual currency mining, illicit use of virtual currencies, unauthorized electricity consumption, money laundering. These charges are derived from the criminalization of cryptocurrency activities and related offenses. Penalty Amount: Similar to trading violations, penalties include:. Outcome: Arrests, dismantling of mining operations, seizure of expensive mining hardware, prosecution, and convictions leading to imprisonment and fines.
• Outcome: Arrest, seizure of assets/equipment, prosecution, and typically conviction leading to imprisonment and/or fines, based on the criminalization of these activities.
• Outcome: Arrests, dismantling of mining operations, seizure of expensive mining hardware, prosecution, and convictions leading to imprisonment and fines.

Andorra

• Current Status: No enforcement actions related to cryptocurrency activities have been reported as of October 2024.
• Monitoring Advice: Keep abreast of updates from the Andorran Treasury and General Council for any future regulatory crackdowns or compliance notices.
• Requirement: VASPs must transmit originator and beneficiary information for all cross-border transactions, aligning with the most stringent requirements of the counterparties’ jurisdictions.
• Andorran Penal Code Clause 312: Imposes fines ranging from €10,000 to €50,000 or imprisonment up to 5 years for non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations, including failure to transmit required Travel Rule data.

Angola

• Regulator: Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA)
• Entity Targeted: General Public and Financial Institutions (no specific crypto entities named in public enforcement). Violation Type (Implied): Operating unregistered or unregulated financial services, consumer protection risks, lack of legal tender status, money laundering risks. Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as these were warnings, not direct penalties against entities.
• Date: recent communications have been issued over the past few years, but the specific cited items are dated and not themselves ongoing as of mid-2026.
• Outcome: Advising citizens against using cryptocurrencies, reminding financial institutions of their obligations regarding unregistered financial products, and reiterating that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Angola.
• Club of Mozambique: "Angola: Central Bank issues new warning on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies"
• Date: August 26, 2021 (2021-08-26)
• Fines: Monetary penalties imposed for failure to secure necessary licences or breaches of environmental and safety regulations.
• Suspension of Licences: Immediate revocation of building permits or contractor licences for repeated or serious violations.
• Criminal Prosecution: Under relevant construction and environmental statutes, offenders may face criminal charges, including imprisonment and substantial fines.
• Source: Republic of Angola – Legal System and Research, Analysis of 'Law on the Status of NGOs' Bill: Angola.

Antigua and Barbuda

• Nature of Regulation: The Financial Services Regulatory Commission (FSRC) of Antigua and Barbuda is the primary regulator for financial services, including digital assets. Antigua enacted the Digital Assets Business Act (DAB Act) in 2020 to regulate virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Their approach tends to be more focused on licensing and compliance rather than frequent public enforcement actions against major players.
• Transparency: Public disclosure of enforcement actions, especially with specific penalties and dates, may be less common or less detailed in smaller jurisdictions compared to larger financial centers like the US, UK, or EU.
• Jurisdictional Focus: While companies may incorporate in Antigua, their primary operational hubs and customer bases often lie elsewhere, leading to enforcement actions being initiated by regulators in those other jurisdictions.
• Regulator Name: Financial Services Regulatory Commission (FSRC)
• Relevant Legislation: Digital Assets Business Act (DAB Act) 2020
• Scope: The DAB Act governs any person carrying on or purporting to carry on a digital assets business from within Antigua and Barbuda or to or from Antigua and Barbuda, requiring licenses for activities such as virtual asset exchange, transfer, custody, and participation in financial services related to initial coin offerings.

Argentina

• Regulator: Buenos Aires Court (Judge Susana Parada)
• Entity Targeted: Polymarket (crypto-powered prediction platform). Violation Type: Operating as an unlicensed online betting service without identity or age verification. Penalty: Nationwide access block; directed ISPs to restrict access; Google and Apple instructed to remove mobile applications. Outcome: Platform blocked countrywide.
• Regulator: Argentine Federal Police and Supreme Court
• Entity Targeted: President Javier Milei (for promoting $LIBRA cryptocurrency). Violation Type: Market manipulation; alleged rug pull scam. Penalty Amount: $251 million in investor losses documented. Outcome: Over 100 criminal complaints filed; judicial investigation launched; described as "Cryptogate" and The Economist called it the "first big scandal" of Milei's presidency.
• Regulator: National Securities Commission (CNV) under Law 27,739 (passed March 2024)
• Violation Type: Regulatory compliance requirements; FATF-aligned VASP oversight. Outcome: Coinbase suspended ARS-to-USDC trading operations after less than one year in the market.
• Regulator: National Securities Commission
• Entity Targeted: CoinX crypto platform. Violation Type: Operating without authorization; operating similar to a Ponzi scheme. Outcome: Platform banned; thousands of investors affected with millions in losses.
• Legal basis: Law 25,246 (AML), UIF Resolution 94/2023 for VASPs; RePET under National Law 26,268.

Armenia

• Entity Targeted: Individuals and organized criminal groups involved in establishing and operating large-scale fraudulent cryptocurrency investment schemes, often promising high returns from "mining farms" or fake trading platforms. Violation Type: Large-scale fraud (often under Article 178 of the Criminal Code of Armenia), money laundering (Article 190), illegal entrepreneurship (Article 188), and sometimes other related criminal offenses. Outcome: Multiple arrests of individuals involved, ongoing criminal proceedings, freezing and seizure of assets, and international cooperation to track down perpetrators and recover funds. As these are complex criminal cases, final verdicts and sentences can take significant time.
• Armenian authorities are conducting mass raids and investigating nearly 40 individuals for money laundering, indicating that the situation has progressed beyond the initial multiple arrests and asset freezes described in the claim.

Australia

• Non-compliance penalties are severe: failing to enrol or register can result in fines up to AUD 210,000 for corporations and potential criminal charges, including imprisonment
• The Binance fine stands out as the largest quantified penalty and a landmark court ruling.
• AUSTRAC's actions affected the most entities, signaling broad sector crackdown.
• Recent FCA 2024/25 enforcement data now reports substantial detail on major fined actions, including aggregate fine totals and specific enforcement outcomes, so it is no longer accurate to say that penalty details are generally limited or that there are no other major fined actions with full details in the results.
• Search results lack comprehensive coverage of all actions; additional minor warnings or investigations (e.g., 417 registered exchanges monitored) exist but are not individually significant.

Austria

• Titles III (ARTs) and IV (EMTs) of MiCA, covering stablecoins, will apply from 30 June 2024.
• The remaining provisions of MiCA for other crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers will apply from 30 December 2024.
• E-money Tokens (EMTs) (Title IV of MiCA):
• Under MiCA as applied in Austria, stablecoins are split into (i) e‑money tokens (EMTs), defined as crypto‑assets that purport to maintain a stable value by reference to one official currency, and (ii) asset‑referenced tokens (ARTs), defined as crypto‑assets that purport to maintain a stable value by reference to one or several assets or values other than a single official currency (for example baskets of fiat currencies that are not legal tender, commodities like gold, or other crypto‑assets). The broad ‘any other value or right or combination thereof’ formulation is no longer the operative description for EMTs, which are now limited to one official currency, while ARTs cover the multi‑asset or non‑currency references.
• EMTs are considered e-money under the E-Money Directive (2009/110/EC) and its Austrian implementation, the E-Geldgesetz 2010. MiCA effectively extends the existing e-money framework to crypto-assets.
• Regulatory Reference: MiCA, Article 3(1)(5) and Title IV.
• Asset-Referenced Tokens (ARTs) (Title III of MiCA):
• ARTs are a new category specifically created by MiCA.
• Regulatory Reference: MiCA, Article 3(1)(4) and Title III.
• MiCA aims to create a specific framework for ARTs and EMTs, meaning that if a token falls under these MiCA definitions, it will primarily be regulated as such, rather than as a "security" under the traditional WAG 2018/KMG, or merely as a "payment token" (which is not a formal legal classification but a functional description).
• However, if a crypto-asset (even if attempting to be stable) does not meet MiCA's definitions for ARTs or EMTs and exhibits characteristics of a financial instrument, it could still be regulated under existing Austrian securities law (e.g., WAG 2018) or capital market law (KMG). MiCA has a clear scope exclusion for financial instruments already regulated under existing EU legislation like MiFID II.
• Issuers of EMTs must always issue them at par value upon receipt of funds and are required to redeem them at par value upon request.

48 further Austria enforcement records

Azerbaijan

• Financial Monitoring Service (FMS): Responsible for AML/CFT oversight and financial intelligence.
• Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA): For criminal investigations, including cybercrime and financial fraud.
• Prosecutor General's Office: For leading criminal prosecutions.
• Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBAR): Regulates traditional financial institutions and payment systems, but direct crypto regulation is still being formalized.
• Regulator/Enforcement Body: Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), Prosecutor General's Office.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals or groups operating alleged fraudulent schemes (e.g., Ponzi schemes, pyramid schemes) using cryptocurrencies as an investment vehicle or payment method. Violation Type: Fraud, swindling, operating illegal financial schemes, potentially money laundering. Penalty Amount: This is not a "fine." Instead, it involves arrests, criminal investigations, pre-trial detention, potential prosecution leading to imprisonment, and asset forfeiture. Specific "penalty amounts" as regulatory fines are not applicable here.
• Date: Ongoing throughout the period. Reports of such arrests and investigations appear periodically in local media.
• Arizona enforcement outcomes include arrests, ongoing criminal investigations, potential charges, prosecution, and sentencing if found guilty.
• Specifics: While a single major, highly publicized case with all details (specific penalty amount, date, and outcome like a fine) isn't readily available in English for regulatory actions, there have been numerous local reports on the general crackdown on online fraud, including schemes that involve cryptocurrencies. These are typically handled by the police and prosecutor's office.
• April 2023: Reports indicated that the Financial Monitoring Service (FMS) had submitted proposals to revise legislation concerning virtual assets and their regulation to prevent their use in money laundering and terrorism financing. This indicates a proactive stance on the regulatory side, but not a specific enforcement action against an entity.
• Source: Report on FMS activities (Azerbaijani sources, but often picked up by financial news) (Note: This link points to a general news article about regulatory proposals, not a specific enforcement action).
• Source for General AML/CFT Concerns (FATF/MONEYVAL):

8 further Azerbaijan enforcement records

Bahamas

• Regulator: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
• Entity Targeted: FTX Trading Ltd. and Samuel Bankman-Fried (CEO and co-founder). Violation Type: Securities fraud scheme defrauding equity investors. Penalty Amount: Not specified in available results. Outcome: FTX filed for bankruptcy after a spike in customer withdrawals exposed an $8 billion shortfall in accounts. The SEC charged Bankman-Fried with orchestrating a scheme that defrauded equity investors; FTX had raised more than $1.8 billion from investors, including approximately $1.1 billion from about 90 U.S.-based investors. The Securities Commission of the Bahamas subsequently froze assets of one of FTX's subsidiaries.

Bahrain

• Outcome: Received a Crypto-Asset Service Provider license. This is not an enforcement action but demonstrates the active regulatory environment.

Bangladesh

• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, and implicitly, anyone involved in cryptocurrency. Violation Type: Engaging in cryptocurrency transactions, which is considered illegal under existing foreign exchange regulations (Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947) and anti-money laundering laws (Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2012). BB states crypto carries high risks of money laundering, terror financing, and capital flight. Penalty Amount: N/A (for a warning), but the underlying laws carry severe penalties (fines, imprisonment, asset forfeiture) for non-compliance. Outcome: Public awareness campaigns, continued illegal status of crypto, discouragement of financial institutions from dealing with crypto. This forms the basis for criminal prosecutions.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals running illegal multi-level marketing (MLM) schemes using crypto, conducting "digital hundi" (informal remittance) via crypto, or engaging in crypto-related scams. Violation Type: Fraud, money laundering, operating illegal financial schemes, breach of Digital Security Act. Penalty Amount: Varies upon conviction (fines and imprisonment). Asset seizures occur during arrest. Specific penalty amounts are not publicly available at the time of arrest or often even immediately after conviction. Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, disruption of illegal schemes, seizure of assets. Violation Type: Money laundering, violation of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, illegal hundi operations. Penalty Amount: Varies upon conviction. Outcome: Arrests, disruption of illegal remittance networks.
• Entity Targeted: Websites, apps, and platforms (including potentially crypto exchanges) deemed illegal or operating against national interests. Violation Type: Operating without license, facilitating illegal financial activities (which crypto trading falls under), or other violations of telecommunication laws. Penalty Amount: N/A (penalty is the blocking of access). Outcome: Restricted access to various online platforms, making it harder for Bangladeshi citizens to access crypto services directly.
• Public awareness campaigns exist in Bangladesh, but the illegal status of cryptocurrencies is evolving toward regulatory consideration, reducing outright discouragement of financial institutions and altering the prosecutorial landscape.
• Penalties for fraud, money laundering, and illegal financial schemes under Bangladesh's Digital Security Act now include specific provisions such as up to 10 years' imprisonment and fines of up to BDT50 million (approximately US$405,500) for offenses like online gambling under the Gambling Prevention Act of 2026.
• Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, disruption of illegal schemes, seizure of assets.
• Violation Type: Money laundering, violation of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, illegal hundi operations. Penalty Amount: Varies upon conviction.
• Outcome: Arrests, disruption of illegal remittance networks.
• Outcome: Restricted access to various online platforms, making it harder for Bangladeshi citizens to access crypto services directly.

Barbados

• Regulator: Barbados Financial Services Commission (FSC)
• Entity Targeted: Implicitly, any Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP) operating or attempting to operate in Barbados without a license, or failing to comply with the Digital Assets Act, 2019 and associated regulations. The FSC also targets the general public with warnings about the risks of unregulated entities. Violation Type: Operating an unlicensed VASP, failure to meet AML/CFT requirements, consumer protection breaches by unregulated entities.
• Penalty amounts for operating without a license under Barbados’s digital assets regime have been increased by later amendment; the 2019 figures cited in the claim are no longer current.
• Date: Ongoing, since the proclamation of the Digital Assets Act, 2019 (proclaimed October 2019), and its subsequent amendments and guidelines.
• FATF and related regulators have continued to strengthen VASP rules and guidance, but significant implementation gaps remain for offshore VASPs, Travel Rule compliance, and broader supervision, so the situation is better described as ongoing regulatory tightening with persistent enforcement challenges rather than completed regulatory clarity.
• Digital Assets Act, 2019: This is the foundational legislation for regulating digital assets and VASPs in Barbados. It outlines licensing requirements, supervisory powers of the FSC, and penalties for non-compliance.
• Source URL: https://www.fsc.gov.bb/DigitalAssets/Digital-Assets-Act-2019.pdf (This is the Act itself, outlining potential penalties and the regulatory framework.)
• FSC Website - Digital Assets Section: The FSC regularly updates its website with information regarding licensing, guidance, and warnings related to digital assets. This is where any significant enforcement actions would likely be announced. While it doesn't list specific enforcement actions against named entities, it details the regulatory requirements.
• Source URL (FSC Digital Assets Section): https://www.fsc.gov.bb/DigitalAssets/Pages/Digital-Assets.aspx
• FSC Public Warnings: The FSC frequently issues general warnings to the public about dealing with unregulated entities and the risks associated with various financial products, including those related to cryptocurrencies. While these aren't enforcement actions against a specific entity with a fine, they are a form of regulatory action aimed at consumer protection and highlight the FSC's vigilance. For specific warnings, you would need to browse their 'News & Updates' or 'Public Notices' sections, but these usually warn against types of scams or the dangers of unlicensed activity rather than sanctioning a named, operating entity with a fine.
• Source URL (FSC News & Updates - check for notices regarding digital assets): https://www.fsc.gov.bb/NewsUpdates/Pages/News-and-Updates.aspx
• Relatively New Framework: Enforcement actions often take time to materialize after a regulatory framework is put in place.

3 further Barbados enforcement records

Belarus

• Entity Targeted: WhiteBird LLC (the Belarusian legal entity associated with the WhiteBIT crypto exchange). Violation Type: Failure to comply with the requirements for Hi-Tech Park residency and the norms of Decree No. 8. While specific details are often not fully disclosed by HTP, such exclusions typically stem from operational deficiencies, non-compliance with AML/CFT standards, or failure to meet the requirements of the special legal regime. Penalty Amount: Loss of HTP residency (effectively, revocation of its operating license in Belarus). No specific monetary fine for the exclusion itself is usually reported. Outcome: WhiteBird LLC was excluded from the HTP. This led to WhiteBIT announcing the cessation of services for residents of Belarus as of March 2024.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and organized criminal groups operating unregistered crypto exchanges, engaging in investment fraud schemes involving crypto, or using crypto for money laundering. Violation Type: Illegal entrepreneurial activity (operating a crypto exchange without HTP registration), fraud, money laundering, theft of crypto assets. Penalty Amount: Varies greatly. These are criminal cases, leading to arrests, investigations, and potential imprisonment, confiscation of assets, and restitution orders. The "penalty amount" is not a fixed fine but relates to the scale of the illicit activity (e.g., millions of dollars laundered or stolen) and subsequent asset seizures. Outcome: Arrests, initiation of criminal proceedings, asset seizures (including crypto and traditional assets), and potential convictions with prison sentences.
• Outcome: Arrests, initiation of criminal proceedings, asset seizures (including crypto and traditional assets), and potential convictions with prison sentences.

Belgium

• Legal Basis: The Law of 18 September 2017 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and on the restriction of the use of cash. Specifically, Article 5, §1, 37° designates "providers of custodian wallets" as entities subject to AML/CFT obligations.

Benin

• Benin is a UEMOA/UMOA member and BCEAO is the common central bank and the banking/e-money/payments regulator. But BCEAO is not 'the primary financial regulator' across the board and does not issue directives: UEMOA directives and règlements are adopted by the Conseil des Ministres de l'UEMOA (BCEAO issues instructions, avis and circulaires), securities are regulated by AMF-UMOA (the former CREPMF, renamed 2022), and AML/CFT obligations bind through national transposition — for Benin, Loi n° 2024-01 du 20 février 2024, which transposes the UMOA Loi uniforme of 31 March 2023. AML supervision and STR receipt sit with CENTIF-Bénin.
• Developing Frameworks: Many African nations, including Benin, are still in the early stages of developing comprehensive regulatory frameworks specifically for cryptocurrencies. Enforcement often takes the form of general warnings or actions against broad financial fraud rather than specific crypto licensing violations.
• Limited Public Reporting: Unlike jurisdictions with mature financial markets (e.g., USA, EU), individual enforcement actions, especially those involving relatively smaller sums or entities, are often not widely publicized by regulators in Benin or the wider UEMOA region.
• Focus on Fraud: When actions occur, they are often initiated by law enforcement (police, judicial authorities) against individuals or groups involved in pyramid schemes or investment fraud using cryptocurrencies, rather than by a financial regulator against a crypto service provider for regulatory non-compliance.
• The BCEAO’s regulatory stance on crypto‑actifs in Benin has been updated; the earlier communiqué no longer reflects current enforcement deadlines.
• BCEAO's own published register of electronic-money issuers in the UMOA, situation au 28 février 2026, lists eight authorised arrangements for Benin — the Trésor Public du Bénin (prepaid card), three établissements de monnaie électronique (MTN Mobile Money Benin, Moov Money, ID Money Benin) and four bank/telecom partnerships (BESTCASH, CORIS-MONEY, and two CELTIS CASH arrangements). Not two. The claim is in any event unrelated to virtual assets: no crypto or VASP authorisation exists in Benin at all.
• Police or judicial actions against individuals for fraud or Ponzi schemes where cryptocurrency was the means rather than the specific regulatory violation.
• Formal legal enforcement against refusal of BCEAO banknotes and coins is now in place, superseding informal warnings.

Bermuda

• Regulator: Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA).
• Entity targeted: Bittrex Global (Bermuda) Ltd (Class F Full DABA licensee, ceased operations in 2024). Violation type: Non-compliance with DABA requirements, including segregation of digital assets in the "Andromeda Omnibus Wallet," Digital Asset Custody Code of Practice (2019), AML/ATF, KYC, and UN Sanctions protocols (identified via 2022 onsite inspections). Penalty amount: Not specified in sources.
• Date: BMA concerns raised in 2022 inspections; investigation appointed August 2023 under DABA section 61; Supreme Court ruling May 2025 (Lai and others v BMA); sanction application July 2025.
• Outcome: BMA appointed Teneo FA for investigation; company in liquidation with joint liquidators seeking court sanction for interim distribution to former customers (July 2025 ruling approved steps); UBOs/directors' legal challenge rejected by Supreme Court in May 2025.
• Fines up to US$250,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment for unlicensed digital asset business.
• Fines up to US$10,000,000 for DABA breaches or non-compliance with BMA directions.
• License revocation, public censure, prohibition orders, or court injunctions.
• Unlicensed digital asset business: Fine up to US$250,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment.
• Unauthorized digital asset issuance: Fine up to US$100,000, 5 years imprisonment, or both.
• Non-compliance with BMA directions: Fine up to US$2 million.
• AML/ATF violations (e.g., POCA Regulations): Up to 2 years imprisonment and/or US$750,000 fine; BMA civil penalty up to US$10 million per failure.
• Bittrex Global Limited (in liquidation) is a Bermuda entity currently subject to Bermuda Court of Appeal proceedings regarding customer crypto assets.

4 further Bermuda enforcement records

Bolivia

• Violation Type: Primarily fraud, pyramid scheme (estafa con promesa de rendimientos extraordinarios), illicit financial intermediation, and sometimes money laundering. Cryptocurrencies are often a tool used in these schemes to obscure transactions or give an appearance of legitimacy/innovation. Penalty Amount: Not applicable as a direct "penalty for crypto violation." Penalties are sought under existing criminal laws for fraud, which can include imprisonment and restitution to victims. Specific fines for the crypto aspect are not typically levied. Outcome: Arrests of perpetrators, freezing of assets (where possible), public warnings against these types of investments, and ongoing legal proceedings for fraud. The use of cryptocurrencies in these schemes often complicates asset recovery due to their decentralized nature.
• Outcome: Arrests of perpetrators, freezing of assets (where possible), public warnings against these types of investments, and ongoing legal proceedings for fraud. The use of cryptocurrencies in these schemes often complicates asset recovery due to their decentralized nature.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) (Državna agencija za istrage i zaštitu) - primary law enforcement agency.
• Federal Police Administration (FUP) (Federalna uprava policije) - law enforcement agency of the Federation of BiH.
• Prosecutor's Office of BiH (Tužilaštvo Bosne i Hercegovine) - leads the criminal prosecution.
• Support from international agencies (e.g., Europol, foreign law enforcement).
• Entity Targeted: An organized international criminal group. Violation Type: International drug trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering through cryptocurrencies. The use of encrypted applications (Sky ECC and Anom) and cryptocurrencies was central to their operations for communication and financial transactions.
• As this is an ongoing criminal investigation and prosecution, specific final "penalty amounts" (fines, sentences) are pending court decisions.
• Reports indicate seizures in the hundreds of kilograms of drugs and significant amounts of cash.
• Date: Operations and arrests occurred primarily in April and May 2023, with follow-up actions and indictments in subsequent months. The investigation had been ongoing prior to these public operations.
• Multiple arrests were made across BiH (and internationally in coordinated actions).
• Indictments were subsequently filed by the Prosecutor's Office of BiH against numerous individuals for organized crime, international drug trafficking, and money laundering.
• The operations aimed to dismantle a major international drug cartel with strong links to criminal groups in the region and beyond, relying heavily on modern communication and payment methods (crypto).
• The case highlights the growing use of cryptocurrencies by organized crime groups in BiH and the region for illicit financial flows, prompting law enforcement to adapt.

3 further Bosnia and Herzegovina enforcement records

Botswana

• NBFIRA publishes named public notices against virtual asset service providers in Botswana, comprising unlicensed-provider warnings against YellowOcta.com Trading Company on 13 September 2022, Berry Crypto Trading Platform on 12 December 2022 and FS Global Properties Limited Botswana on 13 March 2023, and a February 2026 notice revoking the licence of PAA Capital (Proprietary) Limited under section 15(b) of the Virtual Assets Act, 2025; none of these notices states a monetary penalty.
• Botswana's operative virtual-asset statute is the Virtual Assets Act, 2025 (Act No. 4 of 2025), which commenced on 24 January 2025 under the Virtual Assets Act (Date of Commencement) Order, 2025, S.I. No. 9 of 2025, and whose section 40 repeals the Virtual Assets Act, 2022 (Act No. 3 of 2022); section 9 prohibits unlicensed virtual asset business, section 11 governs the issue of licences, and NBFIRA is the Regulatory Authority exercising supervisory and enforcement powers under the Act.
• NBFIRA is the Regulatory Authority for virtual asset service providers under the Virtual Assets Act, 2025 (Act No. 4 of 2025), and it has issued named public warnings against unlicensed providers, including YellowOcta.com Trading Company on 13 September 2022, Berry Crypto Trading Platform on 12 December 2022 and FS Global Properties Limited Botswana on 13 March 2023, and it revoked PAA Capital (Proprietary) Limited's licence in February 2026 under section 15(b) of that Act.
• The Bank of Botswana declared on 10 November 2021 that crypto assets carry no backing by the state or the central bank as to legal tender status, transferability, exchange or value, and that the public has no recourse to the Bank for fraud, misconduct or losses arising from crypto-asset business; licensing and supervision of virtual asset service providers rest with NBFIRA under the Virtual Assets Act, 2025 (Act No. 4 of 2025), not with the Bank of Botswana.
• The Financial Intelligence Agency is Botswana's financial intelligence unit under the Financial Intelligence Act, 2022 (Act No. 2 of 2022), receiving suspicious transaction reports through the goAML platform within five working days and licensing nobody, while NBFIRA is the AML/CFT supervisory authority for virtual asset service providers; ESAAMLG's September 2025 follow-up report records that Botswana has not yet identified and assessed the money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks of virtual asset activities and VASPs, leaving Recommendation 15 rated partially compliant.
• Regulator Name: Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA)
• Entity Targeted: General public and unregistered virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Violation Type: Operating or engaging with unregistered virtual asset businesses, inherent risks of unregulated crypto activities (e.g., fraud, market volatility, money laundering). Penalty Amount: Not applicable (these are warnings, not enforcement actions against specific entities).
• Botswana's dated virtual-asset public statements are the Bank of Botswana press release of 10 November 2021, NBFIRA's licensing public notice of 20 June 2022, NBFIRA's named unlicensed-provider notices of 13 September 2022, 12 December 2022 and 13 March 2023, and NBFIRA's February 2026 revocation notice against PAA Capital (Proprietary) Limited; NBFIRA published no virtual-asset advisory in July 2021.
• Outcome: To educate the public about the risks of virtual assets and to caution against engaging with unregistered VASPs. It also served as a notice that a regulatory framework was being developed.
• NBFIRA Advisory on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (July 2021): https://www.nbfira.org.bw/news-media/media-releases/advisory-virtual-assets-and-virtual-asset-service-providers
• (While this specific advisory is from 2021, NBFIRA has maintained this stance and regularly reiterates similar warnings.)
• Regulator Name: Government of Botswana (led by the Ministry of Finance, with NBFIRA as the designated supervisor)

7 further Botswana enforcement records

Bulgaria

• Violation Type: Non-compliance with the Measures Against Money Laundering Act (MAMLA), specifically regarding VASP registration, customer due diligence (CDD), ongoing monitoring, suspicious transaction reporting (STR), record-keeping, internal control rules, etc. Outcome: Administrative fines, cessation of non-compliant activities, and potential criminal investigations in severe cases of money laundering.
• Outcome: Administrative fines, cessation of non-compliant activities, and potential criminal investigations in severe cases of money laundering.
• Legal Basis: EU sanctions are typically imposed through Council Decisions and implemented via Council Regulations. These Regulations are directly applicable in all EU Member States without the need for national transposition.

Burkina Faso

• Regional Regulatory Landscape: Burkina Faso is a member state of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA in French). The primary financial regulator for monetary policy and banking supervision in this region is the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).
• BCEAO's public position is confirmed as of July 2026 — Governor Jean-Claude Kassi Brou: 'Ce n'est pas une monnaie. Ce n'est pas réglementé. Donc soyez prudents' — and BCEAO has taken no entity-specific enforcement action in Burkina Faso. But 'not regulated' now needs qualification: since 30 December 2024, Loi n° 046-2024/ALT art. 58 makes it unlawful to carry on professional PSAV activity in Burkina Faso without prior agrément or autorisation, and PSAV are assujettis to the full AML/CFT regime (art. 3). What does not exist is an operational regime: no competent authority has been designated under art. 59, so no licence can actually be obtained. BCEAO created the C-CRYPTO drafting committee and held its international crypto-assets conference in Dakar on 8 May 2026; a framework is in preparation with no published timeline.
• Focus: The BCEAO's primary concern has been financial stability, money laundering, and consumer protection related to the unregulated nature of crypto assets. Their communications emphasize caution rather than actively pursuing enforcement against crypto service providers, likely due to a lack of a clear regulatory framework for such assets.
• Correct that Burkina Faso has no operational crypto framework — no licensing regime, no designated crypto regulator, no prudential or conduct rules — but no longer correct that crypto entities are undefined in national law. Loi n° 046-2024/ALT du 30 décembre 2024 defines 'actif virtuel' (art. 2 point 2) and 'prestataire de services d'actifs virtuels' (art. 2 point 51, expressly including custody), makes PSAV assujettis (art. 3), and by art. 58 prohibits professional PSAV activity without prior agrément or autorisation from the competent authority. Art. 59 defers all PSAV-specific requirements to that competent authority, which Burkina Faso has not designated — so a criminal/administrative prohibition exists on paper with no route to compliance and no supervisor to enforce it.
• Nature of Reported Incidents: Any incidents related to cryptocurrencies in Burkina Faso are more likely to be:
• Fraud or Ponzi Schemes: Individuals losing money to scams involving promises of high returns from crypto investments. These would fall under criminal investigations (by the police and judicial system) rather than regulatory enforcement by a financial authority against a crypto service provider. Details of such cases (if public) rarely include information about a specific "regulator," "penalty amount," or an "entity targeted" in the regulatory sense.
• General Warnings: As mentioned, public advisories from the BCEAO or national financial intelligence units (like the Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières - CENTIF in Burkina Faso) about the risks.
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)
• Botwana’s enforcement target is the general public and unregistered virtual asset service providers (VASPs)
• Violation Type: N/A (warnings, not enforcement) / Operating outside regulated financial system. Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Ongoing, but prominent warnings in recent years (e.g., 2020, 2021, 2022).
• Outcome: Increased public awareness of risks, but no direct enforcement on specific entities.

3 further Burkina Faso enforcement records

Burundi

• Emerging Regulatory Landscape: Many developing nations, including Burundi, are still in the early stages of establishing comprehensive regulatory frameworks for cryptocurrencies. The focus often remains on issuing warnings and advisories rather than direct, targeted enforcement actions against specific entities.
• Central Bank Stance: The primary financial regulator in Burundi is the Banque de la République du Burundi (BRB). Like many central banks in Africa, the BRB has generally adopted a cautious stance towards cryptocurrencies, often stating that they are not recognized as legal tender and advising citizens of the associated risks (volatility, scams, lack of consumer protection). These are regulatory statements but not enforcement actions against specific entities.
• Lack of Public Reporting: Even if smaller, localized enforcement actions against individuals or informal crypto operations have occurred (e.g., related to fraud or unlicensed financial activities), they are often not widely reported by international or even national news outlets, especially without significant financial or legal implications.
• Lower Adoption Rates & Market Size: Compared to larger economies, the scale of cryptocurrency adoption and the size of the local crypto market in Burundi are generally smaller, which can mean fewer instances that trigger high-profile enforcement.
• Regulatory bodies in Burundi are prepared to impose fines and suspend operations of non-compliant entities. Enforceable actions aim to deter fraud and maintain market stability. How a deeper US-Burundi partnership could unlock ...

Cabo Verde

• Primary Regulator: The Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV) is the central bank and the main authority responsible for overseeing financial institutions and monetary policy. It is also the most likely body to address issues related to virtual assets and cryptocurrencies from a financial stability and consumer protection perspective.
• Regulator: Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV)
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions. Violation Type: Prevention of illegal financial activities, consumer protection against risks associated with unregulated virtual assets, general warnings against the use of cryptocurrencies due to their volatility, lack of regulation, and potential for fraud/money laundering. Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as these are warnings, not specific enforcement actions against an entity.
• Date: Multiple instances, typically over the past few years. A significant warning was issued in late 2021/early 2022 and reiterated since.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness, deterring regulated financial institutions from dealing directly with unregulated crypto assets. The BCV has consistently advised caution.
• For general regulatory updates and warnings, one would typically refer to the official publications section of the BCV website. However, specific enforcement case details are not usually published there for general warnings.
• A common approach from central banks in developing economies is to issue warnings via local press. For example, local news outlets often report on BCV warnings:
• Example of a local news report referencing a BCV warning: While not a direct BCV press release, a source like this indicates ongoing vigilance: https://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2021-12-07-Banco-de-Cabo-Verde-alerta-para-os-riscos-das-criptomoedas-e-aconselha-cuidado- (Dated Dec 7, 2021, Portuguese) - This report indicates BCV's warning about risks. (2021-12-07)
• Issuing warnings to the public about the risks of unregulated virtual assets.
• Developing a regulatory framework for virtual assets, which is a process that typically precedes widespread enforcement.
• Any cases of fraud involving cryptocurrencies would likely be handled under general criminal law by the police and judicial system, rather than specific crypto-related enforcement by a financial regulator, especially if dedicated virtual asset laws are still nascent. These types of criminal cases are often not widely reported internationally with the specific details requested.

Cambodia

• Reiteration of the existing ban and public warnings.
• General law enforcement actions against fraud or illegal activities that might involve cryptocurrencies, rather than specific regulatory actions for crypto-specific violations.
• Regulator Name: National Bank of Cambodia (NBC), Securities and Exchange Regulator of Cambodia (SERC), General-Commissariat of National Police (jointly issued original ban).
• Entity Targeted: The general public, unauthorized individuals/entities attempting to circulate, trade, or develop cryptocurrencies. Violation Type: Circulating, trading, mining, or using unauthorized virtual currencies, which are not recognized as legal tender or financial products in Cambodia. Penalty Amount: Not applicable for public warnings. Criminal penalties would apply for engaging in illegal financial activities or fraud.
• Date: The original ban was issued in 2018/2019. Warnings have been continuously reiterated, including within the last three years.
• Example of recent reinforcement (2022): The NBC Governor reinforced the ban and warned against the risks of digital assets in various forums.
• Example of ongoing concern (2023-2024): Cambodian authorities continue to monitor and warn against the use of unauthorized digital assets, often linking it to broader financial stability and anti-money laundering efforts.
• Outcome: Continued public awareness campaigns and maintenance of the ban, aiming to prevent the adoption and use of cryptocurrencies in the country.
• Phnom Penh Post article referencing the joint statement: https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/cambodia-bans-use-trading-cryptocurrency (While 2018, it's the foundational policy still in effect.)
• Khmer Times article quoting NBC officials on crypto risks: https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501062089/nbc-warns-people-of-potential-risks-of-digital-currencies/ (Published Aug 2022)
• ACAMS Today article discussing Cambodia's FATF actions and virtual assets: https://www.acamstoday.org/cambodias-fatf-grey-list-exit/ (Published Dec 2023 – highlights continued monitoring of virtual assets as part of AML/CFT efforts, implying continued enforcement of existing prohibitions rather than new regulatory frameworks.)

Cameroon

• Il n'existe aucune interdiction générale des crypto-actifs en zone CEMAC et la BEAC n'a émis aucun texte d'interdiction. La mesure de 2022 est la Décision COBAC D-2022/071 du 6 mai 2022, prise par la COBAC (superviseur bancaire), qui interdit aux seuls établissements assujettis à la COBAC de détenir, utiliser, échanger ou convertir des cryptoactifs pour compte propre ou pour compte de clients, de les comptabiliser au bilan, et leur impose un dispositif de détection et une remontée d'information à la COBAC et à la BEAC. Les personnes physiques et les entreprises non assujetties ne sont pas visées. À l'inverse, le Règlement n° 01/22/CEMAC/UMAC/CM du 21 juillet 2022 (en vigueur le 1er août 2022) admet les 'actifs numériques' et 'jetons numériques' sur le marché financier d'Afrique centrale et soumet les prestataires de services sur actifs numériques à l'agrément de la COSUMAF.
• Enforcement against crypto-related Ponzi schemes/fraudulent operations.
• Regulator Name: Bank of Central African States (BEAC - Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale), the central bank for the CEMAC region (which includes Cameroon).
• Un cadre communautaire existe bel et bien et s'applique au Cameroun : le Règlement n° 01/22/CEMAC/UMAC/CM du 21 juillet 2022 et le Règlement Général de la COSUMAF du 23 mai 2023 soumettent les prestataires de services sur actifs numériques (PSAN) à l'agrément de la COSUMAF ; la Décision COBAC D-2022/071 du 6 mai 2022 interdit les cryptoactifs aux établissements assujettis à la COBAC ; le Règlement n° 02/24/CEMAC/UMAC/CM du 20 décembre 2024 fait des prestataires de services d'actifs virtuels des assujettis LBC/FT (art. 6) et exige un agrément préalable de l'autorité compétente de l'État membre (art. 42). En revanche, aucun agrément PSAN n'a été délivré et les instructions d'application de la COSUMAF n'ont pas été publiées, de sorte que le marché demeure de fait non supervisé. Il n'existe aucun texte national camerounais spécifique aux crypto-actifs.
• Il est exact qu'aucune interdiction générale des crypto-actifs n'est appliquée au Cameroun — mais parce qu'aucune n'a jamais été édictée, et non parce qu'une interdiction antérieure serait tombée en désuétude. La Décision COBAC D-2022/071 du 6 mai 2022 ne visait que les établissements assujettis à la COBAC et reste en vigueur pour eux ; l'usage des cryptoactifs par le public n'a jamais été prohibé, le gouverneur de la BEAC s'étant borné à déconseiller l'investissement (nov. 2022).
• La Décision COBAC D-2022/071 n'assortit pas elle-même la violation d'un montant, mais les sanctions ne relèvent pas des seuls tribunaux nationaux ou d'une 'police financière' : la COBAC dispose du pouvoir disciplinaire propre sur les établissements assujettis (avertissement, blâme, interdiction d'activités, suspension ou révocation des dirigeants, retrait d'agrément). Sur le volet LBC/FT, le Règlement n° 02/24/CEMAC/UMAC/CM confie le contrôle aux 'autorités de contrôle' (art. 11) — COBAC et COSUMAF — l'ANIF n'ayant aucun pouvoir de sanction.
• Date: May 6, 2022 (2022-05-06)
• Aucune prohibition générale des activités liées aux crypto-actifs n'a été établie en zone CEMAC. L'exploitation d'une plateforme d'échange n'est pas 'hautement illégale' : elle constitue au contraire un service sur actifs numériques soumis à l'agrément de la COSUMAF depuis le Règlement n° 01/22/CEMAC/UMAC/CM du 21 juillet 2022 et le Règlement Général COSUMAF du 23 mai 2023. Le minage n'est visé par aucun texte CEMAC. Seuls les établissements assujettis à la COBAC sont soumis à une interdiction, en vertu de la Décision COBAC D-2022/071.
• Reuters Article: https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/cemac-central-bank-bans-crypto-assets-2022-05-09/ (2022-05-09)
• IMF Report mentioning the circular: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/10/05/pr22336-imf-executive-board-concludes-2022-article-iv-consultation-with-cemac (See section on policy recommendations and risks).
• Les poursuites relèvent effectivement de la justice camerounaise (Procureur de la République, tribunaux) et de la police judiciaire, mais la police nationale camerounaise est la Délégation Générale à la Sûreté Nationale (DGSN) — il n'existe pas de 'Direction Générale de la Police Nationale' au Cameroun. L'ANIF n'est pas une autorité de poursuite ni de contrôle : elle reçoit et analyse les déclarations de soupçon et transmet ses rapports au Procureur de la République (décret n° 2005/187 ; art. 105 du Règlement n° 02/24). Enfin la Décision COBAC D-2022/071 ne fournit aucune base d'illégalité opposable à des non-assujettis.
• Le fondateur de Global Investment Trading (GIT), promoteur de la plateforme Liyeplimal, est Émile Parfait SIMB — et non 'Emile Parfait Mbori', qui n'existe pas. Le jeton était le Limo / Limo dollar (commercialisé aussi sous le nom LimoCoin) — et non un 'Mofor Coin'. Les faits reprochés sont l'escroquerie et la collecte illégale de fonds : le MINFI avait mis en demeure GIT, parmi 17 entités, de cesser ses collectes illégales de fonds (communiqué d'octobre 2020) et la COSUMAF avait publié des mises en garde en octobre 2020 et juin 2021 pour exercice sans agrément.

7 further Cameroon enforcement records

Canada

• Ongoing Focus on Unregistered Platforms: Securities regulators continue to target platforms operating in Canada without registration. This often results in cease trading orders, financial penalties, and requirements for platforms to either register or exit the Canadian market.
• Many international crypto trading platforms that previously operated without registration have entered into pre-registration undertakings (PRUs) with provincial commissions, which are formal agreements required to continue operating while pursuing registration, rather than post-hoc settlements for past non-compliance.
• The Canadian government has ordered Hikvision to cease operations for Canadian residents unless it registers, but this is a company-specific regulatory action, not a general rule for all Canadian residents.
• Providing investor compensation or making payments for regulatory costs.
• There is no registration process required for automakers to enter or re-enter the Canadian market under the current Canada-China EV agreement, which allows direct shipments of Chinese EVs under a new tariff regime.
• Bybit: In March 2023, the OSC reached a settlement with Bybit, requiring the platform to pay $2,468,982 and provide an undertaking that it would not operate in Ontario without registration.
• KuCoin: In June 2022, the OSC obtained orders against KuCoin (Mechbit Technology Ltd.) permanently banning it from participating in Ontario's capital markets and requiring it to pay an administrative penalty of $1,650,000 and $99,754 for costs.
• Binance: Following a pattern of non-compliance, Binance entered into an undertaking with the OSC in December 2022 to cease all operations in Ontario. Later, in May 2023, the AMF imposed an administrative monetary penalty of $2.25 million on Binance for operating an unregistered platform and offered non-compliant derivatives in Quebec.

Cayman Islands

• Court-supervised liquidations (April 3, 2025): Cayman Grand Court ordered supervised liquidations of AXIA Network Foundation (ANF) and ANF MergeCo Ltd (crypto entities in the failed Axia Group) for efficacy in stakeholder interests; no regulatory penalty specified. (2025-04-03)
• General CIMA fines trend: Increase in administrative fines post-2022 amendments, e.g., September 2025 fines on Blacktower entities for AMLR breaches (non-crypto), and a prior KYD4M+ fine in 2021 (pre-2023).
• Freezing assets and reporting relationships or transactions involving designated persons/entities to the Cayman Islands Financial Reporting Authority (FRA), per the Terrorism Act (2018 Revision) and Proliferation Financing (Prohibition) Act (2017 Revision).
• Implementing sanctions screening policies under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (2020 Revision) for entities conducting "relevant financial business," including checks against UK/Cayman lists (not just EU/UN/OFAC).
• CIMA advises FSPs (including VASPs) to note OFAC's extraterritorial reach due to global USD/crypto transaction risks, though not legally binding locally; no crypto-specific exemptions apply under international regimes.
• EU/UN compliance is indirect via UK implementation; UNSCRs on terrorism/proliferation are enforced without delay.
• All Cayman persons/entities (including VASPs) must screen customers, counterparties, and transactions against applicable lists: UK sanctions (mirroring pre-Brexit EU/standalone UK regimes + UN), plus Cayman autonomous terrorist lists under Terrorism Law (2018 Revision), Proliferation Financing (Prohibition) Law (2017 Revision), and Proceeds of Crime Law (2020 Revision).
• Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions (FRA): Details reporting/freezing duties; available via CIMA/FRA resources linked at https://www.cima.ky/sanctions-overview.
• Applies to any person in Cayman Islands, Cayman-registered entities/ships/aircraft, or Cayman-resident British nationals abroad.
• No standalone Cayman crypto list; relies on CIMA's published consolidated list of UK-extended Orders: https://www.cima.ky/sanctions-overview.
• Autonomous additions via local terrorism/proliferation laws (no crypto carve-outs).
• OFAC crypto designations (e.g., SUEX exchange, Blender mixer) are not binding but recommended for screening due to secondary risks: https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information and https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov.

1 further Cayman Islands enforcement records

Central African Republic

• BEAC is the central bank of the six CEMAC states and the Central African Republic is a member, and BEAC has issued no virtual-asset instrument of its own; COSUMAF is the designated competent authority for digital asset service providers in CEMAC, COBAC bars supervised credit, microfinance and payment institutions from acquiring, holding, transferring or converting crypto-assets under Décision COBAC D-2022/071 of 6 May 2022, and the Central African Republic's financial intelligence unit is an ANIF.
• BEAC and COBAC directed their April and May 2022 response at the Central African Republic's Loi n° 22.004 du 22 avril 2022 régissant la cryptomonnaie, and the Republic repealed that law's legal-tender and guaranteed-convertibility provisions in March 2023 as a prior action for its IMF Extended Credit Facility.
• The Central African Republic faces downside financing risks related to BEAC and has previously shown practices challenging regional monetary policy uniformity, suggesting potential for financial instability risks. While robust Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) legal frameworks were noted in 2006, the provided evidence does not directly confirm that BEAC specifically argued a CAR law violated CEMAC conventions concerning unified monetary policy.
• No fine was imposed on the Central African Republic; the operative regional measure was Décision COBAC D-2022/071 du 6 mai 2022, which bars COBAC-supervised credit institutions, microfinance establishments, payment institutions and bureaux de change from acquiring, holding, exchanging, converting or booking crypto-assets and requires them to report detected crypto operations to COBAC and BEAC.
• BEAC convened a working group on 29 April 2022, one week after Loi n° 22.004 was promulgated, and COBAC adopted Décision D-2022/071 on 6 May 2022 barring supervised institutions from crypto-asset activity.
• The Central African Republic's National Assembly adopted a revised cryptocurrency law on 23 March 2023 that removed bitcoin's legal-tender status and turned the duty to accept crypto into a freedom to accept it, and IMF Country Report No. 23/155 records repeal of the legal-tender and guaranteed-convertibility provisions of Loi n° 22.004 as a met prior action.
• The International Monetary Fund holds no regulatory authority over the Central African Republic and acted through programme conditionality, making repeal of the crypto legal-tender and convertibility provisions a prior action for the 38-month Extended Credit Facility arrangement.
• IMF Country Report No. 23/155 of May 2023 records macro-fiscal, financial-stability and integrity risks from the April 2022 crypto legislation and from project Sango, holds that the legal-tender grant violated BEAC's exclusive right of issue in the monetary union, and conditions the 38-month Extended Credit Facility on repeal of the legal-tender and convertibility provisions.
• The IMF's published assessment of the Central African Republic's crypto policy is Country Report No. 23/155 of May 2023, covering the 2023 Article IV consultation and the Extended Credit Facility request, and it records that all three prior actions, including the crypto repeal, were met.
• Sango coin sold roughly 10 percent of its 210 million token target for under 2 million euros, its website went offline until April 2025, and the Central African Republic pivoted to the Solana-based $CAR memecoin launched on 9 February 2025, which lost more than 75 percent of its value within days.
• IMF (Press Release / Staff Statement): https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/07/26/pr22262-car-imf-staff-concludes-2022-article-iv-consultation (See paragraphs on crypto risks)
• Reuters (reporting on IMF stance): https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/imf-urges-central-african-republic-reconsider-bitcoin-law-2022-05-24/ (2022-05-24)

1 further Central African Republic enforcement records

Chad

• The CEMAC crypto measure of 6 May 2022 is Décision COBAC D-2022/071, taken by the Commission Bancaire de l'Afrique Centrale and not by BEAC, and it binds only COBAC-supervised institutions — banks, financial establishments, microfinance institutions, payment institutions and bureaux de change — barring them from acquiring, holding, transferring, converting or booking crypto-assets and requiring them to detect such operations and report them to COBAC and BEAC. It creates no offence for the Chadian public, so holding, trading, exchanging and mining crypto-assets are not criminalised in Chad; since 20 December 2024 virtual-asset service providers are AML/CFT assujettis under article 6(e) of Règlement n° 02/24/CEMAC/UMAC/CM.
• Legal Basis: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions are binding on all UN member states, including Chad. Chad is required to implement these resolutions into its national law. UN sanctions typically target specific individuals, entities, and groups involved in terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or specific conflict zones.
• Legal Basis: OFAC administers and enforces U.S. economic and trade sanctions programs primarily against countries and groups of individuals, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers. OFAC sanctions have extraterritorial reach, meaning they can apply to non-U.S. persons if their activities involve a "U.S. nexus" (e.g., using U.S. dollar clearing, U.S.-based technology, or engaging with U.S. persons).
• Legal Basis: The European Union implements its own autonomous sanctions regimes, often complementing UN sanctions, and has extraterritorial reach for EU persons and entities. EU sanctions are typically imposed through Council Decisions and Regulations.

Chile

• Entity Targeted: Individuals associated with "Mind Capital" in Chile, notably promoters and recruiters of the scheme. Violation Type: Alleged multi-level marketing scheme, fraud (estafa), swindling, and illegal banking activities, using cryptocurrencies as a facade. Outcome: Criminal proceedings are ongoing against several individuals involved in promoting and operating the scheme within Chile. The goal is to prosecute those responsible and recover funds for victims.
• Entity Targeted: Chilean individuals and entities linked to the international "Generación Zoe" and "IM Forex" schemes. Violation Type: Alleged pyramid scheme, fraud (estafa), swindling, and illegal financial operations, misleading investors with promises of high, guaranteed returns using crypto as an investment vehicle. Penalty Amount: Criminal charges have been filed, leading to arrests and asset seizures. Specific penalties (prison sentences, restitution) are pending final judicial decisions. Outcome: Several individuals have been arrested and charged in Chile for their roles in promoting and operating the scheme. The primary operator of Generación Zoe, Leonardo Cositorto, was arrested in Argentina and is facing charges there. Chilean authorities continue to investigate and prosecute local affiliates. Penalty Amount: No direct penalties attached to a warning. Penalties would come from future enforcement actions under the new FinTech Law, once fully implemented. Outcome: Increased public awareness about crypto risks. The FinTech Law now requires Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) to register with the CMF and comply with various regulations (e.g., AML/CFT, consumer protection). This will enable direct regulatory enforcement actions in the future against non-compliant entities.
• Outcome: Criminal proceedings are ongoing against several individuals involved in promoting and operating the scheme within Chile. The goal is to prosecute those responsible and recover funds for victims.
• Outcome: Several individuals have been arrested and charged in Chile for their roles in promoting and operating the scheme. The primary operator of Generación Zoe, Leonardo Cositorto, was arrested in Argentina and is facing charges there. Chilean authorities continue to investigate and prosecute local affiliates.
• Warnings in Chile target the general public and unregistered crypto platforms; they are currently preventative with no direct penalties, but future enforcement under the FinTech Law may impose sanctions.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness about crypto risks. The FinTech Law now requires Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) to register with the CMF and comply with various regulations (e.g., AML/CFT, consumer protection). This will enable direct regulatory enforcement actions in the future against non-compliant entities.

Colombia

• Entity Targeted: OmegaPro Group (an international alleged Ponzi scheme), its local promoters, influencers, and related entities operating in Colombia (e.g., Bux Corp, Smart Business Corp). Violation Type: Unregistered and unauthorized financial intermediation, operating a multi-level marketing scheme that promised high returns without proper backing, misleading advertising, consumer fraud, and alleged pyramid scheme. Outcome: SIC ordered the cessation of all promotion and operations of OmegaPro-related schemes in Colombia, imposed significant fines, and mandated restitution to affected consumers. The Fiscalía has pursued criminal charges, leading to arrests of key promoters and the freezing of assets. Many victims have lost significant sums, and the full extent of recovery is uncertain.
• Entity Targeted: Daily Cop S.A.S. and its founders/promoters (e.g., Camilo Andrés Suárez Aldana, David Mateo Suárez Aldana). Violation Type: Alleged pyramid scheme, unauthorized and illegal financial intermediation using cryptocurrencies as a front, offering unrealistic returns, consumer fraud. Outcome: SIC issued a definitive resolution ordering the immediate cessation of Daily Cop's activities, imposing fines, and requiring restitution. The Fiscalía subsequently arrested key figures behind the scheme and initiated criminal proceedings, uncovering millions of dollars in alleged fraud.
• Entity Targeted: Local promoters and affiliates of the international Generación Zoe scheme operating in Colombia. Violation Type: Alleged illegal financial intermediation, fraud, and operating a Ponzi/pyramid scheme under the guise of coaching and crypto investments. Penalty Amount: Arrests and criminal charges against Colombian operators. Assets linked to the scheme were seized. Outcome: Colombian authorities, working with international counterparts, arrested individuals linked to Generación Zoe's operations in the country. Criminal proceedings are ongoing for charges related to aggravated fraud and illegal financial intermediation. Outcome: Provided valuable insights for future regulation, demonstrating a willingness by the SFC to study and understand crypto operations under controlled conditions.
• Outcome: SIC ordered the cessation of all promotion and operations of OmegaPro-related schemes in Colombia, imposed significant fines, and mandated restitution to affected consumers. The Fiscalía has pursued criminal charges, leading to arrests of key promoters and the freezing of assets. Many victims have lost significant sums, and the full extent of recovery is uncertain.
• Outcome: SIC issued a definitive resolution ordering the immediate cessation of Daily Cop's activities, imposing fines, and requiring restitution. The Fiscalía subsequently arrested key figures behind the scheme and initiated criminal proceedings, uncovering millions of dollars in alleged fraud.
• Outcome: Colombian authorities, working with international counterparts, arrested individuals linked to Generación Zoe's operations in the country. Criminal proceedings are ongoing for charges related to aggravated fraud and illegal financial intermediation.
• Outcome: Provided valuable insights for future regulation, demonstrating a willingness by the SFC to study and understand crypto operations under controlled conditions.

Comoros

• Developing Regulatory Landscape: Comoros is a small, developing island nation. Its financial regulatory framework is still maturing, and specific legislation or dedicated enforcement mechanisms for complex digital assets like cryptocurrencies are likely not yet robust or fully established.
• Focus on Warnings, Not Enforcement: Like many emerging economies, the primary approach of its financial regulator (the Central Bank of Comoros – Banque Centrale des Comores, BCC) regarding cryptocurrencies has typically been to issue general warnings to the public about the risks associated with volatile and unregulated assets, rather than to conduct formal enforcement actions against specific entities. Such warnings are often generic and do not name specific actors or impose penalties.
• Lack of Transparency/Public Disclosure: Even if minor enforcement actions or investigations were to occur, they are unlikely to be publicly disclosed with the level of detail requested (penalty amounts, specific dates, outcomes, public reports) in a country with less developed financial transparency standards compared to major global financial hubs.
• Limited Scale of Crypto Activity: It's also possible that the scale of cryptocurrency operations or significant violations within Comoros has not yet reached a level that would trigger major, publicly reported enforcement actions.

Costa Rica

• Regulator Name: Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF)
• The targeted entities under Costa Rica's enforcement framework are now specifically regulated financial institutions and registered Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), rather than the general public or anyone implicitly operating with virtual assets.
• Violation Type: N/A (This is a regulatory clarification, not an enforcement action for a violation). However, financial institutions are warned about the risks of dealing with unregulated entities or engaging in unregulated activities. Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Ongoing, with several specific real-world developments and escalating crises (e.g., political clashes, alignment with Trump, structural violence) rather than general communiques.
• September 2021: SUGEF Circular SGF-0036-2021 reiterates that virtual assets are not legal tender and are not regulated by SUGEF unless they fall under existing regulated activities.
• January 2022: SUGEF continues to issue warnings regarding the risks of virtual assets.
• Outcome: SUGEF maintains that virtual assets are not regulated financial products or services under its supervision. Financial institutions are advised to exercise extreme caution when dealing with virtual assets and to ensure compliance with existing AML/CFT regulations if handling any related transactions. This means that if a bank facilitates transactions involving crypto, it must still comply with its existing AML obligations.
• SUGEF Official Website (communiques are often published here, though direct links to specific circulars can be hard to maintain as websites update): https://www.sugef.fi.cr/
• News reports often cover SUGEF's stance. For instance, see articles from reputable Costa Rican financial news outlets discussing these circulars: https://www.elfinancierocr.com/ (You would typically search for "SUGEF criptomonedas" on such sites for specific articles around the mentioned dates).
• Regulator Name: Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR)
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial system. Violation Type: N/A (Warnings about risks, not enforcement).
• Date: Ongoing, with official statements reinforcing the stance.

13 further Costa Rica enforcement records

Cote d'Ivoire

• Entity Targeted: General public and financial institutions operating within the UEMOA zone (including Côte d'Ivoire). Violation Type: While not a "violation" in the traditional sense, the BCEAO's consistent stance warns against the use, holding, or facilitation of transactions involving cryptocurrencies, emphasizing their speculative nature, lack of regulatory oversight, and potential for fraud and money laundering. It effectively "enforces" a non-recognition policy. Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as this is a general regulatory stance and warning, not a specific penalty against an entity. Outcome: A clear declaration that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, are not regulated, and pose significant risks. Financial institutions are generally dissuaded from engaging with them. This discourages formal crypto operations.
• Outcome: A clear declaration that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, are not regulated, and pose significant risks. Financial institutions are generally dissuaded from engaging with them. This discourages formal crypto operations.

Cuba

• Lack of Transparency: The Cuban government is not known for its transparency regarding internal enforcement actions, especially against individuals or smaller, private entities.
• Focus on Regulation: Cuba's primary public actions concerning crypto have been the creation of a legal framework to regulate virtual assets, aiming to harness them for economic benefit (e.g., bypassing US sanctions, facilitating remittances) while simultaneously controlling their use to prevent illicit activities and maintain state oversight.
• Nature of the Economy: In a state-controlled economy, significant independent financial operations (like an unregistered crypto exchange) would likely be shut down or absorbed without a public trial or detailed announcement.
• Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) holds expanded enforcement powers, including unilateral authority to freeze bank accounts without notice and suspend Visa and Mastercard transactions.
• Entity Targeted: Not a specific entity. This legislation targets all individuals and legal entities operating with virtual assets in Cuba. It mandates that virtual asset service providers (VASPs) must obtain a license from the BCC. Violation Type: Not applicable as a specific enforcement action. However, the law defines that operating a virtual asset service without a license, or engaging in activities deemed illicit by the BCC, would constitute a violation. Penalty Amount: Not applicable for the decree itself. The decree establishes the legal basis for future penalties for non-compliance, which could range from fines to imprisonment, depending on the severity of the violation as outlined in Cuba's criminal code.
• Decree-Law 215/2021: Published in the Official Gazette on August 16, 2021, coming into effect 90 days later. (2021-08-16)
• Resolution 215/2021 (BCC): Published on September 2, 2021, detailing the licensing requirements and regulatory framework. (2021-09-02)
• Outcome: Legalization and regulation of virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) under the oversight of the Central Bank of Cuba. The framework aims to promote economic development, facilitate remittances, and circumvent financial sanctions, while simultaneously seeking to prevent illicit activities, money laundering, and terrorist financing.
• Cuban Official Gazette (Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba) - Decree-Law 215/2021: While the direct link to the specific issue might fluctuate, this is where it was published. You can usually find it by searching "Gaceta Oficial Cuba Decreto Ley 215/2021."

Cyprus

• Entity Targeted: eToro (Europe) Ltd (a major global trading platform also offering crypto services). Violation Type: Non-compliance with regulatory requirements related to organizational requirements, safeguarding clients' funds, and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). This included deficiencies in operational risk management, internal controls, and measures taken to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Outcome: Imposition of an administrative fine. eToro (Europe) Ltd stated it has taken corrective measures.
• Entity Targeted: Bitpanda GmbH (a well-known European digital investment platform operating as a registered VASP in Cyprus). Violation Type: Non-compliance with the AML/CFT Law, specifically regarding internal controls and measures for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and deficiencies in customer due diligence procedures. Outcome: Imposition of an administrative fine. Bitpanda GmbH took corrective measures.
• Outcome: Imposition of an administrative fine. eToro (Europe) Ltd stated it has taken corrective measures.

Czech Republic

• Entity Targeted: Alexander Vinnik (primary alleged operator of BTC-e/WEX), and associated individuals/entities involved in money laundering. Violation Type: Operating an unlicensed money transmission business, money laundering (estimated billions of dollars), and wire fraud using Bitcoin. Outcome: Disruption of a major global cryptocurrency-based money laundering operation. Seizure of significant assets. Conviction and ongoing prosecution of key individuals.
• Entity Targeted: Various obliged entities, including (but not limited to) payment institutions, banks, and potentially smaller crypto service providers. Specific names and detailed violations for smaller crypto firms are not always publicly disclosed unless the fine is exceptionally large or the case is particularly egregious. Violation Type: Failure to comply with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) obligations (e.g., insufficient customer due diligence, inadequate risk assessment, failure to report suspicious transactions). Penalty Amount: Varies significantly depending on the severity and scale of the violation. Fines can range from tens of thousands CZK to millions CZK. FAÚ annually publishes statistics on fines but not always specific details for each entity unless it's a high-profile case. Outcome: Improved AML compliance among obliged entities, deterrence of future violations.
• Entity Targeted: Companies or platforms operating without the required licenses (e.g., for payment services, investment services) in the Czech Republic, or those promoting fraudulent schemes. These are often foreign entities without a Czech presence or clear regulatory status. Violation Type: Offering financial services (which the ČNB deems to include certain crypto-related activities) without proper authorization/license, or promoting questionable investment schemes. Penalty Amount: No direct financial penalty from the warning itself, but it can lead to further investigation by other authorities or legal action if unauthorized activity continues. Outcome: Public awareness, potential cessation of unauthorized activities, groundwork for further regulatory or criminal action if ignored.
• Legal Basis: Act No. 253/2008 Coll., on Selected Measures Against Legitimisation of Proceeds of Crime and Financing of Terrorism (AML Act).
• Outcome: Disruption of a major global cryptocurrency-based money laundering operation. Seizure of significant assets. Conviction and ongoing prosecution of key individuals.
• Outcome: Improved AML compliance among obliged entities, deterrence of future violations.
• Outcome: Public awareness, potential cessation of unauthorized activities, groundwork for further regulatory or criminal action if ignored.
• The FSA has the authority to impose fines and suspend licenses for non-compliance with regulatory requirements related to digital asset securities. Recent enforcement actions have targeted issuers failing to meet transparency obligations. Basic Information | Ministry of Finance CR

Democratic Republic of the Congo

• Regulator Name: Banque Centrale du Congo (BCC)
• Entity Targeted: General Public, financial institutions (indirectly). Violation Type: N/A (This was a public warning, not an enforcement action against a specific violator.) The warning addressed the risks of using unregulated financial instruments like cryptocurrencies and clarified that they are not legal tender in the DRC. Penalty Amount: N/A.
• The Banque Centrale du Congo's public crypto warnings are its avis au public dated 9 November 2018 against the illegal collection of public savings through a purported cryptocurrency, and its communiqué of 7 July 2020 stating that crypto-assets are neither regulated nor authorised to operate in the DRC; the BCC's own avis index records no June 2021 warning.
• Outcome: To inform the public of the risks and to clarify that cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender, aiming to deter their use within the formal financial system. The outcome is public awareness rather than a specific legal penalty.
• Reuters Article citing the BCC's warning: https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/democratic-republic-congo-central-bank-warns-over-cryptocurrency-use-2021-06-16/ (2021-06-16)
• Article on African Business citing the BCC's stance: https://african.business/2021/07/technology-innovation/central-bank-of-congo-sounds-alarm-on-cryptocurrencies/

Denmark

• E-money Tokens (EMTs): Crypto-assets that aim to maintain a stable value by referencing the value of one official currency (e.g., a EUR-pegged stablecoin).
• Asset-Referenced Tokens (ARTs): Crypto-assets that aim to maintain a stable value by referencing any other value or right, or a combination thereof, including one or more official currencies, commodities, or other crypto-assets (e.g., a stablecoin referencing a basket of currencies or gold).
• Titles III (ARTs) and IV (EMTs) of MiCA apply from June 30, 2024. (2024-06-30)
• The remaining provisions of MiCA apply from December 30, 2024. (2024-12-30)
• EMTs are explicitly classified as a specific type of crypto-asset within MiCA, but their issuance is restricted to entities already authorized as credit institutions or e-money institutions under the E-Money Directive 2009/110/EC (EMD2). MiCA effectively extends and adapts EMD2 rules for EMTs.
• ARTs are a distinct category under MiCA.
• Securities: Stablecoins that qualify as financial instruments (securities) under MiFID II are excluded from MiCA's scope and remain subject to existing securities legislation. However, most common stablecoin designs are unlikely to meet the definition of a transferable security under MiFID II.
• Algorithmic Stablecoins (without robust reserves): MiCA effectively prohibits purely algorithmic stablecoins that do not maintain a stable value through reserves (see section 5 below).
• Issuers must ensure a 1:1 backing for all outstanding EMTs in the official currency they reference.
• The reserve assets must be held in segregated accounts with credit institutions.
• They must be invested only in highly liquid, low-risk assets and in a manner that ensures stability and sufficient liquidity.
• Reference: MiCA, Articles 32-35.

33 further Denmark enforcement records

Djibouti

• Regulator: The primary financial regulator in Djibouti is the Banque Centrale de Djibouti (BCD) (Central Bank of Djibouti).
• Regulatory Stance: The BCD has generally focused on issuing warnings about the risks associated with unregulated financial activities, but these are broad advisories rather than specific enforcement actions against crypto firms or individuals.
• Absence of Specific Laws: As of my last update, Djibouti lacks a dedicated legal and regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies. This means there are no specific crypto laws to enforce.
• Limited Crypto Adoption: The overall adoption and usage of cryptocurrencies in Djibouti are relatively low compared to more developed economies.
• Regulatory Focus: The BCD's regulatory priorities may be focused on traditional financial sectors and broader financial stability, rather than active enforcement in an unregulated crypto space.
• Lack of Public Reporting: Even if smaller, general financial crime investigations indirectly involved crypto, they are typically not publicly reported as "cryptocurrency enforcement actions" unless specific crypto regulations were violated.
• Global Legal Insights - Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation 2024 (Djibouti Chapter):
• This resource often provides a good overview of the legal status of cryptocurrencies in various countries. For Djibouti, it typically indicates a lack of specific regulation.
• While a direct link to the 2024 chapter for Djibouti might require a subscription or specific search, you can usually find this information by searching "Global Legal Insights Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation Djibouti". An older version indicating similar status: Global Legal Insights 2022 - Djibouti (page 139 for context) (Note: While 2022, the regulatory status for smaller nations often doesn't change rapidly without specific announcements.)
• Law Firm Analyses (e.g., DLA Piper, Baker McKenzie, etc. if they cover Africa):
• Major law firms often publish summaries of crypto regulations across jurisdictions. Their analyses for Djibouti consistently highlight the absence of a specific framework.
• Example of a general resource often citing lack of regulation in many African countries: Africa Blockchain Report (While not specific to Djibouti, it generally categorizes countries without specific laws.)

Dominica

• Regulator Name: Financial Services Unit (FSU)
• Role: The FSU is Dominica's primary regulator for non-bank financial institutions. It is responsible for licensing, supervising, and regulating financial services entities, including Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). Dominica has enacted the Virtual Asset Business Act, 2020, which brings VASPs under the FSU's oversight for licensing and AML/CFT compliance.
• Enforcement Focus (General): While they would be the primary body for enforcement, public records of specific crypto enforcement actions (fines, cease and desist orders against named entities) are not readily available. Their work primarily involves ensuring compliance with licensing requirements and AML/CFT obligations.
• Financial Services Unit, Dominica: https://fsu.gov.dm/
• Virtual Asset Business Act, 2020 (Dominica) - available via legal resources or local government gazettes.
• Regulator Name: Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Dominica
• Role: The FIU is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating suspicious transaction reports (STRs) related to money laundering and terrorist financing. This includes activities involving virtual assets. They cooperate with law enforcement and regulatory bodies.
• Enforcement Focus (General): The FIU investigates financial crimes, but their actions typically lead to broader criminal investigations or shared intelligence, rather than public "enforcement actions" with fines detailed by the FSU or a court for specific crypto violations against a named entity.
• FIU Dominica: http://www.fiu.gov.dm/
• Regulator Name: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB)
• Role: The ECCB is the monetary authority for the eight-member OECS, including Dominica. While not a direct regulator of individual VASPs, the ECCB plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and often issues warnings or guidance regarding unregulated financial activities, including certain aspects of cryptocurrencies. They have also led the DCash pilot project, a digital version of the Eastern Caribbean dollar.
• Enforcement Focus (General): The ECCB primarily focuses on systemic risks and overall financial stability. Their actions usually involve policy statements, advisories, or collaboration with national regulators. They are less likely to issue specific enforcement actions against private crypto entities in individual member states.

4 further Dominica enforcement records

Dominican Republic

• Warnings and Advisories: The Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (Banco Central de la República Dominicana - BCRD) has repeatedly issued public statements and communications warning about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, stating that they are not legal tender, are not backed by any government or central bank, and are subject to high volatility and lack of regulation.
• Prohibition for Regulated Entities: Financial institutions regulated by the BCRD and the Superintendency of Banks (Superintendencia de Bancos - SB) are generally prohibited from dealing in or offering services related to cryptocurrencies.
• Absence of a Specific Licensing Framework: Unlike some other jurisdictions, the Dominican Republic does not currently have a specific regulatory framework for the licensing and supervision of cryptocurrency exchanges or related businesses. This means there isn't a specific set of crypto regulations for regulators to enforce against these entities.
• Regulator Name: Banco Central de la República Dominicana (BCRD - Central Bank of the Dominican Republic)
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, and implicitly, anyone considering engaging with cryptocurrencies. Violation Type: While not a specific violation leading to a fine against a crypto entity, the BCRD consistently warns about the lack of legal status, regulatory oversight, and inherent risks of cryptocurrencies. For regulated financial institutions, engaging with crypto could be a violation of existing banking laws and regulations. Penalty Amount: N/A (as this is a general warning, not a specific fine against an entity).
• Date: Ongoing, with multiple communications issued over the past years, including within the last 3 years. A significant communication was issued in March 2021 and has been reinforced since.
• Outcome: To inform the public of the risks and lack of backing for cryptocurrencies, and to reiterate that financial institutions under their supervision should not deal with them. This stance discourages the widespread adoption of crypto within the regulated financial system and informs potential users of the risks.
• Comunicado del Banco Central sobre las criptomonedas (March 25, 2021): This is one of the most definitive statements from the Central Bank. (2021-03-25)
• Financial Intelligence Unit (UAF) - General Information: While the UAF is responsible for AML/CFT, specific public administrative enforcement actions against crypto entities in the DR are not readily published on their site. Their role would typically be in identifying suspicious transactions.
• Legal Basis: This obligation is typically incorporated into national law, such as the Dominican Republic's AML/CFT framework.
• Legal Basis: Relevant U.S. statutes and Executive Orders.
• Legal Basis: Various EU Regulations and Council Decisions.

Ecuador

• Legal Basis: Resolution 014-2014-M (or its subsequent reiterations) issued by the Monetary and Financial Policy and Regulation Board (Junta de Política y Regulación Monetaria y Financiera) and implemented by the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE). This resolution, dated July 28, 2014, effectively banned private cryptocurrencies, stating that they are not recognized as legal tender and cannot be used as a means of payment within the country. (2014-07-28)

Egypt

• Legal Basis: Article 206 of Law No. 194 of 2020 (the Central Bank and Banking Sector Law) explicitly states: "It is prohibited to issue cryptocurrencies or trade them, or promote them, or establish or operate platforms for their trading, or to carry out activities related to them without obtaining a license from the Board of Directors of the Central Bank in accordance with the rules and conditions determined by it."
• Legal Basis: The FRA issued Decree No. 171 of 2023 "Regarding the Rules for the Establishment and Licensing of Companies to Practice Non-Banking Financial Activities Using Digital Technology." This framework focuses on digital assets that qualify as financial instruments (e.g., tokenized securities, tokenized bonds, NFTs representing fractional ownership in real assets or funds).

El Salvador

• Role: Created by the Digital Assets Issuance Law (Ley de Emisión de Activos Digitales), enacted in January 2023. CNAD is the primary regulator for the issuance, offering, and trading of digital assets (excluding Bitcoin, which is governed by the Bitcoin Law as legal tender). It grants licenses to Digital Asset Service Providers (DASPs).
• Enforcement Focus: Primarily focused on ensuring compliance with the Digital Assets Issuance Law, licensing requirements, and investor protection for new issuances and service providers. Non-compliance with these new laws would likely be the basis for future enforcement.
• Role: Regulates traditional financial institutions. While Bitcoin is legal tender, the SSF's direct oversight of crypto firms is limited unless they are also traditional financial entities or deal with fiat in specific regulated ways. It ensures financial stability and consumer protection within the traditional system.
• Role: Oversees monetary policy, financial stability, and payment systems. While Bitcoin is legal tender, the BCR does not directly regulate crypto firms but rather manages the implications of Bitcoin adoption on the broader economy.
• Role: Handles criminal investigations, including fraud, money laundering, and other illicit activities that might involve cryptocurrencies. Any criminal misuse of crypto would fall under their jurisdiction.
• Pro-Bitcoin Stance: El Salvador's government has been a proponent of Bitcoin adoption, aiming to attract investment and innovation in the crypto space. This has meant less of a "crackdown" mentality and more of a "build the framework" approach.
• New Laws, New Regulation: The most significant development is the creation of the Digital Assets Issuance Law and the CNAD in early 2023. This law establishes licensing requirements for digital asset service providers. Enforcement will primarily occur as the CNAD begins to fully implement its mandate, licenses entities, and addresses non-compliance with these new rules.
• Focus on State-Sponsored Initiatives: Much of the scrutiny and "enforcement" (in terms of ensuring compliance or addressing issues) has internally revolved around state-sponsored initiatives like the Chivo Wallet and the Volcano Bonds. These are not "enforcement actions" against private entities, but rather regulatory/operational challenges for the state itself.
• Regulator: Government of El Salvador (operating the Chivo wallet, thus acting as an internal regulator/oversight body).
• Entity Targeted: The Chivo Wallet system itself (state-owned). Violation Type: User complaints regarding fraud, identity theft, unauthorized transactions, and technical glitches related to the initial rollout and subsequent operation of the Chivo wallet. These were widely reported, especially in 2021-2022. While not an enforcement action against a private company, the government had to address these issues, which led to system improvements and enhanced security measures. Penalty Amount: N/A (Internal operational costs, reputation damage, potentially user reimbursements).
• Date: Ongoing since the September 2021 launch, particularly prominent in late 2021 and early 2022.
• Outcome: The government implemented fixes, offered customer support, and improved security. This highlights a self-correction mechanism rather than external regulatory enforcement.

14 further El Salvador enforcement records

Eritrea

• Highly Closed System: Eritrea is one of the most closed and authoritarian countries in the world. Information on internal financial regulations, law enforcement actions against individuals or entities, and judicial processes is almost never made public.
• Lack of Transparency: There is no independent press, and government transparency is virtually non-existent. Financial regulations and enforcement are managed opaquely, primarily by the National Bank of Eritrea (NBE) and state security services.
• Strict Financial Controls: The Eritrean government maintains extremely strict capital controls and foreign exchange regulations. The Nakfa (ERN) is the only legal tender, and any attempt to bypass the official financial system (like using cryptocurrencies for transactions or remittances) would be viewed very seriously as a violation of national financial sovereignty and potentially as illicit financial activity or even a threat to national security.
• No Public Regulatory Framework for Crypto: There is no known public regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies in Eritrea. Given the government's control over the financial sector, it is highly improbable that crypto assets are recognized or tolerated. Their use would likely be considered implicitly illegal due to the lack of official recognition and the overarching foreign exchange controls.
• Absence of Public Enforcement Records: Unlike countries with transparent legal systems, Eritrea does not publish details of financial enforcement actions, arrests, or penalties. If individuals or small groups were caught engaging in crypto activities, they would likely face severe consequences through the state's security apparatus, but these events would not be publicly documented or reported.

Eswatini

• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Eswatini (CBE)
• Entity Targeted: General Public (warnings) / Financial Institutions (guidance). Violation Type: N/A (warnings, not enforcement).
• Date: Ongoing, with several statements over the years.
• Outcome: Public awareness, cautious approach to crypto.
• Central Bank of Eswatini (CBE) Public Statement on Virtual Assets (Cryptocurrencies)
• Entity Targeted: General Public, financial institutions. Violation Type: N/A (Advisory/Warning).
• The Central Bank of Eswatini issued no cryptocurrency or virtual-asset statement on 28 January 2021. Its published crypto communications are an April 2018 announcement that the Bank was researching cryptocurrency, and the 2023 notice 'Considerations for Dealing in Cryptocurrencies', which states that cryptocurrencies have no legal tender status in Eswatini and that crypto investments or assets are currently unregulated. (2021-01-28)
• The Central Bank of Eswatini's 2023 notice 'Considerations for Dealing in Cryptocurrencies' states that cryptocurrencies 'do not exist physically and have no legal tender status in Eswatini' and that 'crypto investments or assets are currently unregulated in Eswatini; therefore, investors do not benefit from the legal protection associated with regulated instruments or products'. It is a consumer warning addressed to the public that directs readers to verify a provider's licence with the Central Bank of Eswatini and the Financial Services Regulatory Authority; it contains no directive to financial institutions and imposes no obligation.
• Source URL: While the direct link to the 2021 statement on the CBE website might be harder to pinpoint now due to site updates, its content has been widely reported and forms the basis of their ongoing stance. The CBE's approach is consistent with statements from 2018 onwards. Relevant information often comes up in financial news from the region. A good example of their ongoing communication can be found within their general pronouncements, though specific archived advisories can be challenging to link directly after several years. Their Annual Reports and Financial Stability Reports often contain updates on their stance on cryptocurrencies.
• General reference to their policy/stance: While not a direct enforcement action, the CBE's consistently cautious stance is reiterated in various publications. For instance, their financial stability reports or governor's statements would reflect this. A common search result for their crypto stance points to articles referencing their long-standing cautionary approach.
• Ongoing Discussions and Regulatory Development
• Entity Targeted: Regulators themselves, policy makers. Violation Type: N/A (Policy discussion/development). Outcome: Exploration of regulatory frameworks for virtual assets, participation in regional discussions (e.g., within SADC) regarding crypto regulation. This reflects a proactive stance towards future regulation rather than current enforcement.

1 further Eswatini enforcement records

Ethiopia

• Entity Targeted: The general public, financial institutions, and anyone engaging with or promoting cryptocurrencies within Ethiopia. Violation Type: Engaging in transactions with, holding, or promoting cryptocurrencies, as they are not legal tender and are explicitly prohibited. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to a general warning. For individuals, criminal penalties related to illicit financial transactions, foreign exchange violations, or fraud could apply (not specified by NBE in these warnings). Outcome: Cryptocurrencies remain illegal in Ethiopia. The NBE continues to monitor and warn against their use. Financial institutions are prohibited from facilitating crypto transactions.
• Outcome: Cryptocurrencies remain illegal in Ethiopia. The NBE continues to monitor and warn against their use. Financial institutions are prohibited from facilitating crypto transactions.

European Union

• In January 2026, the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) became the first NCA to publicly announce a formal enforcement action under MiCA, issuing a cease-and-desist order against an unregistered non-EU CASP (CryptoFlow Ltd., registered in the Cayman Islands) for soliciting French residents without authorization; the AMF noted this action as a "test case" for MiCA enforcement coordination across NCAs AMF MiCA Enforcement Action January 2026
• A March 2026 analysis by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) identified that 8 of the 27 EU NCAs had not yet finalized their MiCA enforcement guidelines by Q1 2026, creating "supervisory fragmentation risks" for CASPs operating across multiple member states; the ESRB warned that this could lead to inconsistent application of authorization requirements and investor protections by the April 2026 enforcement date ESRB Analysis of MiCA Supervisory Fragmentation
• The European Commission's March 2026 enforcement update confirmed that the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) had issued formal warnings to 14 crypto-asset firms for failing to submit complete authorization applications by the February 28, 2026 deadline; the AFM warned that firms without approved authorization by April 1, 2026, would face immediate suspension orders European Commission MiCA Enforcement Update March 2026 (2026-02-28)
• By April 2026, NCAs have the mandate under Article 114 to process authorization applications, monitor ongoing compliance, and initiate enforcement actions against non-compliant entities, particularly those operating without authorization and not covered by transitional provisions; enforcement powers include suspension of services, imposition of fines, and public warnings MiCA Article 114 Enforcement
• ESMA has issued a public statement in December 2024 reminding market participants that unregulated entities offering services to EU retail clients without authorization or transitional grandfathering may face enforcement actions, and has called for convergent supervisory practices across Member States ESMA December 2024 Statement
• Practical enforcement examples by April 2026 remain limited; however, in late 2025, the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) issued warnings against several unregistered crypto firms operating without transitional provisions AFM Crypto Warnings
• The application of national transitional provisions under Article 127 is optional for Member States, leading to significant variability: for example, Germany has applied a transitional period until June 30, 2026 for existing CASPs, while France opted for a shorter period ending March 31, 2025, creating uneven enforcement intensity across jurisdictions BaFin Transitional Provisions; AMF France MiCA (2026-06-30)
• By April 2026, ESMA and NCAs will have conducted at least one round of thematic reviews and supervisory stress tests on authorized CASPs, focusing on governance, custody of client assets, and disclosure requirements, as part of ESMA's 2025-2026 Supervisory Convergence Work Programme ESMA Work Programme 2025

Fiji

• Regulator Name: Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Potential Investors. Violation Type: N/A (Preventative advisory, not an enforcement action). Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Ongoing, with repeated statements over the years. Specific advisories in 2021, 2022, 2023.
• Outcome: Public awareness campaigns, warnings against the risks of investing in cryptocurrencies, reiterating that they are not legal tender in Fiji. The RBF has consistently highlighted volatility, scams, and lack of consumer protection.
• RBF Statement (2023) - Warning on Virtual Assets and Cryptocurrency: While a specific press release for 2023 isn't easily found, the RBF's general stance is reiterated in public speeches and financial stability reports. Their 2022 Annual Report mentions ongoing monitoring and collaboration with FIU.
• RBF 2022 Annual Report (See Financial Stability section, general economic outlook)
• Fiji Times Article referencing RBF warning (Oct 2021) (Note: Direct RBF press release link might require deeper archive search; this article confirms the RBF's public warnings around that time).
• Regulator Name: Fiji Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
• Entity Targeted: Financial Institutions, Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), and the general public. Violation Type: N/A (AML/CTF Advisory, not an enforcement action against a crypto entity).
• Date: Ongoing, in line with FATF recommendations. Specific advisories and typologies reports regularly published.
• Outcome: Advising on money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks associated with virtual assets, guiding reporting entities on their obligations, and preventing the use of virtual assets for illicit purposes.
• FIU Website - Reports & Publications (look for Typology Reports discussing VA risks) (While specific reports on crypto enforcement aren't there, their typology reports frequently cover virtual assets as a risk factor for ML/TF).

2 further Fiji enforcement records

Finland

• Entity Targeted: Tesseract Finance Oy (now operating as Stableton). Violation Type: Providing virtual currency services without proper registration for a period, and deficiencies in internal control mechanisms, risk assessment, and customer due diligence processes for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF). Penalty Amount: Public warning (julkinen varoitus). While not a monetary fine, it's a formal and significant disciplinary measure by the FIN-FSA, obliging the company to rectify its shortcomings. Outcome: The company was required to implement corrective measures to comply with the Virtual Currency Providers Act and AML/CTF obligations. The public warning serves as a significant mark on the company's regulatory record.
• Entity Targeted: Coinmotion Oy (a registered virtual currency provider in Finland). Violation Type: Deficiencies in compliance with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) obligations, specifically regarding customer due diligence, risk assessment, and internal control. The FIN-FSA found that Coinmotion's practices did not fully meet the requirements of the Act on Virtual Currency Providers and the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Penalty Amount: Public reprimand (julkinen huomautus). Similar to the public warning, this is a formal, non-monetary disciplinary action, indicating serious shortcomings that required immediate correction. Outcome: Coinmotion Oy was instructed to rectify the identified deficiencies in its AML/CTF processes to ensure full compliance with regulatory requirements.
• Outcome: The company was required to implement corrective measures to comply with the Virtual Currency Providers Act and AML/CTF obligations. The public warning serves as a significant mark on the company's regulatory record.
• Outcome: Coinmotion Oy was instructed to rectify the identified deficiencies in its AML/CTF processes to ensure full compliance with regulatory requirements.
• Legal Basis: UN Security Council Resolutions (e.g., those relating to terrorism financing, proliferation of WMDs, specific country regimes). Finland, as an EU member, implements these through EU Council Regulations.
• Legal Basis: U.S. statutes and Executive Orders.
• Legal Basis: The primary legal framework is the Act on Virtual Currency Providers (572/2019), which came into force in Finland on May 1, 2019. This Act places virtual asset service providers (VASPs) under the supervision of the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) and subjects them to AML/CFT obligations akin to traditional financial institutions. (2019-05-01)

Gambia

• Regulator Name: Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG)
• Entity Targeted: The general public and regulated financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks, payment service providers). Violation Type: Proactive warnings against the risks associated with virtual assets, including:.
• Operating outside the regulated financial system.
• Potential for money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT risks).
• Consumer protection concerns (volatility, scams, lack of recourse).
• Unauthorized issuance or dealing in currency-like instruments.
• Penalty Amount: N/A (No specific monetary penalty levied against a named entity for cryptocurrency-related activities). The "penalty" for regulated financial institutions would be regulatory sanctions, including potential license revocation, for failing to adhere to CBG directives.
• Date: The CBG's stance against cryptocurrencies has been consistent over several years, with public warnings reiterated. A prominent warning was issued around late 2020 / early 2021, and its position has remained unchanged since then. This falls within the last 3 years for its continued relevance.
• De Facto Prohibition: The CBG's warnings essentially create a de facto prohibition for regulated financial institutions from dealing in or facilitating cryptocurrency transactions.
• Public Discouragement: The public is strongly advised against engaging with cryptocurrencies due to high risks.
• Lack of Legal Tender Status: Cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender in The Gambia.
• Absence of Licensing Framework: There is no legal or regulatory framework for licensing cryptocurrency exchanges or service providers.

7 further Gambia enforcement records

Greece

• Entity Targeted: A large international organized crime group operating "boiler rooms" (call centers) that defrauded investors across Europe, including Greece, using fake cryptocurrency investments. Violation Type: Investment fraud, aggravated fraud, money laundering, participation in a criminal organization. Outcome: Multiple arrests (at least 15 in Greece, others internationally), dismantling of call centers, freezing of assets. Criminal proceedings are ongoing.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals operating an illegal cryptocurrency mining farm. Violation Type: Theft of electricity, illegal operation. While not a direct "crypto violation," it's significant as it involves crypto-related activities leading to criminal charges. Outcome: Arrests, charges filed for electricity theft, seizure of equipment. Criminal proceedings.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals involved in a fraudulent scheme that lured victims into investing in fake cryptocurrency platforms. Violation Type: Fraud, money laundering, establishment/participation in a criminal organization. Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations and criminal proceedings.
• Outcome: Multiple arrests (at least 15 in Greece, others internationally), dismantling of call centers, freezing of assets. Criminal proceedings are ongoing.
• Outcome: Arrests, charges filed for electricity theft, seizure of equipment. Criminal proceedings.
• Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations and criminal proceedings.
• Legal Basis: Greek Law 4557/2018 (Articles 40-45) and other specific laws implementing EU sanctions.

Grenada

• Grenada Authority for the Regulation of Financial Institutions (GARFIN): This is the primary regulatory body for non-bank financial institutions and financial services in Grenada. It would likely oversee the licensing and conduct of Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs).
• Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of Grenada: The FIU is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating financial information concerning suspected proceeds of criminal activity and terrorist financing. They would be involved in AML/CFT compliance for virtual assets.
• Virtual Asset Business Act (VABA), 2020: This Act provides the framework for the regulation of virtual asset businesses in Grenada, requiring them to be licensed by GARFIN and comply with AML/CFT requirements.
• Issue Public Warnings: GARFIN and the FIU have issued general warnings to the public about the risks associated with unregistered virtual asset businesses and the importance of due diligence.
• Require Registration/Licensing: All entities operating as Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) in Grenada are legally required to be licensed by GARFIN and comply with AML/CFT regulations enforced by both GARFIN and the FIU.
• Monitor and Investigate: The FIU, in particular, would investigate suspicious transactions involving virtual assets as part of its mandate to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Non-compliance could lead to investigations, orders to cease operations, and potentially sanctions.
• Such actions have not occurred at a level deemed "significant" for public reporting.
• Any enforcement has been handled privately, or through warnings and cease-and-desist orders without public financial penalties.
• The focus has primarily been on establishing and implementing the regulatory framework rather than major punitive actions against specific entities being publicly announced.
• While the site provides information on regulated entities and laws, it does not have a dedicated "enforcement actions" section for crypto with the requested details.
• Similar to GARFIN, the FIU website outlines its mandate and provides general guidance but does not list specific crypto enforcement actions.
• Virtual Asset Business Act, 2020 (Grenada):

1 further Grenada enforcement records

Guernsey

• Broader Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) deficiencies: These actions are usually against regulated financial services businesses (e.g., fiduciaries, banks, investment firms) for systemic failures in their AML/CFT frameworks, rather than specifically for engaging in or facilitating cryptocurrency transactions improperly. While these failures could indirectly impact virtual asset activities if the entities were involved, the enforcement isn't explicitly "crypto-focused."
• Governance and operational failings: Breaches of regulatory principles, corporate governance, or data protection rules.
• Unlicensed activity: The GFSC has a licensing regime for Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). Enforcement might occur for operating without a license, but public records don't typically detail large fines specifically for this in recent years.
• The GFSC often works to prevent breaches through proactive supervision, guidance, and licensing requirements for VASPs.
• Enforcement actions might involve confidential settlements or outcomes that are not fully disclosed publicly, especially for smaller breaches.
• Public statements of censure or fines are typically reserved for more significant, often systemic, breaches.
• GFSC Enforcement Actions: https://www.gfsc.gg/news/enforcement-actions
• GFSC Public Statements: https://www.gfsc.gg/news/public-statements
• GFSC Virtual Assets Information: https://www.gfsc.gg/industry-sectors/banking/virtual-assets

Guinea

• Regulator Name: Banque Centrale de la République de Guinée (BCRG) - (Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea)
• Entity Targeted: The general public, financial institutions, and implicitly, any unregistered cryptocurrency operators or promoters within Guinea. Violation Type: Engaging with or promoting financial instruments (cryptocurrencies) that are not recognized as legal tender, are volatile, speculative, and outside the regulated financial system, posing risks of fraud, money laundering, and financial instability. This is a preventative warning rather than a direct violation levied against an entity. Penalty Amount: Not applicable (this is a public warning, not a fine against an entity).
• Date: Multiple warnings have been issued over recent years, with renewed emphasis. For instance, reports from early 2022 and 2023 reiterated these positions.
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness of the risks, discouragement of widespread crypto adoption, and a clear signal to financial institutions to avoid dealing with crypto assets. It also serves as a foundational stance for any future enforcement.
• Given the nature of central bank warnings in a developing nation, a single, consistently updated URL for every press release might not exist or be easily accessible in English. However, such warnings are often reported by regional financial news or the central bank's own publications.
• Jeune Afrique (mentioning regional trends and central bank warnings): https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1247493/economie/en-afrique-de-louest-le-bitcoin-se-developpe-hors-des-radars/ (Article in French, discusses general context, published 2021 but reflects ongoing stance)
• Actualité Africaine (example of regional warnings): https://www.actualiteafricaine.com/2022/02/08/la-bceao-met-en-garde-contre-les-cryptomonnaies/ (While this specifically mentions BCEAO, Guinea's central bank often aligns with or issues similar warnings, emphasizing the common regional stance. You'd typically find similar local press releases from BCRG itself.)
• Regulator Name: General Guinean Police / Judicial Authorities (e.g., Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire - DCPJ, or local gendarmerie).
• Entity Targeted: Individuals or groups orchestrating investment schemes or scams that might utilize cryptocurrencies or promise crypto-related returns. Violation Type: Fraud, illegal financial operations, potentially money laundering. Penalty Amount: Varies by judicial decision; often involves arrests, prosecution, and potential imprisonment, but not typically a "regulatory fine" in the initial enforcement phase. Specific amounts are rarely publicized at the time of arrest.
• Date: Such incidents occur periodically, but specific, high-profile arrests solely centered on cryptocurrency in Guinea with international reporting in the last 3 years are difficult to pinpoint.
• Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, potential prosecution and conviction under general criminal law.
• Source URLs: It is extremely challenging to find specific, internationally reported examples of such actions for Guinea with all requested details. Local news may report arrests related to fraud, but often lack specific crypto-centric details or follow-up on outcomes and penalty amounts in English.

3 further Guinea enforcement records

Guyana

• Entity Targeted: Individuals associated with "Coinvest Guyana" and "Accelerated Capital Firm Inc. (ACFI)," particularly Yuri Garcia-Lopez and Ateeka Ishmael, along with others later implicated. Violation Type: Operating a pyramid scheme, obtaining money by false pretences (fraud), unlicensed financial operations. The scheme reportedly solicited investments with promises of high returns, often facilitated through digital means and sometimes referencing digital asset investments as part of its pitch, though its core was a classic Ponzi/pyramid structure.
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, and implicitly, anyone considering operating an unregulated cryptocurrency business in Guyana. Violation Type: While not a "violation" in itself, the BoG warns against the inherent risks and unregulated nature of cryptocurrencies, implying that conducting such activities falls outside the regulated financial system and thus carries significant risks for participants. The advisories highlight that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, are not regulated by the BoG, and offer no consumer protection. Penalty Amount: N/A (These are advisories, not direct enforcement actions with fines). Outcome: Increased public awareness of the risks associated with cryptocurrencies in Guyana, a clear statement that such activities are outside the regulated financial sector, and a deterrent for unregulated operations seeking legitimacy. This stance limits the growth of formal crypto businesses until a regulatory framework is established.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness of the risks associated with cryptocurrencies in Guyana, a clear statement that such activities are outside the regulated financial sector, and a deterrent for unregulated operations seeking legitimacy. This stance limits the growth of formal crypto businesses until a regulatory framework is established.

Haiti

• Regulator Name: Banque de la République d'Haïti (BRH - Central Bank of Haiti)
• Entity Targeted: The general public, financial institutions operating in Haiti. (This was a general warning, not targeting a specific crypto company or individual). Violation Type: Not a violation, but rather a warning against the inherent risks associated with using unregulated virtual assets (cryptocurrencies) and a clarification of their legal status. The BRH emphasized that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Haiti and are not subject to the country's financial regulations. Penalty Amount: None. This was a public advisory/warning.
• Date: November 2021
• Outcome: The communiqué served to officially inform the public and financial sector that cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender, are not regulated by the BRH, and their use carries significant risks (volatility, cyber-security, money laundering, and terrorist financing). It effectively discourages their use within the formal financial system and signals that anyone engaging with them does so at their own risk. It sets a cautious tone for the country's approach to digital assets.
• While finding the direct PDF on the BRH website in English can be challenging as the site is primarily in French, reputable news sources reported on the communiqué. Here's a link to a news report referencing it:
• Haiti: Central Bank Warns Public on Crypto Use (Cryptopotato, reporting on the BRH communiqué, November 2021)
• The official press release can often be found in the archives section of the BRH website (brh.gouv.ht), usually under "Communiqués de Presse" for November 2021.
• Limited Framework: Haiti does not have a comprehensive legal or regulatory framework specifically for cryptocurrencies.
• Central Bank Stance: The BRH maintains a cautious stance, primarily focusing on warning the public about risks and clarifying that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender.
• Absence of Specific Enforcement: The lack of specific enforcement actions against crypto entities suggests either:
• A very low level of formal crypto business activity that would trigger regulatory scrutiny.
• A regulatory environment that has not yet developed the tools or mandate for proactive enforcement against crypto service providers.

1 further Haiti enforcement records

Holy See

• Low Cryptocurrency Activity: The Vatican City State is a unique, extremely small sovereign entity with a highly specialized financial system primarily focused on managing the assets of the Catholic Church and its charitable works, as well as supporting its diplomatic missions. It is not a center for commercial cryptocurrency activity or innovation.
• Robust AML/CTF Framework: The Holy See has significantly strengthened its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) framework in recent years, under the supervision of its financial intelligence and supervisory authority, the Autorità di Supervisione e Informazione Finanziaria (ASIF). This includes complying with international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and undergoing evaluations by MONEYVAL (the Council of Europe's AML body).
• Regulatory Preparedness (Not Enforcement): While there haven't been enforcement actions, ASIF has issued guidance and regulations acknowledging the risks associated with virtual assets (cryptocurrencies). This indicates preparedness rather than a history of specific enforcement cases.
• Regulator Name: Autorità di Supervisione e Informazione Finanziaria (ASIF)
• Relevant Action: Issuance of regulatory frameworks for virtual assets.
• Violation Type: Not applicable, as this is regulatory guidance, not an enforcement action. Penalty Amount: Not applicable.
• Date: ASIF Circular No. 10 on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers was originally issued in June 2020 and subsequently updated.
• Outcome: Established an AML/CTF framework for entities dealing with virtual assets within the Holy See's jurisdiction, requiring them to comply with reporting and due diligence obligations. This ensures that if any virtual asset activity were to occur, it would be subject to strict oversight.
• ASIF Official Website (Regulatory Section): While specific links to circulars might change, ASIF's website is the primary source for its regulations. You would typically find its Circulars and Regulations under sections like "Normativa" or "Publications."
• General ASIF Website: https://www.asif.va/
• ASIF's Publications (often include circulars): https://www.asif.va/en/publications/ (You might need to navigate to "Normativa" or "Circulars" to find the specific documents like Circular No. 10 on virtual assets.)
• MONEYVAL Reports: MONEYVAL evaluations of the Holy See often detail their progress in implementing FATF recommendations, including those related to virtual assets. These reports confirm the existence and scope of the Holy See's regulatory framework.

1 further Holy See enforcement records

Honduras

• Regulator Name: Banco Central de Honduras (BCH)
• Honduras' financial regulator (CNBS) issued a mandatory prohibition on financial institutions trading crypto assets, which is a binding regulatory restriction rather than a non-punitive clarification. The action targets financial system institutions, not the general public, and no monetary penalty was imposed, but the prohibition itself constitutes active enforcement.
• Date: March 25, 2024 (Communiqué 001/2024) - Although this specific communiqué is from 2024, it reiterates and strengthens previous warnings, making it the most current and definitive statement within the timeframe. Previous, less formal warnings have been issued in prior years. (2024-03-25)
• Outcome: The BCH officially stated that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Honduras and are not backed or regulated by the Central Bank. It also warned the public about the inherent risks associated with using and investing in cryptocurrencies, emphasizing that they are not recognized as currency or assets by the Honduran financial system. This effectively prohibits financial institutions under BCH supervision from operating with cryptocurrencies as recognized assets and strongly advises the public against their use.
• Official Communiqué (Spanish): https://www.bch.hn/comunicados/COMUNICADO%20NO.%20001-2024.pdf
• News coverage confirming the stance: https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/honduras-central-bank-says-bitcoin-not-legal-tender-warns-risks-2024-03-27/ (2024-03-27)
• Absence of Specific Crypto Laws: Honduras does not have specific laws regulating cryptocurrency exchanges or service providers. Therefore, there are no "crypto-specific" regulatory violations for which an entity could be fined or sanctioned by a financial regulator in the way you might see in the US or Europe.
• Criminal Cases: While there might be instances of fraud or money laundering investigations by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) or police involving cryptocurrencies, these fall under general criminal law, not specific cryptocurrency enforcement by a financial regulator against a crypto entity. These are typically cases against individuals involved in scams rather than regulatory actions against established crypto businesses. Information on such criminal cases is often less detailed publicly regarding "penalty amounts" and "entity targeted" in the context of financial regulation.
• Honduras' regulatory focus on digital assets is still early-stage, but it has moved beyond simple risk warnings to concrete prohibitions. The National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS) has explicitly prohibited financial institutions from handling cryptocurrencies, reflecting a protective stance aimed at financial stability. While there is no crypto licensing regime, Honduras has issued 2022 regulations for fiat-backed electronic money services, which do not cover crypto assets.
• Legal Basis: UN Security Council Resolutions, issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are legally binding on all UN member states. Honduras is obligated to implement these resolutions into its national law and practice.

Hungary

• Issuing warnings against unlicensed service providers (often foreign entities).
• Providing guidance and requiring registration for Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) under AML rules.
• Referring cases of suspected fraud or money laundering to law enforcement (police, public prosecutor).
• Regulator Name: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB - Hungarian National Bank)
• Entity Targeted: Xifra Lifestyle (also known as Xifra Global, Xifra LLC). Violation Type: Unlicensed financial service provision (offering investment services related to cryptocurrency trading without the necessary MNB authorization) and operating a scheme with characteristics of a pyramid scheme. Penalty Amount: The MNB issued a public warning and a cease-and-desist order. While no specific administrative fine amount was publicly disclosed by the MNB in its initial announcement, the action effectively prohibited the entity from operating in Hungary and referred the case to law enforcement for potential criminal proceedings.
• Date: MNB's public announcement was on November 25, 2022. (2022-11-25)
• Outcome: The MNB prohibited Xifra Lifestyle from offering its services to Hungarian residents. The MNB also filed a criminal complaint against the unknown perpetrators. The platform subsequently largely ceased operations in Hungary.
• MNB Press Release (Hungarian): https://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2022-evi-sajtokozlemenyek/a-penzugyi-fogyasztovert-vedelmeben-figyelmeztet-az-mnb-a-xifra-lifestyle-cryptovaluta-alapu-befektetesekkel-kapcsolatos-piramisjatek-gyanus-tevekenysegevel-kapcsolatban
• English News Summary (referencing MNB action): https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/12/06/2568527/0/en/Global-authorities-crack-down-on-Xifra-Lifestyle-and-its-affiliates.html
• Police Investigations: Hungarian police frequently conduct investigations and make arrests related to cryptocurrency fraud, scams, and money laundering. However, these are criminal proceedings targeting individuals or criminal groups, rather than administrative enforcement actions by a financial regulator against a formal "entity" with a specific "penalty amount" in the same way the MNB acts. The outcomes are typically arrests, charges, and eventual court sentences, which are distinct from regulatory fines.
• Tax Authority (NAV): The National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) enforces tax laws on crypto income and transactions, but these are typically individual or corporate audits and assessments rather than publicly announced "enforcement actions" against specific crypto platforms with a universal "penalty."
• MNB Warnings: The MNB often issues general warnings to consumers about the risks of crypto, or specific warnings about unlicensed foreign entities, without a formal "fine" or "penalty amount" attached, but these are crucial in protecting consumers and maintaining market integrity.

India

• Bans on manipulative participants such as Jane Street in July 2025.
• Scrutiny of front‑running cases, leading to fines and operational restrictions.

Indonesia

• Case Context: Indonesian authorities, led by PPATK and Densus 88, analyzed on-chain data to trace funds from domestic sources (e.g., Indonesian exchanges) to foreign terrorism networks. One individual sent 15 transactions totaling over 49,000 USDT. Defendants acted as financiers, not direct attackers.
• Significance: Marked Southeast Asia's first court acceptance of blockchain evidence in terrorism financing cases, setting a legal precedent. PPATK noted rising suspicious crypto transactions, including a 2023 joint action uncovering ISIS funding disguised as humanitarian aid.
• Regulatory Shift: OJK assumed crypto oversight from Bappebti in January 2025, mandating AML/CFT reporting (SEOJK No. 20/2024), which supported these investigations.
• Case Context: Kominfo probed Worldcoin's data practices amid global concerns (e.g., similar actions in Kenya, Germany). Emphasized protecting digital rights under Indonesian law.
• Significance: Highlights Indonesia's focus on data privacy in crypto/biometric projects, aligning with OJK's consumer protection rules (e.g., OJK No. 27/2024).

Iran

• Tavanir (Iran Electricity Generation, Transmission and Distribution Company): The primary entity responsible for identifying and disconnecting illegal mining operations.
• Law Enforcement Force (LEF): Conducts raids and arrests.
• Iran's judiciary is used as a political tool to prosecute and repress peaceful protesters, political opponents, and individuals deemed security threats, often under post-war security laws, as documented by EU sanctions and human rights monitors.
• Ministry of Energy: Sets policies and oversees Tavanir.
• Entities Targeted: Unlicensed cryptocurrency mining farms, both large-scale industrial operations and smaller home-based setups.
• Illicit cryptocurrency mining without a license.
• Electricity theft or misuse of subsidized electricity.
• Operating energy-intensive equipment without authorization.
• Confiscation of equipment: Thousands of mining rigs (ASICs) have been confiscated, valued at millions of dollars collectively. For example, in June 2021, Tavanir announced the confiscation of 7,000 illicit mining machines.
• Fines: Imposed based on the amount of electricity consumed and potential damages. Specific individual amounts are rarely disclosed but can be substantial.
• Disconnection from Power Grid: Mandatory for detected illegal operations.
• Arrests and Imprisonment: Individuals operating these farms often face arrest, fines, and potential prison sentences. Reports frequently mention dozens or hundreds of arrests during major campaigns.

35 further Iran enforcement records

Iraq

• Original Ban Directive (2021)
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)
• Entity Targeted: All financial institutions operating under CBI supervision, and implicitly, the general public and any platforms attempting to facilitate cryptocurrency trading or transactions within Iraq. Penalty Amount: Not a specific fine for the directive itself. Non-compliance by financial institutions could lead to severe regulatory penalties, including fines, license suspension, or revocation. Individuals could face legal prosecution under existing financial crime laws.
• Date: Announced in February 2021.
• Outcome: All licensed banks, financial institutions, and payment service providers were prohibited from dealing in cryptocurrencies. This established the legal framework making crypto activities illegal in Iraq.
• Al-Monitor (February 2021) - "Iraq bans cryptocurrency, citing money laundering concerns"
• Re-affirmation and Enhanced Warnings (2023)
• Entity Targeted: Financial institutions, payment companies, money transfer agencies, and the general public, with specific warnings against foreign companies operating illicitly within Iraq. Violation Type: Engaging in, promoting, or facilitating cryptocurrency transactions, deemed a breach of Iraqi financial law and a risk to the national economy and financial system. Penalty Amount: Not a specific fine for the re-affirmation. The directive reiterated that any individual or entity found dealing in cryptocurrencies would be subject to legal prosecution, implying criminal charges rather than administrative fines.
• Date: Issued a circular to banks and financial institutions in February 2023.
• Outcome: Reinforced the existing ban, explicitly stating that using or dealing with cryptocurrencies is against Iraqi law and that violators would face legal consequences. It aimed to shut down any perceived loopholes or illicit operations. This was a significant re-emphasis of the country's hardline stance.
• Reuters (February 2023) - "Iraq central bank reiterates crypto ban, warns of legal consequences"
• CoinDesk (February 2023) - "Iraq Central Bank Reaffirms Crypto Ban and Warns of Legal Action"

51 further Iraq enforcement records

Ireland

• No major enforcement actions reported as of mid-2025, but ongoing monitoring by the NCA ensures compliance with AML/CFT rules.
• Potential penalties include fines and revocation of licenses for non-compliance. Source

Isle of Man

• Outcome: No specific, publicly documented cases matching all criteria were found within the specified timeframe.

Italy

• Fines up to €5 million or 3% of annual turnover for companies
• Suspension or revocation of business authorization
• Up to €700,000 for individuals

Jamaica

• Evolving Regulatory Landscape: Jamaica does not yet have a comprehensive, dedicated regulatory framework specifically for cryptocurrencies and virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Enforcement would largely fall under existing laws such as anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws, fraud statutes, or securities regulations if a crypto asset were deemed a security. The lack of specific licensing requirements for most crypto activities means fewer direct "licensing violation" cases.
• Focus on Warnings and Education: Regulators have primarily focused on public education and issuing warnings about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, including scams, volatility, and their potential use in illicit finance.
• Nature of Enforcement: Any enforcement related to crypto in Jamaica is more likely to be:
• Individual Fraud Cases: Handled by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), often against individuals who have defrauded others using crypto, rather than against a crypto entity. These cases might not be classified or reported as "cryptocurrency enforcement actions" by financial regulators.
• AML/CFT Investigations: Conducted by the FID. These investigations are often sensitive and their outcomes, especially regarding specific entities or penalty amounts, may not be publicly disclosed unless they lead to criminal charges or high-profile asset seizures.
• Market Size: The cryptocurrency market in Jamaica, while growing, is still relatively small compared to larger jurisdictions, potentially leading to fewer large-scale, entity-level violations that would trigger significant public enforcement actions.
• Role: The central bank, responsible for monetary policy and financial system stability. Has been leading the charge on Jamaica's CBDC (JAM-DEX).
• Stance on Crypto: Cautious. While supporting innovation, the BOJ has repeatedly warned the public about the risks of unregulated cryptocurrencies, emphasizing their volatility and lack of consumer protection. They have clarified that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Jamaica.
• Source: Bank of Jamaica publications and press releases.
• Bank of Jamaica - News & Press Releases (search for crypto/digital currency)
• BOJ's position on Digital Currencies (2018, still relevant for their caution)
• Role: Jamaica's primary agency for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes.

7 further Jamaica enforcement records

Japan

• Regulator: Financial Services Agency (FSA).
• Regulator: National Tax Agency (NTA).

Jersey

• Regulator Name: Jersey Financial Services Commission (JFSC)
• Entity Targeted: Volopa (Jersey) Limited (an e-money institution). Violation Type: Significant and systemic breaches of the Money Laundering (Jersey) Order 2008 concerning its AML/CFT systems and controls. This included failures in client due diligence, transaction monitoring, and governance. While not explicitly stated as crypto-specific, e-money institutions often facilitate transactions that can involve virtual assets, making robust AML controls crucial in this space. Penalty Amount: £395,097 (civil financial penalty).
• Date: 29 May 2024 (date of public statement)
• Outcome: Imposition of a civil financial penalty and requirement to implement remediation measures.
• Source URL: https://www.jfsc.org/news-and-events/jfsc-imposes-civil-financial-penalties-on-volopa-jersey-limited-for-amlcft-breaches/
• Entity Targeted: Ms Kateryna Sazonova (former Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) and Compliance Officer for a licensed trust company). Violation Type: Failure to make a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) regarding a client whose funds were identified as proceeds of a cyber fraud. Cyber fraud frequently involves the use of virtual assets for the movement and concealment of illicit funds, making this action highly relevant to the crypto space indirectly. Penalty Amount: Prohibited from performing any function as a Money Laundering Reporting Officer, Compliance Officer, or Principal Person for any person registered under regulatory laws in Jersey. No specific financial penalty was imposed on her in this public statement.
• Date: 23 March 2023 (date of public statement)
• Outcome: Public statement issued, disqualification from holding key positions in regulated entities in Jersey.
• Legal basis: POCL 1999, Terrorism (Jersey) Law 2002, MLR 2008 (as amended).

Jordan

• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, and anyone contemplating dealing in cryptocurrencies. Violation Type: Dealing in, trading, or promoting cryptocurrencies within the Jordanian financial system is prohibited and deemed risky. The CBJ considers cryptocurrencies to carry high risks due to their volatile nature, lack of regulatory oversight, potential for money laundering and terrorist financing, and cyber risks. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to a general warning/prohibition. However, engaging in prohibited activities could lead to legal repercussions under existing financial and anti-money laundering laws, though specific penalties for crypto dealing outside of fraud aren't often publicized for individuals. Licensed financial institutions found violating CBJ directives could face regulatory penalties. Outcome: Maintenance of a strict prohibitory environment, discouraging financial institutions from engaging in crypto-related activities and warning the public against associated risks.
• Outcome: Maintenance of a strict prohibitory environment, discouraging financial institutions from engaging in crypto-related activities and warning the public against associated risks.

Kazakhstan

• Regulator Name: Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Financial Monitoring (AFM), in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy, National Security Committee, and local authorities.
• Entity Targeted: Numerous unregistered cryptocurrency mining farms operated by various individuals and organizations across the country. Violation Type: Unlicensed business activity, illegal electricity consumption, tax evasion, sometimes money laundering, and operating outside the legal framework for crypto mining. Outcome: Shut down of operations, seizure of equipment (hundreds of thousands of mining devices), criminal charges against operators, and significant administrative fines. While individual penalty amounts for each entity are not publicly disclosed, the total economic impact and asset seizures were substantial. For instance, in 2022 alone, the AFM reported stopping 51 illegal mining farms and confiscating equipment worth billions of tenge.
• Date: Ongoing, but major crackdowns and public announcements occurred particularly between January 2022 and March 2023.
• Outcome: Over 50 illegal mining farms were shut down, leading to the confiscation of equipment and initiation of criminal cases. This action significantly reduced the strain on the national energy grid and established a precedent for strict enforcement against unregistered mining.
• AFM: Kazakhstan clamps down on illegal crypto mining farms (This link provides context on various AFM actions, including illegal crypto-related activities.)
• Reuters: Kazakhstan clamps down on illegal crypto miners as electricity crunch looms
• Kazinform: 51 illegal crypto farms shut down in Kazakhstan
• Entity Targeted: Operators and websites of unregistered cryptocurrency exchanges and peer-to-peer trading platforms. Violation Type: Unlicensed financial activity, facilitation of illegal financial operations (e.g., fraud, money laundering), violation of financial regulations. Penalty Amount: Not specified as a direct fine in publicly available reports. Outcome: Blocking of website access, criminal charges against individuals involved, seizure of funds (if traceable).
• Date: Multiple instances reported, for example, a significant operation in February 2023.
• Outcome: Websites were blocked, and criminal investigations were launched against individuals involved in operating these platforms. This reinforces Kazakhstan's stance against any crypto trading outside the regulated AIFC framework.
• AFM: Activities of a large cryptocurrency exchange in Almaty were suppressed by law enforcement agencies (This specifically refers to an operation in February 2023, though penalty details aren't itemized.)
• Kazinform: Financial Monitoring Agency blocks 138 websites for illegal online casinos, cryptocurrencies (This article from Jan 2024 highlights ongoing efforts against illegal online platforms, including those related to cryptocurrencies, demonstrating continuous enforcement.)

8 further Kazakhstan enforcement records

Kenya

• Regulator name: Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC); High Court of Kenya; Ministry of Interior and National Administration.
• The Office of the Data Protection Commissioner issued suo motu determination ODPC/COMP/1394/2023 on 6 September 2023 against Worldcoin Foundation, Tools for Humanity and Tools for Humanity GmbH over biometric iris data collected in Kenya; the general penalty in section 73 of the Data Protection Act, No. 24 of 2019 is a fine not exceeding three million shillings or imprisonment not exceeding ten years or both, while the Data Commissioner's administrative penalty notice under sections 62 and 63 is capped at five million shillings or one per cent of an undertaking's preceding annual turnover, whichever is lower.
• Date: Operations halted in 2023; registration revoked and full activities banned recently (post-2023, exact date unspecified).
• Outcome: High Court restraining order issued pending judicial review; ODPC revoked Tools for Humanity's data processor registration; all Worldcoin activities banned in Kenya for one year.
• Source URL: https://iapp.org/news/a/worldcoin-case-a-watershed-moment-for-data-protection-in-kenya
• Regulator name: Central Bank of Kenya (CBK); upheld by courts under National Payments Systems Act (NPSA) and money remittance regulations.
• Entity targeted: Bitpesa (operating through Lipsha Consortium Limited). Violation type: Operating money remittance business via Bitcoin without CBK authorization; AML/KYC non-compliance due to cryptocurrency anonymity. Penalty amount: None specified (service termination, not direct fine).
• Date: Pre-2023 court case (Lipisha Consortium Limited & another v Safaricom Limited), but relevant to ongoing CBK enforcement precedent.
• Outcome: Safaricom legally suspended M-PESA services; court upheld termination to avoid AML liability for facilitating unauthorized crypto transactions.
• Source URL: https://freemanlaw.com/cryptocurrency/kenya/
• Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) Crypto Fraud Unit: Handled over 500 crypto-related cases in past three years; dozens of arrests in 2024. High-profile busts in Nairobi and Nakuru targeted scams worth $119,000, $100,000, and $30,000 (no named entities or penalties detailed). Losses totaled $43.3 million in 2024 scams.
• Source URL: https://openexo.com/l/f3ed363e

Kiribati

• Nascent Regulatory Environment: Kiribati is a small island nation with a developing financial sector. Its regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies like cryptocurrency are either nascent or non-existent. There is no specific legislation or dedicated body for crypto regulation in place.
• Limited Crypto Activity: The level of cryptocurrency adoption and activity within Kiribati is generally very low compared to larger economies, meaning fewer potential targets for enforcement.
• Regulatory Bodies: The primary financial authorities in Kiribati are:
• The Bank of Kiribati (BoK): The central bank responsible for monetary policy and financial system stability.
• The Kiribati Financial Intelligence Unit (KFIU): Deals with anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT).

Kuwait

• Capital Markets Authority (CMA)
• Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK)
• Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI)
• Note: These regulators acted in concert to issue the prohibition.
• Entity Targeted: All regulated financial institutions, including banks, investment companies, financial services firms, and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed in Kuwait. This effectively targets the activity itself within the regulated sector. Violation Type: Engaging in any virtual asset activities, including:.
• Issuance, trading, or dealing in cryptocurrencies.
• Using cryptocurrencies as a payment method.
• Licensing of virtual asset service providers (VASPs).
• This is a proactive ban designed to prevent violations, rather than a punitive action against a past transgression.
• Penalty Amount: Not a specific fine, but a prohibition. The "penalty" for regulated entities found to be non-compliant with this ban would be regulatory sanctions, including license revocation, operational restrictions, and potentially fines under existing financial laws.
• Date: Announced in July 2023.
• Outcome: All financial institutions supervised by the CMA, CBK, and MOCI are prohibited from providing virtual asset services or engaging in crypto-related activities. The ban was issued in the context of money laundering, terrorist financing risks, and consumer protection concerns, aligning with the recommendations of international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

3 further Kuwait enforcement records

Kyrgyzstan

• Regulator/Enforcing Agency: State Committee for National Security (SCNS, known as GKNB in Russian), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), in cooperation with national energy companies (e.g., National Energy Holding).
• Entity Targeted: Organized groups and individuals operating illegal crypto mining farms. Violation Type: Illegal electricity consumption (theft), illegal entrepreneurship, potential tax evasion. Penalty Amount: Varies. Typically involves confiscation of mining equipment, imposition of fines for stolen electricity, and initiation of criminal proceedings. Exact financial penalties for each individual operation are often not publicly detailed but can amount to millions of KGS in damages to the energy grid. Arrests and potential imprisonment for organizers.
• Date: Ongoing, with several significant busts occurring regularly. For a prominent example:
• December 2023: SCNS reported neutralizing a large illegal crypto mining farm in Bishkek operating in an abandoned factory.
• Outcome: The operation was shut down, over 2,000 ASIC miners and related equipment were seized. The estimated damage to the state budget from illegal electricity consumption was around 25 million KGS (approx. $280,000 USD) over three years. Criminal proceedings were initiated.
• Source URL (December 2023 action):
• AKIpress - SCNS neutralizes large-scale illegal cryptocurrency mining farm in Bishkek
• Kabar.kg - SCNS uncovers another illegal crypto farm in Bishkek
• Entity Targeted: Organizers and promoters of the "S-Group" financial pyramid scheme. Violation Type: Fraud, establishment of a financial pyramid, illegal enrichment. The scheme falsely promised high returns from investments in various "projects," including crypto trading. Penalty Amount: No single "fine" amount specified as it's a criminal case. The goal is asset seizure and restitution to victims. The estimated damage to victims was substantial, reaching billions of KGS. Organizers face criminal charges, which can lead to imprisonment.
• Date: Investigations and arrests began notably in late 2022 and continued into 2023.
• Outcome: Several organizers and active participants were arrested. Assets were seized, including luxury cars, real estate, and bank accounts. Investigations are ongoing, aimed at identifying all victims and recovering lost funds. The scheme was effectively dismantled in Kyrgyzstan.
• Source URL (Reporting on S-Group in Kyrgyzstan):

10 further Kyrgyzstan enforcement records

Labuan (Malaysia)

• Legal Basis: Implemented through the Financial Sanctions Act 2009 and specific Financial Sanctions Orders issued by the Minister of Finance.
• Legal Basis: While OFAC (U.S.) and EU sanctions are not directly enforceable as Malaysian law, compliance is critical and practically mandatory for Labuan VASPs due to several factors:

Laos

• Issuing Official Warnings and Prohibitions: The BOL has repeatedly reminded the public and financial institutions that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and pose significant risks.
• A Brief Experiment with Authorized Mining (and subsequent cooling): There was a period in late 2021 where the Lao government approved a pilot project for a few companies to mine and trade cryptocurrencies, primarily to generate revenue for the state. However, this was a government initiative, not an enforcement action, and the enthusiasm seems to have significantly cooled since.
• Regulator Name: Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL)
• Entity Targeted: The general public, financial institutions, and potentially anyone engaging in cryptocurrency activities. Violation Type: Engaging in activities with unrecognized digital assets, not being compliant with existing financial regulations, operating outside authorized financial systems. The BOL views cryptocurrencies as speculative assets that are not legal tender and pose risks like money laundering, fraud, and financial instability. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to warnings; potential penalties for actual illegal operations would fall under existing financial or criminal laws, not specific crypto regulations.
• Date: Warnings have been issued periodically, with renewed emphasis in recent years. Key periods include late 2021 when global crypto interest surged, and ongoing reminders.
• Outcome: Reinforcement of the official position that cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender or regulated financial products in Laos. Discouragement of public participation.
• Vientiane Times (October 2021, reporting on BOL warning): While this article discusses the approval of mining, it also highlights the BOL's concurrent warnings about general crypto use:
• Laos Public Security News (April 2023, warning against cryptocurrency investment scams): This type of article from a government agency often reflects the general enforcement approach against fraud involving crypto. (Note: Direct links to specific articles from Lao government sites in English can be ephemeral. This is indicative of the type of enforcement focus).
• Search Term Example: "Lao Public Security warns crypto scam"
• Regulator/Initiator: Government of Laos, potentially via relevant ministries and the BOL.
• Entity Targeted: N/A (this was a policy approval, not an enforcement action). Violation Type: N/A. Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Approved in principle in late 2021.

2 further Laos enforcement records

Latvia

• Penalty Amount: Varies depending on the severity of the violation, ranging from warnings and administrative measures to significant fines. However, publicly reported large fines against pure crypto businesses are scarce. Outcome: Remedial actions required, potential fines, or in severe cases, withdrawal of registration/license.
• Outcome: Remedial actions required, potential fines, or in severe cases, withdrawal of registration/license.

Lesotho

• Role: The primary financial regulator responsible for monetary policy, financial stability, and the supervision of banks and financial institutions.
• The Central Bank of Lesotho has issued two public statements on cryptocurrency, on 9 November 2017 and on 20 May 2024; the 20 May 2024 statement warns that cryptocurrencies fall outside the regulatory purview of the Central Bank of Lesotho and that there is no recourse to the Bank in the event of losses, and that offering cryptocurrencies as investment opportunities exposes promoters to sections 27 and 28 of the Capital Market Regulations 2014, which require investment advisers to be licensed by the Bank.
• No Lesotho authority has taken a published crypto enforcement action against any named entity: the Central Bank of Lesotho's crypto output consists of the general public warnings of 9 November 2017 and 20 May 2024, and no fine, sanction, revocation or prosecution concerning virtual assets has been published by the Bank, the Financial Intelligence Unit or the Director of Public Prosecutions.
• Source (General Stance/Warnings): While specific enforcement actions against entities are not public, the CBL's position can be inferred from various financial stability reports and public pronouncements, although direct press releases on specific crypto enforcement are not readily available.
• General indication of their cautious approach: African Financial & Economic Data (AFED) Portal sometimes aggregates statements, and local news (though scarce on crypto enforcement specifically) would echo official warnings. However, a direct, public-facing URL for a specific CBL warning post-2021 related to enforcement against an entity is not found. The general stance predates and continues post-2021.
• Role: The national agency responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and other financial information to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes.
• Stance on Crypto: The FIU would be involved in monitoring for illicit financial activities involving cryptocurrencies as part of its broader anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) mandate.
• Enforcement Actions: The FIU's actions are typically confidential and involve investigations rather than public enforcement actions with penalties against specific crypto entities, unless they lead to criminal prosecutions by law enforcement, which are also not publicly reported as "crypto enforcement actions" by a financial regulator in Lesotho.
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Lesotho.
• Entity Targeted: No specific crypto entity has been publicly targeted with a formal enforcement action by a financial regulator. Violation Type: No public record of specific violations leading to formal enforcement. Warnings generally highlight risks of fraud, money laundering, and consumer protection issues due to unregulated status. Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as no formal penalties have been publicly announced.
• Date: No specific dates for enforcement actions within the last 3 years.

Libya

• Limited Transparency: Enforcement actions, especially in financial crime or emerging tech, might not be widely publicized or documented in English-language media.
• Focus on Other Crimes: Law enforcement may prioritize other forms of financial crime or security threats.
• Technical Capacity: Regulators and law enforcement might lack the specialized technical capacity to track, investigate, and prosecute complex cryptocurrency-related offenses effectively.
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Libya (CBL)
• Entity Targeted: All individuals and financial institutions within Libya (general ban, not a specific entity). Violation Type: Dealing in, trading, or possessing cryptocurrencies. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to the ban itself, but potential penalties under Libyan law for illegal financial activities could include fines and imprisonment.
• Date: The initial ban was issued in 2018, and it has been reaffirmed multiple times since. There is no indication it has been lifted in the last three years.
• Outcome: Cryptocurrencies remain illegal in Libya.
• Middle East Monitor - Libya's Central Bank bans dealing in cryptocurrency (Dated 2018, but establishes the foundational ban which remains active.)
• Global Legal Insights - Libya Banking Regulation 2023 (General overview of banking regulation, often indirectly mentioning or implying the continued ban by not listing crypto as regulated.)
• Central Bank of Libya official statements (Arabic) would be the definitive source, but specific English-language press releases on continued enforcement or reaffirmation are rare. Statements in Arabic from 2018 banning crypto are widely reported by news agencies.)

Liechtenstein

• Entity Targeted: Various companies identified for unauthorized operation, often involving crypto/token offerings. (Specific company names are usually listed on the FMA's warning page, which is regularly updated). Violation Type: Operating financial services or token services without the necessary license under the TVTG or other relevant financial market laws, often coupled with allegations of scams or misleading information. Penalty Amount: Not a direct monetary fine imposed by the FMA in this context, but rather a public warning and expectation of cessation of activity. Failure to comply can lead to further legal action. Outcome: Public notification of unauthorized activity, demand for cessation of operations in Liechtenstein, consumer protection.
• Entity Targeted: Licensed TVTG service providers or other financial institutions. (Specific names are not always publicly disclosed for every action, but the FMA's annual reports provide aggregated data). Violation Type: Non-compliance with the TVTG, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) regulations, or other prudential requirements. Penalty Amount: Not a direct public monetary fine, but the severe penalty of loss of operating license, resulting in the inability to conduct regulated activities in Liechtenstein. This represents significant financial loss and reputational damage for the entity. Outcome: Withdrawal of authorization, cessation of regulated activities, safeguarding market integrity.
• Outcome: Public notification of unauthorized activity, demand for cessation of operations in Liechtenstein, consumer protection.
• Outcome: Withdrawal of authorization, cessation of regulated activities, safeguarding market integrity.
• Legal basis: DTA (LGBl 2008.265) + TVTG Arts. 20–29 (sector-specific AML rules) Legislation and official policy documents - Eurydice.eu.
• Legal Basis: SPG (LGBl. 2009/047) and SPV (LGBl. 2009/098), as amended by LGBl. 2019/274 to explicitly include all TVTG roles (Art. 2 SPG). Banking Laws and Regulations 2026 | Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

• The CSSF maintains a public register of VASPs operating in Luxembourg. This registration process is a crucial form of regulation and "pre-enforcement." Entities must demonstrate robust AML/CFT frameworks to be registered.
• Failure to register or comply with AML/CFT obligations is a violation, and the CSSF's primary "enforcement" in such cases often involves:
• Issuing warnings for unregistered activities.
• Ordering non-compliant entities to cease operations.
• Intensive supervisory engagement, which can lead to operational changes but not necessarily a public fine.
• Significance: This proactive stance aims to prevent illicit activity rather than solely penalize it after the fact, which might explain the lack of numerous public fines.
• Extensive searches of the CSSF's official communications, press releases, and reputable financial news sources for the period of mid-2021 to mid-2024 do not reveal specific, public enforcement actions against named cryptocurrency entities with associated penalty amounts for non-compliance with virtual asset regulations.
• Luxembourg's regulatory actions, especially related to AML/CFT, can sometimes be resolved through administrative measures, enhanced supervision, or non-public agreements, rather than large public fines.
• It is common for financial regulators globally to take actions that are not widely publicized, especially when dealing with smaller entities or when issues are resolved through direct engagement and remediation. The absence of a public record does not necessarily mean an absence of regulatory scrutiny or internal corrective actions.
• Regulator: Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF)
• Law of 25 March 2020: Establishing a register for VASPs, transposing parts of the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5).
• CSSF Circular 20/747: Revised prudential requirements for VASPs.

9 further Luxembourg enforcement records

Malawi

• Regulator Name: Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Unregulated Crypto Activities. Violation Type: Operating or engaging in unregulated financial activities; lack of legal tender status. Penalty Amount: N/A (warnings, not penalties).
• Date: Various, with significant warnings issued throughout the period.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness regarding the RBM's stance; discouragement of participation in unregulated crypto markets.
• RBM's Consistent Stance: The Reserve Bank of Malawi has repeatedly stated that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Malawi and are not regulated by the RBM. They have warned the public about the inherent risks, including volatility, cyber-attacks, and potential for fraud, as these assets operate outside the regulated financial system.
• "Reserve Bank of Malawi still probing cryptocurrency issue" (May 2022) - While not a direct enforcement, it clarifies the RBM's ongoing cautious approach and lack of regulation.
• [No direct RBM press release URL found readily, but widely reported in Malawian media.]
• Emerging Regulatory Framework: Malawi has been working towards establishing a regulatory framework for virtual assets. In late 2023, the National Assembly passed the Virtual Assets Service Providers (VASP) Bill. This bill aims to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, bringing them under the supervision of the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) and potentially the Reserve Bank of Malawi in the future.
• "Malawi Passes Virtual Assets Service Providers Bill to Regulate Crypto Market" (November 2023) - This indicates future potential for enforcement, but actual enforcement actions under this new law would typically follow its full implementation and operationalization.
• Criminal Investigations (Non-Regulatory Enforcement): While there might be instances of police investigations into fraud schemes that use cryptocurrencies as a vehicle for illicit activity, these are criminal law enforcement actions (e.g., arrests, prosecutions for fraud) rather than specific administrative enforcement actions by a financial regulator against a crypto service provider for regulatory breaches (like operating without a license or AML violations). Such criminal cases rarely provide details of specific "penalty amounts" from a financial regulator.

Malaysia

• Entity Targeted: Binance Holdings Limited and its CEO, Changpeng Zhao (CZ). Violation Type: Operating a Digital Asset Exchange (DAX) without registration/license, which is a violation under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007. The SC considers digital assets as securities, and operating a platform for trading them requires authorization. Penalty Amount: No explicit monetary fine was announced at the time of the public reprimand. The penalties were operational: a public reprimand, an order to cease all operations in Malaysia, disable access to its website and mobile applications, and cease all media and marketing activities targeting Malaysian investors. Outcome: Binance was forced to shut down its direct operations in Malaysia. Malaysian users were advised to withdraw their funds. The action led Binance to later pursue a compliant pathway to re-enter the Malaysian market by acquiring a stake in and partnering with a licensed local Digital Asset Exchange (DAX), MX Global, demonstrating the effectiveness of the SC's enforcement in driving regulatory compliance.
• Entity Targeted: Various unauthorized digital asset platforms, investment schemes involving crypto, and individuals promoting them. (Specific names are too numerous to list here, but are updated frequently). Violation Type: Operating or promoting unauthorized investment schemes, digital asset exchanges, or services without the necessary licenses or approvals from the SC Malaysia. Penalty Amount: Typically no specific monetary penalty is announced publicly for being added to the alert list. The "penalty" is a public warning, which often leads to the platform being unable to operate effectively in Malaysia and subsequent cessation of operations or blocking of access. Outcome: Public awareness is raised, and investors are warned against dealing with these entities. This often leads to reduced or ceased operations for the targeted entities within Malaysia.

Maldives

• Regulator Name: Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Unlicensed Operators (not specific named entities). Violation Type: While not a "violation" in the enforcement sense against an entity, the MMA's stance is that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in the Maldives and that they do not license or regulate virtual asset service providers (VASPs). They primarily warn about the risks associated with investing in or using cryptocurrencies, including fraud, volatility, and lack of consumer protection. Penalty Amount: N/A (No fines or penalties have been levied against specific crypto entities by the MMA in this period).
• Date: Ongoing, with several public statements and advisories issued over the past few years.
• Outcome: The outcome of these advisories is to deter the use and proliferation of unregulated cryptocurrencies within the Maldives and to manage public expectations regarding their legality and safety.
• MMA's Consistent Position: The Maldives Monetary Authority has repeatedly stated that cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender in the Maldives. They also do not provide licenses or regulatory oversight for any cryptocurrency-related activities or businesses operating within the country.
• Public Advisories: The MMA has issued warnings to the public about the inherent risks of cryptocurrencies, including price volatility, cybersecurity risks, potential for fraud, and the absence of consumer protection. These advisories are the primary "action" taken by the regulator concerning crypto.
• Focus on AML/CFT: While there isn't a specific crypto regulatory framework, the Maldives, as a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), is working to strengthen its Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) regime. This includes addressing virtual assets in line with FATF recommendations, but this is more about developing future regulations rather than current enforcement actions against existing crypto businesses.
• Lack of Licensed Entities: Since no crypto businesses are licensed by the MMA, there are no regulated entities for the MMA to "enforce" against in the traditional sense (e.g., for non-compliance with licensing conditions or specific crypto-related regulations). Any potential criminal activity involving crypto would fall under general criminal law enforcement by the police, rather than specific financial regulatory enforcement.
• Maldives Monetary Authority - Public Awareness on Virtual Assets (Cryptocurrencies)
• Note: This specific link may refer to a general public awareness campaign on their website. If the direct link changes, searching "Maldives Monetary Authority cryptocurrencies public awareness" on their site will typically yield similar results.
• While specific news articles can be ephemeral, here's an example of the recurring nature of these warnings:
• Sun Online - MMA cautions public against cryptocurrency investments (February 2022)

1 further Maldives enforcement records

Mali

• There is no BCEAO instrument banning or prohibiting cryptocurrency activity in UEMOA; BCEAO's LBC/FT regulation index and its communiqués-de-presse index contain no such act, and the only crypto item BCEAO publishes is the 8 May 2026 Dakar conference. Nor does BCEAO sanction under the AML framework: under the uniform law as transposed by Ordonnance n°2024-011/PT-RM, administrative sanctions are imposed by the autorité de contrôle of the entity concerned (and, in Mali, targeted financial sanctions and asset freezes are ordered by arrêté of the Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances — e.g. Arrêté n°2026-0346/MEF-SG du 5 mars 2026), not by BCEAO and not by CENTIF. The real constraint on crypto activity in Mali is art. 58 of the Ordonnance plus the absence of a designated competent authority under art. 59.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals or informal groups promoting and operating cryptocurrency-based investment scams or pyramid schemes. Violation Type: Fraud, swindling (escroquerie), illegal financial operations, often disguised as crypto investment opportunities. Penalty Amount: Varies depending on the scale of the fraud; can include prison sentences and financial reparations to victims. Specific public records of these amounts for crypto-specific cases in Mali are difficult to pinpoint from international sources. Outcome: Arrests, investigations, and potential prosecutions of individuals involved in scams. Public awareness campaigns to warn citizens against unregulated crypto investment opportunities.
• Outcome: A de facto ban on formal cryptocurrency operations within Mali's regulated financial sector. Financial institutions are prohibited from offering crypto services, and the public is warned about the risks and lack of regulatory protection.
• Outcome: Arrests, investigations, and potential prosecutions of individuals involved in scams. Public awareness campaigns to warn citizens against unregulated crypto investment opportunities.

Marshall Islands

• Limited Public Enforcement Record: The Marshall Islands is a smaller jurisdiction. While it has laws related to financial activities and anti-money laundering (AML) / combating the financing of terrorism (CFT), and has even explored innovative digital asset legislation (like the controversial Digital Assets Act of 2018 to create a sovereign digital currency, the SOV, which has largely stalled due to international pressure), its financial regulatory bodies do not have a robust public record of enforcement actions, particularly for complex and high-profile cryptocurrency cases, in the same way major financial hubs (like the US, UK, or EU) do.
• Role as a Corporate Registry: Many cryptocurrency companies choose to incorporate in the Marshall Islands due to its flexible corporate registry (the Marshall Islands Trust Company Complex, or RMI-TCC). However, their primary operations and therefore primary regulatory oversight and enforcement actions often come from the jurisdictions where they primarily conduct business or where their customers are located, rather than from the RMI itself. For example, a company registered in RMI might face enforcement from the U.S. SEC or DOJ for activities impacting U.S. persons.
• Office of the Banking Commissioner (OBC): Responsible for regulating financial institutions.
• Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU): Deals with AML/CFT matters and suspicious transaction reports. They would investigate financial crimes, but their enforcement actions are typically less public than those of a securities regulator.
• Marshall Islands Trust Company Complex (RMI-TCC): While not a financial regulator in the traditional sense, it manages the corporate registry and could delist companies for non-compliance with corporate laws.
• RMI FIU Website (Primarily focuses on AML/CFT guidance and national risk assessments, not individual enforcement case details.)
• RMI Registry Website (This is for corporate registration, not financial regulation or enforcement actions.)

Mauritania

• Legal Basis (Indirect): The relevant legislation would be Loi N° 2013-057 portant sur les systèmes et moyens de paiement en République Islamique de Mauritanie (Law N° 2013-057 on payment systems and means in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania), and subsequent implementing regulations or circulars from the BCM regarding payment service providers and e-money. This law defines and regulates various payment instruments and services.

Mauritius

• Issuing warnings against unregulated activities.
• Refusing or revoking licenses for non-compliance.
• Providing guidelines and directives.
• Regulator Name: Financial Services Commission (FSC) Mauritius
• Entity Targeted: The General Public and Unlicensed Entities. Violation Type: Engaging in or promoting unregulated virtual asset services, pyramid schemes, or other illicit activities involving virtual assets. Penalty Amount: N/A (warnings do not carry a direct penalty amount for the warning itself, but non-compliance with regulations could lead to severe penalties or legal action if a regulated entity were involved).
• Date: Various dates within the last 3 years (e.g., 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024). These are ongoing advisories.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness, discouragement of participation in fraudulent schemes, and a clear signal that the FSC is monitoring the space. The warnings emphasize that entities operating without a license are illegal.
• Source URL Example (General Warning): While a specific "crypto enforcement action" with a penalty isn't found, the FSC regularly issues public notices regarding unregulated activities:
• FSC Public Notices Page (where such warnings would be found): https://www.fscmauritius.org/en/news-media/public-notices
• You can browse this page for recent advisories, some of which touch upon investment scams, including those potentially using cryptocurrencies. For instance, in 2022-2023, there were various warnings about online trading platforms and investment schemes that could involve virtual assets. Specific examples would require careful historical review of every notice.
• Entity Targeted: All financial institutions and VASPs subject to AML/CFT regulations. Violation Type: Previous strategic deficiencies in the AML/CFT regime identified by FATF. Penalty Amount: N/A (the "penalty" was the grey-listing itself, which impacted the country's financial reputation).
• Date: October 2021 (Mauritius officially exited the FATF grey list). Ongoing since then with continuous monitoring and updates to AML/CFT frameworks.

8 further Mauritius enforcement records

Mexico

• OFAC (Sept 26, 2023): Sanctioned Mario Alberto Jimenez Castro (Sinaloa Chapitos faction) for laundering via cryptocurrency. Elliptic
• U.S. authorities (Nov 20, 2024): Seized $5.4M in three wallets (one VASP) for cartel money laundering. Same source.
• U.S. authorities (Mar 17, 2023): Arrested Sergio Antonio Duarte Frias (Sinaloa) in Guatemala for laundering $869K narcotics proceeds via cryptocurrency. Same source.

Micronesia

• Lack of a Dedicated Regulatory Framework: The FSM currently lacks a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework specifically addressing virtual assets (VAs) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs).
• No Registered or Licensed VASPs: As of the latest assessments, there are no known or registered VASPs operating within the FSM that would fall under a regulatory scope (if one existed).
• Limited Capacity and Awareness: International assessments indicate that the FSM's financial authorities are still developing their understanding and capacity to monitor and regulate the virtual asset sector.
• Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU): This is the primary authority responsible for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) in the FSM. While they address financial crimes, specific crypto enforcement requires a clear regulatory basis for virtual assets.
• Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG): As an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the APG conducts mutual evaluations of its members' AML/CFT regimes. Their reports provide the most comprehensive public information on the FSM's status regarding virtual assets.
• No specific legislation: The FSM had not yet enacted specific legislation or regulations to address virtual assets or virtual asset service providers (VASPs).
• No VASPs identified: The authorities had not identified any VASPs operating within the jurisdiction.
• Lack of understanding and capacity: The report highlighted a lack of understanding by supervisory authorities regarding the risks associated with virtual assets and a need to develop supervisory capacity in this area.
• Recommendations: The APG recommended that FSM develop a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for VAs and VASPs, including registration, licensing, and AML/CFT obligations, and ensure appropriate supervision and enforcement capabilities.
• You will need to navigate to the specific "Mutual Evaluation Report of FSM (2021)" document on this page. (Direct link to PDF may change, but this is the official APG page for FSM reports).
• While the FSM FIU website may not list specific crypto enforcement, it represents the key regulatory body for AML/CFT.
• Note: Finding a stable, official government portal for the FSM FIU that is consistently updated and publicly accessible can be challenging for smaller nations. Many operate with limited public web presence. A general search might lead to mentions within government documents or international aid reports.

1 further Micronesia enforcement records

Moldova

• Moldova has already made notable improvements to its AML/CFT regime and is now in a phase of further enhancement and risk mitigation, with international partners calling for continued strengthening rather than initial framework development.
• Regulator: National Bank of Moldova (BNM), General Prosecutor's Office, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), National Anticorruption Center (CNA).
• Activity: Moldova has been working to align its legislation with FATF recommendations regarding virtual assets. The December 2023 amendments are a direct result of this.
• Outcome: A new regulatory framework for VASPs, requiring registration, AML/CFT compliance, and supervision, will come into effect in mid-2024. This sets the stage for future enforcement actions.
• Moldova.org (Dec 2023): "Moldova adopts Law on Virtual Assets to comply with international standards" - https://moldova.org/2023/12/28/moldova-adopts-law-on-virtual-assets-to-comply-with-international-standards/
• BNM Website (general information on AML/CFT): While not a specific enforcement, it shows the BNM's role in the regulatory framework. https://bnm.md/en/content/financial-intelligence-unit
• Regulator: General Prosecutor's Office, National Anticorruption Center (CNA), Ministry of Internal Affairs.
• Entity Targeted: Usually individuals or criminal groups. Violation Type: Money laundering, fraud, drug trafficking, or other illicit activities where cryptocurrency is used as a payment method or for obfuscating funds. Penalty Amount: Varies based on the severity of the crime, not specifically related to crypto regulation non-compliance. Often involves arrests, asset seizures, and eventual convictions with prison sentences. Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, asset seizures, and potentially convictions. These cases are generally reported by local media, but rarely with specific "penalty amounts" related to the crypto aspect alone, nor detailed names of crypto entities.
• Example (Illustrative of typical criminal reporting, not a specific crypto-focused regulatory action): News reports from Moldovan outlets (like IPN, Jurnal TV, Pro TV Chișinău) occasionally mention arrests related to fraud or illicit schemes where crypto is involved. However, these are criminal prosecutions, not regulatory actions against a VASP. Finding a direct, publicly reported case with all the requested details specific to crypto-related enforcement is challenging.

Mongolia

• Legal Basis: The implementation of UNSC resolutions is typically embedded in a country's national Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws.
• Legal Basis: Penalties would be outlined in the Law on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing and the Mongolian Criminal Code.

Montenegro

• Montenegrin Police (Uprava Policije)
• Special State Prosecutor's Office (SDT - Specijalno državno tužilaštvo)
• Entity Targeted: Do Kwon (and his associate Hon Chang Joon). Violation Type (Montenegro Specific): Forgery of documents (using fake Costa Rican and Belgian passports for illegal entry and travel).
• Note: The underlying reasons for international attention were massive alleged cryptocurrency fraud and capital markets violations (from South Korea and the United States), leading to extradition requests.
• Do Kwon: Sentenced to four months in prison.
• Hon Chang Joon: Sentenced to four months in prison.
• Note: This was for the document forgery charge. The extradition proceedings are separate and ongoing.
• Arrest: March 23, 2023 (2023-03-23)
• Local Conviction: June 19, 2023 (subsequently upheld on appeal) (2023-06-19)
• Extradition Saga: Ongoing since arrest.
• Do Kwon and his associate were convicted in Montenegro for using forged passports and served their sentences.
• A complex and protracted legal battle ensued regarding extradition requests from both South Korea and the United States. Montenegrin courts have issued conflicting rulings on his extradition, leading to multiple appeals and political interventions, delaying a final decision for over a year. As of mid-2024, the extradition process remains highly contested and unresolved, with the Montenegrin Supreme Court recently annulling prior extradition decisions.

1 further Montenegro enforcement records

Mozambique

• Regulator Name: Banco de Moçambique (Bank of Mozambique)
• Entity Targeted: The general public, potential users, and operators of cryptocurrencies within Mozambique. (Not a specific company or individual). Violation Type (Implicit/Guidance): Engaging in financial activities with unregulated assets, operating outside the formal financial system, high risk of fraud/scams, potential for money laundering and terrorist financing. The core message is that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and are not regulated by the Banco de Moçambique. Penalty Amount: N/A (These are warnings, not direct penalties for a specific enforcement case).
• Date: Multiple warnings have been issued over time. A prominent one was issued in April 2021, reiterating previous cautions. These warnings are periodically re-emphasized.
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness regarding the risks of cryptocurrencies, discouragement of their use in official financial transactions, and a clear regulatory position that they are not recognized as legal tender or regulated financial instruments. This forms the basis for any future enforcement, should a specific harmful activity be identified.
• Date: April 20, 2021 (2021-04-20)
• Notes: This article directly quotes the Bank of Mozambique's statement, highlighting that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and are unregulated. It reflects a consistent stance over time.
• Date: This is an annually updated report, reflecting the current legal landscape.
• Notes: This resource confirms that the Bank of Mozambique has consistently issued warnings since 2017, advising against the use of cryptocurrencies due to their unregulated nature and associated risks. It highlights the lack of specific legislation or enforcement actions targeted at crypto activities.

Myanmar

• Regulator: The Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) is the primary financial regulator.
• The Central Bank of Myanmar Directive 9/2020 banning cryptocurrencies remains formally in effect, but enforcement has shifted as the military government proposed the Anti-Online Fraud Bill in 2026 targeting specific crypto-related crimes with penalties of 10 years to life, indicating a move from a blanket prohibition to targeted prosecution of fraud.
• Post-Coup Environment: Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar's financial and legal landscape has become highly opaque. The military junta (State Administration Council - SAC) maintains the ban.
• NUG's Stance: The National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel civilian government, recognized Tether (USDT) as an official currency in December 2021 to raise funds for its resistance, creating a stark contrast to the SAC's position. This is not a recognized legal tender by the de facto government.
• Nature of Enforcement: Enforcement under an outright ban is often not through public regulatory fines against entities, but rather through:
• Warnings: The CBM has issued repeated warnings against crypto use.
• Arrests/Seizures: Individuals found to be trading or using cryptocurrencies might face arrest under general financial laws, anti-money laundering regulations, or even emergency decrees. These arrests are rarely publicized with detailed information, specific penalty amounts, or clear "outcomes" in a transparent legal process that can be sourced.
• Lack of Due Process: In the current political climate, legal processes are often opaque, and information on arrests, charges, and penalties for financial crimes, let alone crypto-specific ones, is not readily available through official channels or independent media with full details.
• No Specific Crypto Enforcement Framework: Since crypto is banned, there isn't a dedicated "crypto enforcement" framework with specific "violation types" and "penalty amounts" distinct from general financial or illegal activity laws.
• Regulator: Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM)
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, and potentially individuals engaging in crypto transactions. Violation Type: Violation of the CBM's ban on cryptocurrencies; engaging in unauthorized financial activities; potentially money laundering or illicit financing. Penalty Amount: Not publicly disclosed in specific cases. Could range from warnings and asset seizures to imprisonment under existing financial or criminal laws.
• Date: Ongoing since May 2020, with reiterated warnings post-coup.

10 further Myanmar enforcement records

Namibia

• Bank of Namibia warnings resting on virtual assets being unregulated were superseded by the Virtual Assets Act 10 of 2023, which commenced on 25 July 2023, and by the seven sets of Bank of Namibia rules gazetted on 1 September 2023 in Government Gazettes 8196 to 8202; virtual assets nonetheless still hold no legal tender status in Namibia.
• Namibia's virtual-asset framework is in force rather than in progress: the Virtual Assets Act 10 of 2023 commenced on 25 July 2023, the Bank of Namibia gazetted seven sets of rules on 1 September 2023, and Government Notice 513 in Gazette 8197 sets six licence classes with minimum capital rising to N$2 700 000 for a virtual asset market place.
• The Bank of Namibia is the Regulatory Authority designated under section 5(1) of the Virtual Assets Act 10 of 2023, makes the rules that govern virtual asset service providers, and grants their authorisations, while NAMFISA holds no virtual-asset licensing or supervisory role.
• Entity Targeted: General public and unregulated entities dealing in crypto assets. No specific private entity was targeted for enforcement. Violation Type: N/A (as no specific enforcement action was taken against an entity). The BoN's actions focused on addressing the unregulated nature of virtual assets and the associated risks. Penalty Amount: N/A (no penalty issued).
• The Bank of Namibia's comprehensive virtual-asset paper is the Revised Position on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers dated August 2022, and no Bank of Namibia virtual-asset release of 15 June 2022 was located on the Bank's own site. (2022-06-15)
• Ongoing warnings have been reiterated since then.
• The Bank of Namibia's August 2022 revised position, which described virtual assets as under-regulated and denied them legal tender or electronic money status, was overtaken by the Virtual Assets Act 10 of 2023 and by the Bank's rules of 1 September 2023, under which a virtual asset service provider must hold a Bank of Namibia licence and register with the Financial Intelligence Centre as an accountable institution.
• Significance: This was a pivotal moment, moving from non-recognition to acknowledging the existence and potential future regulation of virtual assets, while emphasizing current risks. It set the stage for future legislation.
• The Bank of Namibia path bon.com.na/CMSTemplates/BankOfNamibia/docs/press_releases/ returns HTTP 404; the Bank's virtual-asset position paper is served from bon.com.na/CMSTemplates/Bon/Files/bon.com.na/ and is dated August 2022 rather than 15 June 2022. (2022-06-15)
• New Era Live Article (reporting on BoN's stance, Oct 2023): https://neweralive.na/posts/crypto-is-not-money-bank-of-namibia (This article reflects the ongoing cautionary stance post-position paper).
• Namibia's virtual-asset regulator is the Bank of Namibia, designated as the Regulatory Authority under section 5(1) of the Virtual Assets Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023) and named as the maker of all seven rules gazetted on 1 September 2023; NAMFISA has no virtual-asset licensing or supervisory function, and AML/CFT supervision of virtual asset service providers rests with the Financial Intelligence Centre under the Financial Intelligence Act 13 of 2012.
• Date: NAMFISA has consistently issued advisories and warnings, often in conjunction with the BoN's stance. For example, in late 2022 / early 2023, they highlighted investment fraud risks, including those involving digital assets.

3 further Namibia enforcement records

Nauru

• Small Jurisdiction: Nauru is one of the world's smallest nations. Its financial sector is very limited, and the scale of cryptocurrency activity and the potential for "significant" violations (in terms of public reporting) is extremely low compared to larger economies.
• Limited Public Disclosure: Even if minor enforcement actions occurred, small island nations often do not have robust public disclosure frameworks for financial enforcement to the same extent as major financial hubs.
• Regulatory Capacity: While Nauru has a financial intelligence unit (FIU) and participates in global anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts (e.g., through the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering - APG), its regulatory capacity and enforcement resources are constrained.
• National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) of Nauru
• The government owned all media and exercised significant editorial control over content. [https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nauru]
• Self-censorship was widespread among journalists due to fear of job security and legal repercussions. [https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nauru]
• The government effectively enforced occupational safety and health (OSH) standards in the public sector but enforcement was lax in the private sector. [https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nauru]
• Nauruan law is primarily derived from English and Australian common law, integrating indigenous customary law to a limited extent. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Nauru]
• The Crimes Act 2016, enacted on May 12, 2016, reforms various crimes and repeals the Queensland Criminal Code of 1899 adopted by Nauru. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Nauru] (2016-05-12)
• The IP Division consists of a Registrar, two legal officers, a Pleader, and Paralegal officers from the Business Section and the Office of the Solicitor General. [https://justice.gov.nr/intellectual-property-division/]
• Form 1 – Application form for an invention to be registered as a grant of patent is available for download. [https://justice.gov.nr/intellectual-property-division/]
• A Proposed Rule by the Treasury Department on April 17, 2003, imposes special measures against Nauru due to money laundering concerns. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2003/04/17/03-9410/financial-crimes-enforcement-network-imposition-of-special-measures-against-the-country-of-nauru] (2003-04-17)

25 further Nauru enforcement records

Nepal

• Regulator Name: Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB)
• Entity Targeted: General Public, financial institutions, and any individuals or groups involved in cryptocurrency-related activities. Violation Type: Engaging in, facilitating, or promoting illegal cryptocurrency activities (trading, mining, holding, investment), which are considered violations of foreign exchange regulations and potentially money laundering laws. Penalty Amount: The NRB itself doesn't issue direct "penalties" in these warnings, but the legal framework invoked carries significant penalties. Under the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 2019 (2076 BS), violations can lead to:.
• Confiscation of the disputed amount.
• A fine of up to three times the disputed amount.
• Imprisonment for up to three years.
• Confiscation of assets used in the illegal activity.
• Additionally, money laundering charges under the Asset (Money) Laundering Prevention Act, 2008 (2064 BS) can lead to heavier fines and longer prison sentences.
• Date: Ongoing, with significant public warnings reiterated in October 2021, January 2022, and subsequent informal statements by officials.
• Outcome: Crypto activities remain illegal in Nepal. These warnings serve as a deterrent and provide the legal grounds for law enforcement agencies (like Nepal Police) to initiate criminal investigations and arrests.
• The Kathmandu Post (Oct 2021): Nepal Rastra Bank warns against trading cryptocurrencies
• The Himalayan Times (Jan 2022): NRB reiterates ban on cryptocurrency and pyramid schemes
• OnlineKhabar (Nepali - Feb 2022): क्रिप्टो कारोबार गरे नगर्न चेतावनी, गरे कारबाही गरिने राष्ट्र बैंकको भनाइ (NRB warns against crypto trading, says action will be taken if done)

9 further Nepal enforcement records

New Zealand

• Violation Type: Significant breaches of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (AML/CFT Act), including failures in customer due diligence, risk assessments, suspicious transaction reporting, and compliance programme. Penalty Amount: NZD $2.3 million. Outcome: Coinstash admitted to the breaches and agreed to pay the penalty. The DIA noted this was the largest financial penalty issued under the AML/CFT Act for a single infringement notice.
• Entity Targeted: Dasset Limited (now in liquidation). Violation Type: Significant breaches of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (AML/CFT Act), including failures in customer due diligence, risk assessments, record-keeping, and the overall compliance programme. Penalty Amount: NZD $1 million. Outcome: Dasset admitted to the breaches and agreed to pay the penalty. The company subsequently went into liquidation in October 2023, though the DIA noted the penalty was not the direct cause.
• Entity Targeted: James Malcolm Allan (individual). Violation Type: Operating an unregistered financial service provider, making misleading representations about financial products (including crypto-assets), and breaches of the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Financial Service Providers (Registration and Dispute Resolution) Act 2008. Allan had been promoting investments via social media, purporting to offer high returns from trading shares and crypto-assets. Penalty Amount: Permanent ban from providing financial services and from acting as a director or manager of any financial service provider. A pecuniary penalty of NZD $50,000 was also ordered. Outcome: The FMA successfully obtained orders from the High Court against Allan, resulting in the ban and penalty. This was a significant action against an individual promoting crypto-related investments without proper registration or disclosure.
• Outcome: Coinstash admitted to the breaches and agreed to pay the penalty. The DIA noted this was the largest financial penalty issued under the AML/CFT Act for a single infringement notice.
• Outcome: Dasset admitted to the breaches and agreed to pay the penalty. The company subsequently went into liquidation in October 2023, though the DIA noted the penalty was not the direct cause.
• Outcome: The FMA successfully obtained orders from the High Court against Allan, resulting in the ban and penalty. This was a significant action against an individual promoting crypto-related investments without proper registration or disclosure.

Nicaragua

• Regulator Name: The primary financial regulator in Nicaragua is the Banco Central de Nicaragua (BCN) (Central Bank of Nicaragua). The Superintendencia de Bancos y Otras Instituciones Financieras (SIBOIF) (Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions) oversees regulated financial entities, but cryptocurrencies are not recognized as such.
• Official Position: The BCN has consistently stated that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Nicaragua, are not regulated by the Central Bank, and do not fall under the existing legal framework for financial services. They have warned the public about the risks (volatility, lack of consumer protection, potential for illicit activities) associated with their use. This position has been reiterated multiple times.
• Nicaragua does not have specific laws or regulations governing the issuance, trading, or use of cryptocurrencies. This absence of a clear legal framework makes it challenging for regulators to conduct targeted enforcement actions against crypto entities. Any actions related to crypto would likely fall under broader general financial crime, anti-money laundering (AML), or fraud statutes, and these would not typically be reported specifically as "cryptocurrency enforcement actions."
• There are no publicly accessible records or news reports from Nicaraguan official sources or reputable international bodies (like FATF or GAFILAT reports on Nicaragua, which often mention financial crime enforcement) detailing specific penalties, dates, or outcomes of crypto-related enforcement actions against identifiable entities in Nicaragua in recent years.
• Regulator Name: Banco Central de Nicaragua (BCN)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Users of Cryptocurrencies (not a specific entity). Violation Type: N/A (as no specific regulation exists for "violation") – warnings focus on risks and lack of regulatory backing. Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Ongoing, periodically re-issued. An example of a historical warning (which continues to reflect the current stance) dates back several years and is often reiterated.
• Outcome: Public awareness about the unregulated nature of crypto.
• Source URL (Example reflecting the BCN's long-standing position):
• A common way central banks convey this is through their FAQs or press releases. For Nicaragua, information is often disseminated through local media citing BCN officials. While a specific BCN press release within the last 3 years directly about crypto enforcement is not readily found, their consistent position is well-documented in financial news from the region.
• Example (reflecting historical and ongoing stance, often cited in local media): You would typically find this kind of information directly on the BCN's website under "News" or "Press Releases," but direct, specific links to recent warnings might require deeper archival searches. However, numerous articles from Nicaraguan news outlets routinely cite the BCN's stance.
• For instance, an article from El 19 Digital in 2021 cited the BCN reiterating that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender: https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:117498-banco-central-de-nicaragua-aclara-estatus-de-las-criptomonedas- (Note: While this specific article is from 2021, it reiterates a consistent policy that predates and continues through the requested period).

Niger

• Regulatory Frameworks are Nascent: Specific laws and regulations dedicated to cryptocurrencies are still being developed, or they fall under broader financial or anti-money laundering (AML) laws.
• BCEAO is indeed the central bank of the eight UEMOA states, Niger included, and crypto-assets are not legal tender in the Union. But 'has consistently issued warnings' is not supported: both cited communique URLs silently resolve to the bceao.int homepage, and BCEAO's own indexes carry no crypto communique at all. The entire on-record BCEAO crypto output is the Dakar conference of 8 May 2026, the C-CRYPTO drafting committee created May 2026, and Governor Kassi Brou's oral July 2026 caution ('Ce n'est pas une monnaie. Ce n'est pas reglemente. Donc soyez prudents.'). BCEAO plays no supervisory role over crypto in Niger; the binding text is national — Ordonnance n° 2024-56 du 19 decembre 2024.
• Limited Public Reporting: Even if local authorities like Niger's Financial Intelligence Unit (CENTIF Niger) investigate or take action against individuals or small entities for crypto-related fraud or illicit activities, these cases are often prosecuted under general fraud or AML laws and are rarely reported internationally as "cryptocurrency enforcement actions" with specific details and URLs.
• Regulator: Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO)
• Entity Targeted: General public and financial institutions within the UEMOA zone (including Niger). Not a specific entity. Violation Type: Issuance of general warnings against the use and promotion of cryptocurrencies, stating they are not legal tender and carry significant risks (fraud, money laundering, financing of terrorism). Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as this is a regulatory warning, not a specific penalty.
• Date: Multiple communiqués have been issued over several years, with consistent messaging. A notable recent warning was issued in March 2022.
• No such prohibition exists. There is no BCEAO instrument banning or restricting crypto-asset activity by banks, EMEs, SFDs or any other assujetti — the payment-systems index (12 instruments, 2002-2024) and the LBC/FT register contain nothing on crypto-actifs, and the cited communiques do not exist. The only binding constraint anywhere in UEMOA is uniform-law art. 58 (transposed for Niger by Ordonnance n° 2024-56), which prohibits *unlicensed professional PSAV activity* — a licensing rule addressed to VASPs, not a ban addressed to banks.

Nigeria

• Regulator: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
• Entity Targeted: Over 1,100 (specifically 1,146) bank accounts of crypto traders and peer-to-peer merchants. Violation Type: Foreign-exchange racketeering, currency (naira) manipulation, money laundering, terrorism financing. Penalty Amount: Not specified (accounts frozen, no fines detailed).
• Date: Accounts frozen as part of an ongoing investigation starting early 2024; court order obtained by April 2024 (90-day investigation period noted)
• Outcome: Accounts frozen pending investigation completion; EFCC part of interagency task force probing naira manipulation linked to platforms like Binance. Investigation ongoing with potential blocks on fund retrieval even if court-ordered
• Source URL: https://www.dlnews.com/articles/regulation/nigeria-efcc-crackdown-crypto-traders-merchants/
• Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced strict AML checks on crypto firms (2024-2026), but no entities, penalties, or outcomes specified.
• Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires VASP registration under Investments and Securities Act 2025; non-compliance risks license revocation (no dated actions).
• New frameworks mandate national ID linkage for transactions and naira delisting from P2P exchanges (2024-2026), with penalties like license loss for unreported transactions.

North Korea

• Regulator Name: U.S. Department of the Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control - OFAC)
• Entity Targeted: Cryptocurrency Mixers (e.g., Sinbad.io). Violation Type: Facilitating money laundering for sanctioned entities, including North Korea's Lazarus Group, for proceeds from major cryptocurrency heists. Penalty Amount: Assets frozen, U.S. persons prohibited from transacting with the entity, effective shutdown of the service. (No specific fine amount against the mixer, but the economic impact is a cessation of operations).
• Date: November 29, 2023 (Sinbad.io) (2023-11-29)
• Outcome: Shut down of the Sinbad mixer, seizure of its infrastructure, and disruption of a critical money laundering avenue for North Korean hackers. This followed similar actions against Tornado Cash in August 2022, which was also used by the Lazarus Group.
• Source URL (Sinbad): https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1950
• Source URL (Tornado Cash - relevant for NK links): https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tn1645
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and associated cryptocurrency addresses linked to North Korean state-sponsored hacking groups (e.g., Lazarus Group/APT38). Violation Type: Conspiracy to commit money laundering, international money laundering, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, theft of cryptocurrency. Penalty Amount: Indictment of individuals, seizure of tens of millions of dollars in stolen cryptocurrency.
• March 2023: Seizure of $63 million in cryptocurrency related to the March 2022 Axie Infinity's Ronin Bridge hack (where over $625 million was stolen by Lazarus Group).
• January 2023: Seizure of over $100 million in cryptocurrency related to multiple hacks, including the Harmony Bridge (June 2022) and the Axie Infinity hack, both attributed to Lazarus Group.
• Date: January 2023, March 2023 (and ongoing throughout 2022-2024 for various recovery efforts).
• Outcome: Recovery of a significant portion of stolen funds, disruption of North Korea's ability to cash out illicit gains, and public identification of wallet addresses and laundering techniques used by DPRK actors. The indictments serve as a deterrent and basis for future arrests if individuals leave North Korea.
• Source URL (Axie/Harmony Seizures - March 2023 Update): https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-identifies-north-korean-hackers-responsible-for-600m-theft-of-cryptocurrency-from-axie-infinitys-ronin-bridge

6 further North Korea enforcement records

North Macedonia

• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions under NBRSM supervision (banks, savings houses). Violation Type: While not a "violation" in the traditional sense, the NBRSM has consistently warned against the risks associated with cryptocurrencies and explicitly prohibited supervised financial institutions from dealing with them. This sets the regulatory boundary. Penalty Amount: N/A (This is a regulatory warning/stance, not a direct penalty for a specific breach by a regulated entity). Outcome: Heightened public awareness of crypto risks, reinforced prohibition for traditional financial institutions, setting a cautious regulatory tone. The NBRSM maintains that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and do not fall under its regulatory supervision.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and organized groups operating illegal cryptocurrency mining farms. Violation Type: Theft of electricity, unauthorized connection to the electrical grid, potential charges for tax evasion, and sometimes organized crime. Penalty Amount: Seizure of expensive mining equipment (estimated value often in the hundreds of thousands of Euros), criminal charges, potential imprisonment, and financial penalties for stolen electricity. Specific penalty amounts vary per case and conviction. Outcome: Arrests of individuals, confiscation of mining hardware, disruption of illegal operations, and ongoing criminal proceedings. These actions highlight the MVR's focus on economic crime related to crypto.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and criminal groups involved in online fraud schemes often utilizing cryptocurrencies for payments or as the subject of the scam (e.g., fake investment platforms). Violation Type: Computer fraud, money laundering, organized crime. Penalty Amount: Seizure of assets, criminal charges, potential imprisonment, and restitution if convicted. Specific amounts are often under investigation or determined at conviction. Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, disruption of fraudulent networks. The MVR regularly issues warnings about various online scams, many of which now involve cryptocurrency. While a single "major bust" focusing solely on crypto fraud with a public, finalized penalty within the last 3 years is hard to isolate from ongoing investigations, the MVR's continuous alerts and smaller-scale arrests demonstrate active enforcement.
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness of crypto risks, reinforced prohibition for traditional financial institutions, setting a cautious regulatory tone. The NBRSM maintains that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and do not fall under its regulatory supervision.
• Outcome: Arrests of individuals, confiscation of mining hardware, disruption of illegal operations, and ongoing criminal proceedings. These actions highlight the MVR's focus on economic crime related to crypto.
• Outcome: Arrests, ongoing investigations, disruption of fraudulent networks. The MVR regularly issues warnings about various online scams, many of which now involve cryptocurrency. While a single "major bust" focusing solely on crypto fraud with a public, finalized penalty within the last 3 years is hard to isolate from ongoing investigations, the MVR's continuous alerts and smaller-scale arrests demonstrate active enforcement.

Norway

• Entity Targeted: Unknown perpetrators of the Poly Network hack, and the stolen funds themselves. Violation Type: Crypto theft, money laundering. Penalty Amount: Recovery of stolen funds totaling approximately $5.8 million (at the time of recovery announcement). This is not a fine on an entity, but a successful recovery of criminal proceeds. Outcome: Økokrim successfully recovered significant funds stolen in the August 2021 Poly Network hack, which were subsequently mixed using the Tornado Cash service. This was a major international collaboration highlighting Norway's capabilities in tracing and seizing crypto assets involved in sophisticated hacks.
• Entity Targeted: Kryptobørs AS (a Norwegian crypto exchange). Violation Type: Failure to comply with anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, inadequate internal controls, and operating without proper registration/licensing as a virtual asset service provider (VASP) for all services offered. Penalty Amount: Ordered to terminate its business. No specific monetary fine was publicized in connection with this specific order, but the cessation of operations is a severe penalty. Outcome: Finanstilsynet ordered Kryptobørs AS to terminate its business as a virtual asset service provider due to significant and persistent breaches of the Anti-Money Laundering Act and related regulations. This was a decisive action to remove a non-compliant entity from the market.
• Entity Targeted: Norges Kryptobørs AS (a Norwegian crypto exchange). Violation Type: Failure to comply with anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, specifically regarding inadequate risk assessment, customer due diligence (CDD) procedures, and not being properly registered for all types of currency exchange services offered. Penalty Amount: Ordered to cease providing currency exchange services involving fiat currency. No specific monetary fine was publicized in connection with this order, but the restriction on services is a significant penalty. Outcome: Finanstilsynet ordered Norges Kryptobørs AS to stop offering services involving the exchange between virtual and fiat currencies due to serious deficiencies in its AML compliance framework. The firm was permitted to continue offering exchange services between virtual assets.
• Outcome: Økokrim successfully recovered significant funds stolen in the August 2021 Poly Network hack, which were subsequently mixed using the Tornado Cash service. This was a major international collaboration highlighting Norway's capabilities in tracing and seizing crypto assets involved in sophisticated hacks.
• Legal Basis: Implemented through Lov om iverksetting av internasjonale sanksjoner (sanksjonsloven) (Act on the implementation of international sanctions (the Sanctions Act)) and specific regulations (forskrifter) for each sanctions regime.
• Legal Basis: Implemented through the Sanksjonsloven and subsequent "forskrifter" (regulations) issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which effectively transpose EU measures into Norwegian law.

Oman

• Central Bank of Oman (CBO): Has consistently issued warnings against dealing in cryptocurrencies for financial institutions under its supervision, citing risks such as volatility, money laundering, and lack of regulatory oversight. These warnings essentially act as a prohibition for banks and payment service providers. While these warnings are a form of regulatory action, they haven't been followed by publicly disclosed, named enforcement actions with specific fines against a particular entity for crypto-related violations that are distinct from broader financial regulations.
• Capital Market Authority (CMA): This is where the most significant development has occurred recently. The CMA has been working on and recently issued a regulatory framework for Virtual Assets, marking a shift towards controlled legitimization rather than outright prohibition in certain sectors.
• CBO Warnings against Crypto (Ongoing/Recurring)
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Oman (CBO)
• Entity Targeted: Financial institutions regulated by CBO (e.g., banks, payment service providers) and the general public. Violation Type (Implied): Engaging in or facilitating cryptocurrency transactions, promoting crypto investments, or operating without proper licenses/oversight. These warnings aim to prevent such activities. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to a general warning. Any penalties for non-compliance by regulated entities would fall under existing financial regulations, but specific crypto-related fines haven't been publicly detailed.
• Date: Ongoing, with several advisories issued over the past few years. A prominent one was in late 2022/early 2023.
• Outcome: Prohibition for supervised entities and strong discouragement for the public, aiming to mitigate financial and systemic risks.
• While specific CBO press releases on individual warnings are hard to find archived publicly in English, their general stance is widely reported by Omani media and financial news outlets. Here's a relevant article discussing their position:
• Times of Oman (Dec 2022/Jan 2023): https://timesofoman.com/article/124706-oman-moving-forward-with-virtual-assets-amid-cbo-warnings (This article highlights the CBO's warnings in the context of broader developments).
• CMA Issuance of Virtual Asset Regulatory Framework
• Regulator Name: Capital Market Authority (CMA)
• Entity Targeted: Future Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) wishing to operate in Oman, and potentially entities currently operating without oversight. Violation Type (Implied for Future): Operating as a VASP in Oman without a license once the framework is fully implemented, or non-compliance with the new regulations. Penalty Amount: The framework itself details potential fines and sanctions for non-compliance, but these are part of the new regulations rather than penalties for past violations. No specific amounts have been levied yet under this framework against a named entity.

4 further Oman enforcement records

Pakistan

• Entity Targeted: Binance Pakistan (and implicitly, individuals running scam schemes facilitated through Binance). Violation Type: Alleged involvement in multi-million dollar cryptocurrency scam, money laundering, illegal financial transactions, non-compliance with local regulations. The FIA issued a formal notice to Binance's Global Head of Growth for its alleged role in facilitating fraudulent transactions that led to significant financial losses for Pakistani citizens. Penalty Amount: No direct fine was publicly levied against Binance by Pakistani authorities. The "penalty" was primarily investigative pressure, a formal inquiry, and a demand for cooperation, which could have led to further action or reputational damage. The FIA initiated criminal proceedings against individuals involved in the scam. Outcome: The FIA launched an inquiry and issued a formal notice to Binance, demanding details and cooperation. Binance subsequently stated its commitment to cooperate with the FIA and local authorities. The FIA also identified and initiated action against 11 individuals alleged to be masterminds of a multi-million dollar fraud scheme involving Binance. The action highlighted the government's serious concerns about unregulated crypto activities. While Binance itself wasn't fined, the action put significant pressure on the exchange and warned the public.

Palau

• Small Financial Sector & Nascent Regulation: Palau is a small island nation with a relatively small financial sector. While it is exploring digital assets (e.g., its national stablecoin initiative with Ripple), its regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies is still evolving. The focus tends to be on establishing foundational Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) compliance rather than large-scale, public enforcement actions against crypto entities.
• Primary Regulatory Body: The primary body responsible for financial intelligence and AML/CFT oversight in Palau is the Palau Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Their work often involves suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and cooperation with international bodies like the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), but individual enforcement actions with public details like specific penalties against crypto entities are not commonly published.
• Focus on Development, Not Enforcement (Yet): Palau has been notably proactive in exploring the adoption of digital assets, such as its "Root Name System" initiative and the Palau Stablecoin (PSC) pilot program. This indicates a forward-looking approach, but it also means the regulatory and enforcement infrastructure for complex crypto violations may still be under development.
• Palau Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU): While their website primarily focuses on AML/CFT guidelines and STR reporting, it's the key agency for financial oversight.
• Unfortunately, their official website is not consistently accessible or robust for public announcements of detailed enforcement actions. General information regarding FIUs and their role can be found through international bodies like the Egmont Group.
• Palau Stablecoin (PSC) Initiative: Information about Palau's digital currency efforts often comes from news outlets or partners like Ripple. This signifies their engagement with crypto, but not enforcement.
• Example article on PSC: https://ripple.com/news/palau-cbdc-platform-ripple-official-update/ (This discusses a development, not an enforcement.)

Palestine

• Regulator Name: Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA)
• Entity Targeted: All financial institutions under PMA supervision, and by extension, the general public within its jurisdiction. Violation Type: Dealing in cryptocurrencies. The PMA considers cryptocurrencies to be highly volatile, prone to speculative risks, lacking legal tender status, and a tool for money laundering and terrorism financing. Penalty Amount: No specific penalty amount against an individual entity has been publicly announced by the PMA for crypto dealing. The implication is that financial institutions dealing in crypto would face regulatory sanctions (e.g., license revocation, operational restrictions) from the PMA. Individuals could face legal consequences under local laws.
• Date: The PMA first issued a warning against dealing in cryptocurrencies in 2018 and has reiterated its prohibition multiple times, including within the last three years. For instance, statements reiterating caution or prohibition have been reported in 2021.
• Outcome: Cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender in Palestine, and licensed financial institutions are explicitly prohibited from dealing in them. This discourages official adoption and pushes any activity underground.
• While a direct, recent PMA press release explicitly reiterating a new enforcement action is hard to find, consistent news reporting confirms the ongoing prohibition:
• Palestinian Authority Warns Against Dealing in Cryptocurrencies: https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/102924 (This article is from 2018, but the stance remains unchanged and is the foundational regulatory position.)
• Local news references often confirm the PMA's consistent stance: Search for "Palestinian Monetary Authority cryptocurrency" for ongoing mentions of their prohibition.
• Regulator Name: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
• Entity Targeted: Various individuals and entities associated with Hamas's financial network, including specific virtual currency exchanges and crypto addresses. Key targets included Al-Qard al-Hassan (a Lebanon-based entity linked to Hizballah but also implicated in broader terror financing networks), and individuals facilitating Hamas's crypto fundraising efforts. Violation Type: Terrorism financing, providing material support to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization. Penalty Amount: Sanctions (asset freezes, prohibition of transactions by U.S. persons) – not a specific dollar fine but a severe economic penalty. OFAC actions aim to block assets and prevent engagement with the U.S. financial system.
• Date: April 19, 2022 (2022-04-19)
• Outcome: Disruption of fundraising channels for Hamas, freezing of assets in any U.S. jurisdiction, and making it extremely difficult for designated individuals/entities to engage with the global financial system. This action highlighted the increasing use of crypto by terrorist groups and the U.S. government's intent to counter it.
• Treasury Sanctions Hizballah and Hamas Financial Facilitators and Networks: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0730

7 further Palestine enforcement records

Panama

• Evolving Regulatory Framework: Panama has been discussing comprehensive cryptocurrency regulation, most notably with Bill 697, which was partially vetoed in 2022. This lack of a clear, dedicated crypto legal framework means that enforcement would likely fall under existing general financial laws (e.g., anti-money laundering, fraud), making it harder to categorize specifically as "crypto enforcement."
• Focus on AML/CFT: Panama was on the FATF grey list until October 2023, which heavily emphasized improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. While this pressure indirectly affects crypto (as it's a known vector for financial crime), direct, high-profile enforcement actions against crypto entities with specific fines haven't been widely publicized as a result.
• Publicity Practices: Panamanian financial regulators (like the Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá - SBP, or Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores - SMV, or the Unidad de Análisis Financiero - UAF) may not always publicize enforcement actions with the same level of detail as regulators in jurisdictions like the United States or Europe. Criminal investigations would fall under the Ministerio Público (Public Ministry), and details are often restricted during ongoing proceedings.
• Regulator Name: Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá (SBP) - Banking Superintendent of Panama
• Entity Targeted: Financial institutions under its supervision, and the general public. Violation Type (Implied): Operating without proper licensing for financial services involving crypto, and general financial risk to consumers. Penalty Amount: Not applicable (these are warnings, not direct fines).
• Date: Ongoing, but prominent warnings were issued in 2022 and 2023.
• Outcome: Increased awareness among regulated entities and the public about the risks and the SBP's stance that crypto activities are not regulated by them and do not carry deposit insurance.
• The SBP has repeatedly issued statements clarifying that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Panama, are not regulated by the SBP, and entities under its supervision (banks) should exercise extreme caution and assess risks related to crypto assets. They have warned against financial institutions engaging in crypto activities without proper risk management and adherence to existing AML/CFT regulations.
• SBP Comunicado (Press Release) - 2022: "La Superintendencia de Bancos reitera la no validez de las criptomonedas como medio de pago o moneda de curso legal y la no regulación y supervisión sobre ellas." (The Superintendency of Banks reiterates the invalidity of cryptocurrencies as a means of payment or legal tender and the lack of regulation and supervision over them.)
• While a direct URL for a specific enforcement action is not available, you can find the SBP's general warnings and position on their official website under press releases or communiqués:
• Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá Official Website (Navigate to "Comunicados" or "Prensa" for recent statements on crypto risks, often in the context of the failed Bill 697).
• Failed Cryptocurrency Law (Bill 697):

6 further Panama enforcement records

Papua New Guinea

• Regulator Name: Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG)
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions, individuals considering or engaging with cryptocurrencies. Violation Type (Implied): Engaging in unauthorized financial activities; lack of consumer protection for speculative investments; potential for financial crime. Penalty Amount: N/A (This was a public warning, not an enforcement action with a specific penalty).
• Date: August 12, 2021 (The most prominent public warning in recent years) (2021-08-12)
• Outcome: The BPNG clarified that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in PNG. They highlighted risks such as volatility, lack of regulation, potential for scams, and use in illicit activities. The statement advised the public to exercise caution and warned that losses would not be protected by PNG laws. It also indicated the BPNG's intention to develop appropriate regulations for digital assets in the future. This warning has generally underpinned the BPNG's ongoing stance.
• Bank of Papua New Guinea - Public Notice on Digital Currencies, Virtual Assets and Cryptocurrencies (PDF)
• Business Advantage PNG - PNG central bank issues warning on cryptocurrencies
• Entity Targeted: General public, potential market participants, financial sector. Violation Type (Implied): Operating without appropriate licensing once a framework is established; engaging in risky or illicit activities. Penalty Amount: N/A (Ongoing policy development and warnings, no specific penalties).
• Date: Ongoing, with updates or reiterations appearing in various reports and speeches (e.g., annual reports, statements to media).
• Outcome: The BPNG continues to monitor global developments and has expressed its intention to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital assets. This includes exploring options for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and regulating private virtual assets. The current outcome is a state of active observation and policy formulation rather than direct enforcement.
• Statements are often general and not tied to a single "action" URL, but reflect ongoing policy. For example, the BPNG's Annual Reports or public addresses often touch upon these topics. The above 2021 notice remains the foundational document. News articles frequently refer back to this stance:
• PNG Central Bank: A cautious approach towards cryptocurrency - The PNG Bulletin (Refers to BPNG's ongoing stance in 2022)
• BPNG Governor's Speeches and Statements (often contain updates on regulatory priorities) (While not a direct enforcement action, this is where updates on regulatory intent would be found.)

1 further Papua New Guinea enforcement records

Paraguay

• Entity Targeted: Numerous individuals and groups operating large-scale, unauthorized cryptocurrency mining farms. Outcome: Hundreds of illegal mining farms disconnected, numerous arrests, significant economic losses to operators through equipment confiscation and fines, and continued efforts by authorities to curb the practice.
• Entity Targeted: The general public and potential Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). Violation Type: Not applicable, as these are warnings/guidance, not punitive actions. Penalty Amount: Not applicable. Outcome: Increased awareness of risks, and a clear signal that regulatory oversight for VASPs is developing. SEPRELAD has issued guidance on AML/CFT for VASPs, indicating future enforcement will likely come from them once a comprehensive licensing regime is in place.
• Outcome: Hundreds of illegal mining farms disconnected, numerous arrests, significant economic losses to operators through equipment confiscation and fines, and continued efforts by authorities to curb the practice.
• Outcome: Increased awareness of risks, and a clear signal that regulatory oversight for VASPs is developing. SEPRELAD has issued guidance on AML/CFT for VASPs, indicating future enforcement will likely come from them once a comprehensive licensing regime is in place.

Philippines

• Entity: Binance (world’s largest crypto exchange).
• Violation: Operating without required authorization under the Crypto Asset Service Provider (CASP) framework.
• Penalty: Geo-blocking; users given 90 days to exit the platform, with website and app access restricted via coordination with telecom providers.
• Date: 2024 (successful enforcement establishing pattern for later actions).
• SEC public advisory and enforcement (no specific circular cited; referenced as prior CASP violation): https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/philippines-sec-targets-major-crypto-exchanges-in-regulatory-crackdown
• Confirmed in SEC advisory context: https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/27892371667002; https://bitpinas.com/regulation/sec-flags-10/
• Entities: OKX, Bybit, KuCoin, Kraken, MEXC, Bitget, Phemex, CoinEx, BitMart, Poloniex (actively marketing to and serving Filipino users).
• Violation: Operating without SEC licenses/registrations under CASP Rules and Guidelines (Memorandum Circulars No. 4 and No. 5, effective July 2025); providing/soliciting crypto trading services without authorization.
• Penalty: Public advisory (August 1-4, 2025); threats of cease-and-desist orders, criminal complaints, website/app blocking via NTC, takedown requests to Google/Meta. Telecoms (PLDT, Smart, Globe) began blocking; list not exhaustive. (2025-08-01)
• Date: Advisory issued August 1, 2025; warnings escalated August 4, 2025. (2025-08-01)
• SEC Investor Advisory (August 1, 2025), SEC CASP Rules: www.sec.gov.ph (via advisory); https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/philippines-sec-targets-major-crypto-exchanges-in-regulatory-crackdown (2025-08-01)
• SEC Advisory (August 4): https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/27892371667002; https://bitpinas.com/regulation/sec-flags-10/

10 further Philippines enforcement records

Poland

• Legal Basis: Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
• Legal Basis: UN Security Council Resolutions, implemented via EU Regulations.

Portugal

• September 2025: Eurojust coordinated an operation halting a cryptocurrency investment fraud exceeding 100 million euros across Europe, resulting in five arrests including the alleged main perpetrator.
• May 2024: A coordinated operation uncovered a cryptocurrency scam using "rip deals" methods, leading to suspect arrests in France, with investigations involving Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Romania.
• The Portuguese Securities Commission (CMVM) website for market abuse and crypto asset service provider violations
• The Bank of Portugal for anti-money laundering compliance actions
• Individual regulator enforcement databases

Puerto Rico

• Required License: Money Transmitter License (MTL) from the OCFI.
• Reasoning: When an exchange facilitates the exchange of fiat currency for virtual assets, or vice-versa, it is performing a money transmission service by accepting funds (fiat or virtual assets) from one party and making them available to another, or transmitting funds on behalf of consumers.
• FinCEN: Also requires MSB registration (as a money transmitter) with FinCEN.
• Required License: The application of the Money Transmitters Act to purely crypto-to-crypto exchanges can be a grey area in some jurisdictions. However, OCFI, like many other U.S. state regulators, generally takes a broad interpretation that if the virtual assets are considered "value" or "funds" and the entity facilitates their transfer for others, an MTL is likely required. It is best practice to assume an MTL is needed or seek specific guidance from OCFI.
• FinCEN: FinCEN's guidance explicitly states that exchangers of convertible virtual currency (even crypto-to-crypto) are MSBs and must register as such.
• Required License: If a custody provider holds virtual assets on behalf of others and facilitates their transfer or makes them available to others, they are generally considered to be performing a "money transmission" function. Therefore, an MTL from OCFI is typically required.
• FinCEN: Entities that act as custodians of virtual currency, facilitating transfers for others, are generally considered "administrators" or "exchangers" under FinCEN guidance and must register as an MSB.
• Required License: Payment processors that handle virtual assets (e.g., converting crypto payments into fiat for merchants, or vice-versa) are clearly engaged in money transmission. An MTL from OCFI is required.
• FinCEN: Must register as an MSB (money transmitter).
• Net Worth: Applicants must demonstrate a minimum net worth. For a Puerto Rico Money Transmitter License, Act No. 93, Article 5, generally requires a minimum net worth of $100,000 for the first location and an additional $50,000 for each additional location or authorized agent (up to a maximum of $500,000).
• Surety Bond: Licensees must maintain a surety bond to protect consumers. The bond amount is determined by the Commissioner based on the anticipated volume of business, typically ranging from a minimum of $10,000 up to a maximum of $500,000.
• Comprehensive AML Program: Licensed entities must establish and maintain a robust Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) program. This includes:

73 further Puerto Rico enforcement records

Qatar

• Legal Basis: Qatar implements UN Security Council Resolutions through its domestic legal framework, primarily Law No. 20 of 2019 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. This law mandates compliance with UN sanctions, including the freezing of funds and assets of designated individuals and entities.

Romania

• Entity Targeted: Organized criminal groups composed of multiple individuals (often Romanian citizens operating globally). Violation Type: Organized crime, computer fraud, aggravated fraud, money laundering, setting up illegal financial investment schemes (Ponzi-like schemes using crypto). These groups typically lured victims into fake cryptocurrency investment platforms, promising high returns, only to steal their funds. Penalty Amount: Not a single fine, but the estimated damages/stolen funds often run into tens to hundreds of millions of USD/EUR across various operations. Assets (properties, luxury cars, cryptocurrencies, cash) are seized during investigations. Individuals face lengthy prison sentences upon conviction. Outcome: Multiple individuals arrested, indicted, and facing criminal prosecution. Assets seized. Some cases are ongoing in court; others have led to convictions. These operations often dismantle sophisticated, internationally operating fraud rings.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals or, in some cases, businesses found to have undeclared income from cryptocurrency trading or mining. Violation Type: Tax evasion (undeclared income from cryptocurrency transactions). Penalty Amount: Varies significantly depending on the undeclared amounts. It includes back taxes, penalties (e.g., 0.02% per day of delay), and interest. Specific aggregated amounts for "significant" cases against entities are rarely publicized, but for individuals, it can reach hundreds of thousands of RON. Outcome: Tax assessments issued, collection of back taxes, penalties, and interest. Criminal charges for severe cases of tax evasion.
• Legal Basis: Law no. 129/2019 for the prevention and combatting of money laundering and terrorism financing, as subsequently amended and supplemented (transposing AML V).
• Outcome: Multiple individuals arrested, indicted, and facing criminal prosecution. Assets seized. Some cases are ongoing in court; others have led to convictions. These operations often dismantle sophisticated, internationally operating fraud rings.
• Outcome: Tax assessments issued, collection of back taxes, penalties, and interest. Criminal charges for severe cases of tax evasion.

Rwanda

• Rwanda enacted a comprehensive virtual-asset statute on 25 May 2026: Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026 regulating virtual asset business, Official Gazette nº Special of 28/05/2026, which sets licensing conditions at Article 10, suspension and revocation at Article 11, a regulatory sandbox at Article 13, the virtual-asset service list at Article 14, administrative sanctions at Article 32 and offences at Articles 33 to 38, and makes the Capital Market Authority of Rwanda the licensing and supervisory authority. The implementing regulations remain unmade, so the licensing regime is in force yet not operable. No National Bank of Rwanda virtual-asset warning exists as a published central-bank instrument.
• Rwanda's virtual-asset investor-protection rules are statutory and belong to the Capital Market Authority of Rwanda, at Articles 25 to 27 of Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026 on investor protection, market conduct and data and asset protection, with technology and information security at Article 28 and inspections at Article 29. No National Bank of Rwanda cryptocurrency warning exists as a published central-bank instrument, and the Capital Market Authority's licensee register carries ten categories, from exchanges to investment advisers, with no virtual-asset category and no licensed virtual asset service provider.
• Rwanda has a statutory virtual-asset licensing regime at Article 10 of Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026, and enforcement runs through that statute rather than through general financial law: Article 6(b) directs the Capital Market Authority of Rwanda to identify a virtual asset service provider that contravenes the Law, Article 29 provides for inspections, Article 30 for freezing of virtual assets, Article 32 for administrative sanctions and Articles 33 to 38 for offences. Because the implementing regulations are unmade, no licence has been issued and no enforcement action has been published.
• Limited Market Size: The cryptocurrency market in Rwanda may not yet be large enough to attract the scale of illicit activity or the number of unregulated operators that would trigger frequent, large-scale, and publicly reported enforcement actions seen in more mature or permissive crypto jurisdictions.
• Rwanda's virtual-asset regulator is the Capital Market Authority of Rwanda: Articles 5 to 7 of Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026 establish it as the Regulatory Authority, Article 6 charges it with supervising virtual asset service providers and with ensuring their anti-money-laundering compliance, and Article 14 makes it the licensing authority for virtual asset services. Article 8 gives the National Bank of Rwanda a cooperation role together with power to issue directives on matters falling under its own purview, which is a directive power rather than a licensing power.
• Rwanda's official position on virtual assets is set by statute rather than by warning. Article 15 of Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026 bars natural persons from carrying on virtual asset business, provides that virtual assets are not legal tender and cannot be used as a direct means of payment unless the National Bank of Rwanda authorises it, requires approval for mining facilities, virtual-asset automated teller machines and mixer or tumbler services, and restricts marketing to licensed providers. Article 4(3) excludes algorithmic stablecoins, non-fungible tokens and central bank digital currency from the Law's scope.
• Entity Targeted: The general public and potential investors. Penalty Amount: Not applicable, as these are warnings, not fines against specific entities.
• Date: Ongoing, with several statements issued over the years.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness about crypto risks and BNR's position. Discouragement of participation in unregulated crypto schemes.
• Virtual assets are not legal tender in Rwanda, and the rule is statutory rather than declaratory: Article 15 of Law nº 023/2026 of 25/05/2026 provides that virtual assets are not legal tender and cannot be used as a direct means of payment unless the National Bank of Rwanda authorises it. The National Bank of Rwanda has published no instrument of its own stating that position.
• Source URL (Example of BNR's official statements regarding financial stability and emerging risks, which includes virtual assets): It's common for central banks to embed these warnings in their Financial Stability Reports or official press releases. While a single "enforcement action" URL isn't available, the BNR's general position is clear through its publications. You would typically find this mentioned in their Financial Stability Reports or general Press Releases section.
• Finding a direct BNR URL for a specific "warning" is challenging as they are often integrated into broader reports or general statements. A good starting point would be the BNR's official website: https://www.bnr.rw/

5 further Rwanda enforcement records

Saint Lucia

• General warnings to the public about the risks associated with unregulated virtual asset investments.
• Alerts about specific entities that are either unregulated or operating without the necessary licenses in Saint Lucia, often advising the public to exercise caution.
• Guidance on the requirements for obtaining a VASP license.
• Early Stages of Regulation: The VABA is relatively new, and the FSRA may still be in the initial phases of implementing and enforcing its provisions, focusing on awareness and licensing rather than punitive actions.
• Focus on Public Warnings: Many smaller jurisdictions prioritize issuing public warnings about unregulated entities rather than formal enforcement actions with fines, especially if the entities are not locally incorporated or easily subject to local jurisdiction.
• Market Size: The cryptocurrency market in Saint Lucia might be smaller compared to major global financial centers, potentially leading to fewer high-profile violations that warrant significant public enforcement.
• Lack of Public Reporting: It's possible that enforcement actions have occurred but were not deemed significant enough for widespread public announcement, or were settled privately.
• Regulator: Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) of Saint Lucia
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Unregulated Entities (not a specific VASP for a VABA violation). Violation Type: N/A (as they are general warnings, not against a specific entity for a specific violation. However, the underlying concern is often operating without a required VASP license). Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Various (ongoing through 2021-2024)
• Outcome: Public awareness and caution advised regarding unregulated virtual asset services and investments. Promotion of the VABA and licensing requirements.
• Source URL: While not a specific enforcement action against a named entity, the FSRA's official website is the primary source for their public communications, where such notices would be found. You would typically navigate to their News/Public Notices section.

1 further Saint Lucia enforcement records

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

• Entity Targeted: General public and entities falsely claiming to be regulated by the SVG FSA for virtual asset business. Violation Type: Operating or advertising virtual asset business activities without proper licensing under the Virtual Asset Business Act, 2020 (VABA), or misrepresenting regulatory status. Penalty Amount: Not applicable to general warnings; specific penalties for unlicensed operation would be determined if an investigation led to a formal enforcement action, which typically isn't publicly detailed. Outcome: Increased public awareness, pressure on unlicensed entities to cease operations or comply, and a clear stance from the regulator.
• Entity Targeted: All virtual asset service providers (VASPs) and the general public, including those considering operating in or from SVG. Violation Type: N/A (this is a regulatory clarification, not an enforcement action itself). However, entities failing to register or comply with VABA would be in violation. Penalty Amount: N/A. Outcome: Enhanced clarity on legal obligations for VASPs, driving compliance with registration requirements, AML/CFT measures, and consumer protection. This sets the stage for future enforcement by defining what constitutes a violation.
• Outcome: Increased public awareness, pressure on unlicensed entities to cease operations or comply, and a clear stance from the regulator.
• Outcome: Enhanced clarity on legal obligations for VASPs, driving compliance with registration requirements, AML/CFT measures, and consumer protection. This sets the stage for future enforcement by defining what constitutes a violation.

Samoa

• Issuing Public Warnings and Advisories: Highlighting the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, stating they are not legal tender, and advising against their use for domestic transactions or investment.
• Clarifying Regulatory Status: Emphasizing that no local entities are licensed or authorized to deal in cryptocurrencies within Samoa's jurisdiction.
• Maintaining an AML/CFT Framework: While virtual assets are generally outside the regulated financial system, any illicit financial activity using them would fall under general anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws, but there haven't been public reports of specific crypto-related AML/CFT prosecutions in the last three years.
• Proactive Warnings: The regulators' strong warnings may have deterred widespread local adoption or the establishment of crypto businesses without proper authorization.
• Lack of Domestic Licensing: Since no entities are licensed, there are fewer specific regulatory conditions to violate, leading to fewer enforcement actions typically seen in regulated markets.
• Focus on Consumer Protection: The primary goal seems to be protecting Samoan consumers and maintaining financial stability by discouraging involvement with unregulated crypto activities.
• Central Bank of Samoa (CBS) - Public Notice on Virtual Currencies (2018, reaffirmed consistently):
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Samoa (CBS)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Unregulated Crypto Businesses. Violation Type: N/A (Advisory, not an enforcement action against a specific entity). Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: December 2018 (reiterated in subsequent communications)
• Outcome: Advised the public that virtual currencies are not legal tender in Samoa, warned of high risks (volatility, scams, money laundering), and stated that no companies are licensed by the CBS to deal in cryptocurrencies in Samoa. This sets the foundational regulatory stance.
• Source URL: While the specific 2018 notice might be hard to find directly online from CBS, its substance is widely referenced and confirmed in later statements and reports. The CBS website frequently reiterates its cautionary stance on digital assets.

9 further Samoa enforcement records

San Marino

• No Licensed DLT Service Providers (as of last major assessment): A key finding from the MONEYVAL (Council of Europe anti-money laundering body) "Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report on San Marino" published in July 2022 stated:
• Focus on Regulatory Framework Development: San Marino has been more focused on building its regulatory framework. The BCSM is the primary regulator and issues circulars and regulations. Their focus in recent years has been on establishing robust AML/CFT measures for new technologies.
• Discretionary Enforcement/Lack of High-Profile Cases: In smaller jurisdictions, enforcement actions, if they occur, might not always be widely publicized, especially if they are against smaller, unlicensed operations or result in administrative warnings rather than significant public penalties. It's also possible that San Marino hasn't experienced high-profile crypto-related financial crimes or major non-compliance incidents warranting significant public enforcement.
• Regulator Name: Banca Centrale della Repubblica di San Marino (BCSM)
• Relevant Legislation: Law No. 195 of 2020 on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and subsequent BCSM regulations and circulars implementing AML/CFT measures.
• Title: MONEYVAL Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report on San Marino
• This report is crucial as it details San Marino's AML/CFT framework and its effectiveness, specifically mentioning the status of DLT service providers.
• The BCSM website provides official information on regulations, circulars, and the financial sector, but a search of their press releases or supervisory actions sections does not reveal specific crypto enforcement actions meeting the requested criteria within the timeframe.
• Legal Basis: Law No. 182/2004 (AML/CTF Law) and its implementing decrees provide the national legal framework for applying these international obligations.

Sao Tome and Principe

• Small Financial Market: Sao Tome and Principe has a very small economy and financial sector. The adoption and prevalence of complex cryptocurrency operations that would warrant significant enforcement actions (like those seen in major financial hubs) are extremely limited.
• Developing Regulatory Framework: Many smaller nations are still in the early stages of developing specific regulations for cryptocurrencies. Their primary focus tends to be on general financial stability, anti-money laundering (AML), and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) within traditional banking.
• Primary Regulator: The main financial regulator in Sao Tome and Principe is the Banco Central de São Tomé e Príncipe (BCSTP). Their pronouncements on digital currencies typically revolve around issuing warnings to the public about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, rather than specific enforcement actions against entities. They often emphasize that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender.
• Lack of Public Reporting: Even if smaller, localized enforcement actions (e.g., against a very small local operation or individual) were to occur, they are rarely reported beyond national borders or in a manner that is easily accessible internationally.
• Regulator: Banco Central de São Tomé e Príncipe (BCSTP)
• Entity Targeted: General public / Unlicensed entities (implicitly). Violation Type: Engaging with unregulated, volatile, and potentially fraudulent virtual assets; operating without proper licensing (though specific crypto licensing frameworks might not even exist). Penalty Amount: N/A (as these are warnings, not penalties).
• Date: Ongoing (such warnings are typically re-issued periodically or remain on official websites)
• Outcome: Public awareness, discouragement of crypto use, maintaining financial stability.
• Source URL: Official communications from the BCSTP (e.g., their website). However, specific English-language press releases on this topic are not consistently available or archived in a searchable way for international users. You would typically need to monitor the official Portuguese-language site of the BCSTP directly for any such notices.
• Directly monitor the official website of the Banco Central de São Tomé e Príncipe (BCSTP) for any press releases or official circulars.
• Consult reports from international bodies like the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), which sometimes highlight gaps in AML/CFT frameworks in various countries, including how they address virtual assets. However, these would point to systemic issues, not specific enforcement actions against crypto entities.

Serbia

• Entity Targeted: Various domestic entities and individuals operating crypto asset exchange or custody services without the required licenses. While specific names are not always publicly disclosed with detailed penalties, the NBS has consistently emphasized its licensing requirements and taken steps against non-compliant entities. Violation Type: Operating a virtual asset service provider (VASP) without obtaining the necessary operating license from the NBS, as mandated by the Digital Assets Law. This includes facilitating the exchange of virtual assets for fiat currency or other virtual assets, or providing custody services. Penalty Amount: Administrative fines, cessation of operations. The Digital Assets Law (Article 109, Paragraph 1, Point 1 and 2) prescribes fines ranging from RSD 100,000 to RSD 5,000,000 for legal entities and RSD 10,000 to RSD 500,000 for responsible persons within the legal entity, along with potential protective measures like a ban on conducting business. Outcome: Several entities have either ceased operations, come into compliance, or faced administrative proceedings. The NBS continues to monitor the market for unlicensed activity.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and organized criminal groups involved in large-scale crypto Ponzi schemes, investment fraud, and money laundering using virtual assets. Examples include actions related to the "Infinity Economics" scheme and connections to other global crypto scams like "Finiko.". Violation Type: Fraud, money laundering, unauthorized organization of games of chance (depending on the nature of the scheme), cybercrime. These often fall under general criminal statutes rather than specific "crypto violations.". Penalty Amount: Arrests, pre-trial detention, asset freezes (including virtual assets), criminal charges leading to potential prison sentences if convicted. Specific final conviction penalties (amounts/sentences) are rarely publicly detailed for each individual case by Serbian authorities, especially if investigations are ongoing or multi-jurisdictional. Outcome: Numerous arrests have been made, leading to ongoing investigations, indictments, and trials. Assets, including cryptocurrencies, have been seized. These cases are often complex and lengthy.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and legal entities earning income from digital assets (e.g., capital gains from crypto trading, income from mining, staking, or providing crypto services). Violation Type: Tax evasion related to income or capital gains derived from digital assets. Penalty Amount: Varies significantly based on the amount of unpaid tax, plus interest and potential fines as per tax laws. Outcome: Increased tax compliance, with individuals and entities reporting and paying taxes on their crypto gains. Audits and enforcement actions against non-compliant taxpayers are conducted, though details are private unless criminal charges are filed.
• Outcome: Several entities have either ceased operations, come into compliance, or faced administrative proceedings. The NBS continues to monitor the market for unlicensed activity.
• Outcome: Numerous arrests have been made, leading to ongoing investigations, indictments, and trials. Assets, including cryptocurrencies, have been seized. These cases are often complex and lengthy.
• Outcome: Increased tax compliance, with individuals and entities reporting and paying taxes on their crypto gains. Audits and enforcement actions against non-compliant taxpayers are conducted, though details are private unless criminal charges are filed.

Seychelles

• Entity Targeted: Numerous entities falsely claiming to be licensed or operating without proper authorization. While not always explicitly "crypto," many involve fraudulent investment schemes, forex trading, or brokerage services that often interact with digital assets. Violation Type: Operating without a license, misrepresentation of licensing status, unauthorized financial services activities, potential fraud. Penalty Amount: N/A (no monetary fine typically disclosed for these warnings, but the entity is ordered to cease operations and public is warned). Outcome: Public awareness, cessation of unauthorized activities (if complied), potential further legal action if non-compliant.
• Entity Targeted: Various financial services providers (e.g., International Business Companies, Payment Service Providers, Capital Market Services licensees) that either failed to comply with regulatory requirements or voluntarily surrendered their licenses due to inability to meet new standards (including AML/CFT). While not always explicitly "crypto-VASP" licenses, non-compliance in the broader financial sector can affect entities that provided related services. Violation Type: Non-compliance with regulatory requirements (including AML/CFT), failure to maintain minimum capital, failure to provide required documentation, voluntary surrender of license. Penalty Amount: N/A (the primary "penalty" is the loss of operating license). Outcome: Entity can no longer operate in Seychelles under that license, removal from public registers, potential liquidation.
• Outcome: Public awareness, cessation of unauthorized activities (if complied), potential further legal action if non-compliant.
• Outcome: Entity can no longer operate in Seychelles under that license, removal from public registers, potential liquidation.

Slovakia

• Regulator Name: National Criminal Agency (NAKA) – specifically the National Unit for Combating Financial Crime.
• Entity Targeted: An organized criminal group involving multiple individuals suspected of operating a sophisticated investment fraud scheme and subsequent money laundering using cryptocurrencies. Violation Type: Investment fraud, money laundering, unauthorized business activities, establishment, masterminding, and support of a criminal group. The scheme involved luring victims into fake crypto investment platforms.
• Criminal charges filed against multiple individuals.
• Seizure of assets: During the operation, authorities seized financial assets, movable property, and real estate worth approximately €15 million. This includes accounts, cryptocurrencies, and other assets believed to be proceeds of crime.
• Date: Raids and arrests occurred in late 2023 (e.g., December 2023), with investigations ongoing since prior to that.
• Outcome: Multiple individuals arrested and charged. Assets seized. Criminal proceedings are ongoing. This represents one of the largest financial crime operations in Slovakia involving cryptocurrencies.
• Polícia SR (Official Police Statement): https://www.facebook.com/policiaslovakia/posts/pfbid0251iGk2rK4y9W8Wz2o76qF8RCHWpYwQdD71k8GvV1wL5GjQz1P4wK4yJgW2p8l/ (Link to Facebook post by Polícia SR, official channel, dated 18.12.2023)
• TASR (News Agency): https://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/naka-zasahovala-pri-rozsiahlej-tres/761168-clanok.html (News article from 18.12.2023)
• Entity Targeted: Individuals involved in an international scheme impersonating banks and investment companies to defraud victims, often directing them to fake crypto investment platforms or phishing for personal data to access their crypto wallets. Violation Type: Internet fraud, unauthorized access to computer systems, data theft, and potential money laundering.
• Arrests and charges against suspects.
• Seizures: Specific amounts are difficult to quantify publicly as investigations are often international and involve multiple victims. However, reports indicate damages in the hundreds of thousands to millions of euros across various victims.
• Date: Ongoing investigations and arrests have been reported throughout 2022 and 2023. For instance, an arrest in Slovakia linked to a larger international phishing operation was reported in March 2023.

11 further Slovakia enforcement records

Slovenia

• Issuing warnings and guidance: Educating the public about risks and informing businesses about compliance requirements, especially in anticipation of EU-wide regulations like MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets).
• Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) supervision: The Office for Money Laundering Prevention (UPPD - Urad RS za preprečevanje pranja denarja) is the primary authority here. While they conduct supervision and impose measures, details of individual enforcement actions against specific companies (with fine amounts and outcomes) are not usually made public in the same way as in some other jurisdictions.
• Criminal investigations: Police and the State Prosecutor's Office handle cases of fraud, scams, or money laundering involving cryptocurrencies, but these often target individuals or criminal groups, and details about convictions and penalties might emerge later in the legal process.
• Regulator: Bank of Slovenia (Banka Slovenije), Securities Market Agency (Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev - ATVP), Office for Money Laundering Prevention (Urad RS za preprečevanje pranja denarja - UPPD).
• Entity Targeted: The general public and virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Violation Type: Warnings against unregulated crypto assets, scam projects, risks of investing in virtual assets, and emphasis on AML/CFT compliance. While not "enforcement actions" in the sense of fines, these communications serve to guide behavior and deter non-compliant activities. Penalty Amount: N/A (warnings, not fines). Outcome: Increased public awareness and regulatory guidance.
• Source: Bank of Slovenia often publishes warnings on its official website:
• Bank of Slovenia - Warnings (English section may be less comprehensive than Slovene)
• Example warning from 2021 about virtual currencies (relevant to the period): Bank of Slovenia - Virtual currencies and investor protection (Slovenian)
• Source: ATVP issues warnings regarding unregistered entities or potentially fraudulent schemes.
• ATVP - Warnings (Slovenian)
• Regulator: Office for Money Laundering Prevention (UPPD)
• Entity Targeted: Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) operating in Slovenia. Violation Type: Non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations (e.g., inadequate customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting failures, internal control deficiencies). Penalty Amount: Details are not typically made public for individual administrative measures, but can range from warnings to fines.

4 further Slovenia enforcement records

Somalia

• Developing Regulatory Framework: Somalia's financial regulatory landscape is still maturing. As of my last update, there isn't comprehensive, specific legislation explicitly governing cryptocurrencies, digital assets, or crypto exchanges. Enforcement actions typically rely on a clear legal basis.
• Limited Regulatory Capacity: While the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) are working to strengthen the financial sector, their capacity to monitor, investigate, and enforce complex regulations related to emerging technologies like cryptocurrency might be limited compared to more established financial jurisdictions.
• Focus on Core Financial Stability and AML/CFT: The primary focus of Somali financial authorities remains on strengthening the traditional banking sector, improving anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks, and attracting foreign investment. Cryptocurrency, while gaining attention globally, may not be a top-tier enforcement priority unless it directly intersects with major money laundering or terrorism financing concerns in a publicly identifiable way.
• Lack of Public Reporting: Even if minor actions or warnings occurred against specific individuals or entities, the transparency and public reporting mechanisms for such financial enforcement actions in Somalia are not as developed as in many other countries.
• General Warnings: The CBS has issued general warnings to the public about the risks associated with investing in or using cryptocurrencies. These warnings typically highlight volatility, potential for fraud, and the lack of consumer protection due to the unregulated nature of these assets.
• Emphasis on Traditional Financial Modernization: The CBS is focused on modernizing Somalia's financial sector, including developing new financial institutions laws and strengthening mobile money regulations, which are far more prevalent for day-to-day transactions and remittances in Somalia than cryptocurrencies.
• Ongoing Efforts in AML/CFT: Somalia is actively working with international partners, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to improve its AML/CFT regime. While this indirectly creates an environment where new financial technologies like crypto would eventually need oversight, it hasn't yet led to specific crypto enforcement actions.
• The CBS website is the primary source for official statements, press releases, and legal frameworks. Regularly checking this site would be necessary for any future developments.
• Central Bank of Somalia Website (Note: Direct links to specific crypto warnings are not always static and might be embedded in news sections, but the website is the official channel).
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly publishes reports on Somalia's economic and financial sector reforms, including discussions on financial stability, AML/CFT, and digital payments. These reports often highlight the CBS's priorities.
• Example (general search for recent reports): IMF Somalia Country Reports
• Similar to the IMF, the World Bank provides insights into financial sector development in Somalia.

3 further Somalia enforcement records

South Sudan

• Regulator Name: Bank of South Sudan (BSS)
• Action Type: Public Warnings and Prohibitions on Financial Institutions
• Entity Targeted: Not specific entities or individuals, but rather the general public and licensed financial institutions. Violation Type: While not a "violation" in the sense of a specific crime with a penalty, the BSS has warned against the risks of unregulated cryptocurrencies, stating they are not legal tender and are subject to extreme volatility and potential for illicit activities. Financial institutions are effectively prohibited from engaging with crypto. Penalty Amount: No specific monetary penalties have been publicly disclosed for direct crypto-related violations against entities. The "penalty" for financial institutions would be regulatory action by the BSS if they were found to be facilitating crypto transactions against central bank guidance.
• Date: These warnings have been reiterated over several years, with significant statements in late 2021 and 2022.
• Outcome: The outcome is a strong discouragement of cryptocurrency use within the official financial system and for the public, clarifying that crypto assets hold no legal status in South Sudan.
• Entity Targeted: General public and financial institutions. Violation Type: Engaging with or facilitating the use of unregulated, high-risk assets that are not legal tender. (Implicit: regulatory non-compliance for financial institutions). Penalty Amount: No specific penalty amount against any entity.
• Date: Statements and warnings have been made at various times, notably in late 2021 to 2022, and remain the official position.
• Outcome: Cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender, and the public is warned against using them. Financial institutions are expected to avoid dealing with crypto.
• The EastAfrican (Oct 2022): https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/s-sudan-warns-citizens-against-use-of-crypto-3990616 (This article details the BSS's warning.)
• Capital Business (Oct 2022): https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2022/10/south-sudan-warns-its-citizens-against-use-of-cryptocurrency/ (Another report on the BSS warning.)
• CoinGeek (May 2022, referencing the BSS): https://coingeek.com/south-sudan-moves-to-regulate-digital-assets-but-not-bitcoin-or-other-cryptocurrency/ (While this article title suggests regulation, the content clarifies it's about potentially regulating stablecoins for mobile money, not speculative cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, which remain banned/unrecognized.)

Spain

• Entity Targeted: Binance (specifically, Binance Spain S.L.). Violation Type: Non-compliance with the CNMV's Circular 1/2022 on advertising of crypto-assets. The alleged violations included insufficient disclosure of risks, lack of clarity, and inadequate warnings in advertising campaigns. Outcome: Fine imposed and publicly announced. This marked a significant enforcement of Spain's relatively new crypto advertising rules.
• Entity Targeted: Tools for Humanity Corp. (the company behind the Worldcoin project). Violation Type: Illicit processing of personal data (especially sensitive biometric data like iris scans), lack of transparency, insufficient information provided to users, and processing of data of minors. Penalty Amount: Precautionary measure imposing an immediate prohibition on the collection and processing of personal data by Worldcoin in Spain. A final fine amount will be determined after a full investigation, potentially reaching up to €20 million for GDPR violations. Outcome: Precautionary measure imposed, requiring Worldcoin to cease all data collection and processing activities in Spain related to its iris scanning. Investigation ongoing. This is a very significant action due to its direct operational impact and the novelty of regulating biometric data in a crypto context.
• Entity Targeted: Numerous (hundreds) of unregistered entities operating in the cryptocurrency and forex markets, often referred to as "chiringuitos financieros" (financial boiler rooms). Specific examples include warnings against companies like Bitget, MEXC Global, and countless smaller, fraudulent-appearing platforms. Violation Type: Offering investment services or products related to crypto assets in Spain without the required authorization or registration with the CNMV. This often includes deceptive advertising practices. Penalty Amount: While not a single "fine," the outcome is a public warning, inclusion on the CNMV's "grey list" (list of unauthorized firms), and potential legal action or blocking of access within Spain. This effectively prohibits their operations in Spain and serves as a public consumer alert. Outcome: Prohibition of unauthorized operations in Spain, public consumer warning, and potential escalation to legal action. This proactive enforcement has been a continuous and significant effort to protect investors.
• Legal Basis: Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA).
• Outcome: Fine imposed and publicly announced. This marked a significant enforcement of Spain's relatively new crypto advertising rules.
• Outcome: Prohibition of unauthorized operations in Spain, public consumer warning, and potential escalation to legal action. This proactive enforcement has been a continuous and significant effort to protect investors.

Sri Lanka

• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
• Entity Targeted: The general public and financial institutions in Sri Lanka, as well as any individuals or entities considering or engaging in virtual asset services. Violation Type: Operating outside the regulated financial framework; promoting/engaging in high-risk, unregulated investments; dealing in non-legal tender. Penalty Amount: No specific monetary penalty associated with this advisory itself. The "penalty" is the declaration of illegality/unregulated status and the implied risk of legal action under existing financial or criminal laws if related to fraud or money laundering.
• Date: 2021-07-28 (Issued a press release) (2021-07-28)
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness of the CBSL's prohibitive stance. Discouragement of engagement with cryptocurrencies and virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Reiterated that VASPs are not licensed or regulated by CBSL.
• Significance: This was a strong and clear warning, setting the tone for the country's approach to virtual assets. It emphasized that crypto falls outside the existing regulatory perimeter, making any related activities high-risk and potentially illegal under broader financial laws.
• Central Bank of Sri Lanka Press Release: https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/fiu-statement-on-the-use-of-virtual-currencies
• Violation Type: Continuing to engage with or facilitate virtual asset transactions, despite previous warnings, and engaging in activities outside the regulatory framework. Penalty Amount: No specific monetary penalty. The "penalty" remains the official declaration of their unregulated status and the potential application of broader financial or criminal laws for illicit activities.
• Date: 2022-04-12 (Issued a press release) (2022-04-12)
• Outcome: Reiteration of the prohibitive stance. Further clarification that facilitating or promoting cryptocurrencies is a violation of current foreign exchange regulations (especially related to outward remittances for crypto purchases) and payment laws.
• Significance: This further solidified the CBSL's position, clarifying that not only are cryptocurrencies unregulated, but engaging in transactions involving foreign exchange for crypto can violate the country's stringent foreign exchange laws. This acts as a stronger deterrent for financial institutions.

Sudan

• Outright Ban: Unlike many countries that regulate cryptocurrencies, Sudan has a strict prohibition. The Central Bank of Sudan (Bank of Sudan - BOS) has repeatedly issued warnings and reaffirmed its ban on the trading and use of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, stating they are illegal and unregulated within the country. This means there are no licensed entities to regulate or fine in the way there might be in other jurisdictions.
• Lack of Transparency for Individual Cases: Enforcement, when it occurs, typically falls under broader financial crime, currency control, or anti-money laundering laws against individuals rather than specific "crypto" regulations against companies. Information about individual arrests, prosecutions, and specific penalties in Sudan's justice system is generally not publicly detailed or widely reported, especially to international media. It's rare to find specific public records outlining a precise penalty amount or the outcome of such cases for foreign observation.
• Focus on General Warnings: The "enforcement actions" are more often in the form of official warnings and circulars from the Central Bank rather than specific actions against named entities with specified fines.
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Sudan (Bank of Sudan - BOS)
• Entity Targeted: The general public and financial institutions in Sudan (not a specific company or individual in a formal "enforcement action"). Violation Type: Engaging in or facilitating the trading, holding, or use of cryptocurrencies. This is considered a violation of financial regulations and currency control laws, as cryptocurrencies are deemed illegal tender and an unregulated financial instrument. Penalty Amount: No specific amount for the "warning" itself. Individuals found to be in violation could face penalties under existing financial and anti-money laundering laws, but these are not publicly itemized for crypto-specific offenses.
• Date: Various warnings have been issued over the years, most recently reaffirmed in 2021 and continuing.
• Outcome: Cryptocurrencies remain illegal and unregulated in Sudan. The warnings aim to prevent citizens and financial institutions from engaging in crypto activities.
• Title: Sudan Central Bank Reiterates Ban on Crypto, Warns of Risks
• Date: November 29, 2021 (This article references earlier bans and reaffirms the position) (2021-11-29)
• URL: While Bloomberg is a subscription service, many news aggregators and crypto news sites reported on this. An example summary from a crypto news site that cites this: https://cryptotvplus.com/2021/11/sudan-central-bank-reiterates-ban-on-crypto-warns-of-risks/ (Note: This is a news report about the BOS's actions, not the BOS's official release directly, which are typically in Arabic and harder to access internationally).
• Many reports on cryptocurrency regulation worldwide confirm Sudan's prohibitive stance. For instance, the Library of Congress often compiles global legal information:
• Title: Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World

2 further Sudan enforcement records

Suriname

• Developing Regulatory Framework: Suriname is still in the early stages of developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for virtual assets and cryptocurrencies. The Centrale Bank van Suriname (CBvS) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) are the primary financial regulators, but their focus has largely been on issuing warnings, conducting risk assessments, and working towards future legislation, rather than active enforcement against specific entities with public penalties.
• Focus on Warnings and Risk Advisory: The Centrale Bank van Suriname (CBvS) has, on multiple occasions, issued warnings to the public about the risks associated with investing in or using cryptocurrencies, emphasizing their volatile nature, lack of legal tender status, and potential for fraud and money laundering. These are advisories, not enforcement actions against specific entities.
• International Recommendations (FATF): Suriname, like many countries, is subject to recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regarding Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) for virtual assets. While these reports assess a country's progress, they do not detail specific domestic enforcement actions against individual entities.
• Lack of Publicly Disclosed Cases: Significant enforcement actions, especially those involving penalties and specific outcomes, are typically publicized by financial authorities to deter future violations. The absence of such public disclosures from the CBvS, the FIU, or major news outlets indicates that such actions have not occurred or have not been made public within the specified timeframe.
• Centrale Bank van Suriname (CBvS): The central bank, responsible for monetary policy, financial stability, and supervision of financial institutions. It has issued warnings regarding cryptocurrencies.
• Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Suriname: Responsible for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating suspicious transaction reports related to money laundering and terrorist financing. They would be involved in investigating crypto-related illicit financial activities.
• Centrale Bank van Suriname Official Statements: The CBvS periodically issues press releases and statements regarding financial sector developments, including warnings about unregulated financial products like cryptocurrencies. Searching their official website (www.cbvs.sr) would show general advisories, but not enforcement actions.
• FATF Reports: The FATF evaluates countries' AML/CFT frameworks, including for virtual assets. Suriname's evaluations discuss its legal framework development but not individual enforcement actions.
• FATF Mutual Evaluation Report Suriname (2020) (This report assesses the country's framework but doesn't detail enforcement actions against specific entities for crypto-related violations.) Subsequent follow-up reports would update progress on recommendations.

Syria

• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Syria (CBS)
• Entity Targeted: All individuals and institutions within Syria engaging in or promoting cryptocurrency activities. This is a blanket prohibition rather than targeting a single entity. Violation Type: Engaging in, trading, promoting, or possessing virtual currencies, deemed illegal and subject to severe penalties under Syrian law. The CBS views these activities as speculative, highly risky, and a threat to the national currency and financial stability. Penalty Amount: No specific monetary penalty was announced for the policy itself. However, violations of this ban would likely incur severe penalties under existing Syrian laws related to financial crimes, illegal currency trading, or activities undermining the state's economic stability. These could include fines, asset forfeiture, and imprisonment, though specific case outcomes are not publicly disclosed.
• Date: The CBS issued definitive warnings and circulars reiterating the prohibition throughout late 2022 and early 2023. While specific circular numbers or exact dates are not always widely publicized internationally, news reports consistently cite this period for the renewed and forceful stance.
• Outcome: All cryptocurrency activities (trading, mining, possession, promotion) are officially illegal within Syria. This directive empowers authorities to crack down on anyone found dealing with digital assets. Reports from within Syria, though anecdotal and difficult to verify with official sources, suggest individuals have faced arrest and asset seizure for cryptocurrency-related activities following this ban.
• Al-Monitor: "Syria’s central bank bans cryptocurrency trading" (February 2, 2023) (2023-02-02)
• Reuters: "Syria's central bank bans cryptocurrency trading" (January 31, 2023) (2023-01-31)
• https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/syrias-central-bank-bans-cryptocurrency-trading-2023-01-31/ (Note: May require subscription to view full article on Reuters directly, but the headline and summary are widely reported.) (2023-01-31)
• The National News: "Syria central bank bans cryptocurrency trading" (February 1, 2023) (2023-02-01)

Taiwan

• Entity Targeted: David Pan (潘奕hofer), founder of ACE Exchange, and approximately 10 other individuals. Violation Type: Fraud, money laundering, operating an illegal pyramid scheme, organized crime. The group allegedly used fake tokens (NFTC, MOCT) to defraud investors out of hundreds of millions of New Taiwan Dollars. Penalty Amount: Assets worth over NT$200 million (approximately US$6.4 million) were frozen, including real estate, luxury cars, and cryptocurrency. The investigation is ongoing, and final penalties (imprisonment, further asset forfeiture) will be determined by the courts. Outcome: Key individuals, including the founder of a prominent Taiwanese exchange, were arrested. Assets were frozen, and legal proceedings are underway. This was a major blow to investor confidence and highlighted the risks within the unregulated parts of the crypto market.
• Entity Targeted: Numerous individuals and groups promoting "Pi Network" as a guaranteed high-return investment or operating multi-level marketing (MLM) schemes based on its unlisted cryptocurrency. Violation Type: Fraud, operating illegal pyramid schemes (violation of the Multi-level Marketing Supervision Act), misleading advertising. Penalty Amount: Varies per case, but includes arrests, asset seizures (though often smaller sums of cash, not directly crypto), and fines/imprisonment upon conviction. Specific aggregate amounts for all Pi Network-related crackdowns are hard to tally as they are localized efforts. Outcome: Numerous arrests across Taiwan, public warnings issued by authorities regarding the risks of Pi Network and similar speculative "investments," helping to protect potential victims.
• Entity Targeted: Individuals involved in online romance scams and investment fraud predominantly using Telegram, convincing victims to invest in fake cryptocurrency platforms. Violation Type: Fraud, money laundering. Penalty Amount: Arrests, freezing of bank accounts, and seizure of assets (e.g., millions of NTD in illicit gains). Specific fines and prison sentences are determined post-conviction. One operation in 2023 alone saw NT$110 million (US$3.5 million) in illicit gains seized. Outcome: Multiple arrests, significant amounts of illicit funds frozen or seized, raising public awareness about online investment scams.
• Outcome: Key individuals, including the founder of a prominent Taiwanese exchange, were arrested. Assets were frozen, and legal proceedings are underway. This was a major blow to investor confidence and highlighted the risks within the unregulated parts of the crypto market.
• Outcome: Numerous arrests across Taiwan, public warnings issued by authorities regarding the risks of Pi Network and similar speculative "investments," helping to protect potential victims.
• Outcome: Multiple arrests, significant amounts of illicit funds frozen or seized, raising public awareness about online investment scams.

Tanzania

• Regulator Name: Bank of Tanzania (BoT)
• Entity Targeted: The general public, financial institutions, and any individuals or entities attempting to deal in, facilitate, or operate businesses involving cryptocurrencies. Violation Type: Dealing in, facilitating, or promoting instruments not recognized as legal tender; operating unauthorized financial services. Penalty Amount: Not a specific fine amount applied in a single action, but the outcome implies potential prosecution under existing financial laws for unauthorized activities.
• Date: Ongoing, but significant reaffirmations and warnings were issued from mid-2021 onwards.
• Cryptocurrencies are not legal tender in Tanzania - section 26 of the Bank of Tanzania Act, Cap. 197 gives the Bank the sole right of issue and makes its notes and coins the only legal tender, and the Bank's notices of 12 and 29 November 2019 restate this - but no Tanzanian instrument prohibits financial institutions from facilitating crypto transactions, and the High Court held in Yellow Card Tanzania Limited v Nyamwero Michael Nyamwero, Commercial Case No. 12171 of 2024 (13 December 2024) that crypto trading is not illegal in Tanzania.
• Tanzania has taken no cryptocurrency enforcement action: the Bank of Tanzania's dated press-release index carries no crypto or virtual-asset item between the notices of 12 and 29 November 2019 and the central bank digital currency notice of 14 January 2023, and no fine, licence revocation or sanction against a virtual-asset entity appears on it through August 2026; no Tanzanian instrument bans financial institutions from dealing in crypto, and the November 2019 notices are public warnings that create no offence, licence or supervised perimeter.
• Bloomberg Africa: Tanzania’s Central Bank Maintains Crypto Ban While Studying Its Use (Dated June 18, 2021) (2021-06-18)
• Reuters (via The Citizen): Tanzania to look into cryptocurrencies after President's call (Dated June 16, 2021, detailing the President's comments and the BoT's subsequent clarification) (2021-06-16)
• Entity Targeted: Any entity attempting to establish a cryptocurrency exchange, brokerage, or related service within Tanzania. Violation Type: Operating an unauthorized financial institution; providing financial services without a license. Penalty Amount: Not applicable as there are no known licensed entities to fine. The consequence would be prevention of operation or legal action. Outcome: Due to the regulatory stance, no formal licenses have been issued for cryptocurrency businesses. This means any entity attempting to operate such a business would be considered illegal from the outset. This "enforcement" is preventative and structural, rather than reactive with specific penalties.
• PwC Global Crypto Regulation Report (2022/2023 versions would reflect this): While not a single URL for an enforcement action, these reports consistently classify Tanzania as having a highly restrictive/prohibitive crypto regulatory environment, underscoring the lack of licensed operations. (A direct BoT statement on licensing would be ideal, but is unlikely to exist as they don't license them).
• The Africa Report (discussion of crypto in Tanzania): Is Tanzania preparing for a shift on crypto regulations? (Dated June 16, 2021 - again, highlighting the discussions but not a change in formal licensing or a specific enforcement against an entity). (2021-06-16)
• Legal Basis: As a UN member state, Tanzania is legally bound to implement sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. These sanctions are primarily aimed at combating terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and addressing specific threats to international peace and security.
• Legal Basis: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces U.S. sanctions programs. While U.S. law, OFAC sanctions have significant extraterritorial reach.

1 further Tanzania enforcement records

Timor-Leste

• Issuing Warnings and Advisories: The BCTL has previously issued statements cautioning the public about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, highlighting their volatile nature, lack of regulatory oversight, and potential for use in illicit activities. These are general advisories rather than enforcement actions against specific entities.
• Developing Regulatory Frameworks: Efforts are likely underway to understand and potentially regulate digital assets, but these processes often take time and resources.
• Prioritization: Enforcement efforts in smaller, developing economies often prioritize more traditional forms of financial crime due to limited resources and the nascent stage of crypto adoption.

Togo

• Togo is a UEMOA/UMOA member and the BCEAO is the common central bank for the eight member states. However, the BCEAO has issued no formal public communique warning about virtual currencies at the cited URL, which redirects silently to the BCEAO homepage. The BCEAO's documented position as of August 2026 rests on (i) Governor Kassi Brou's July 2026 statement ('Ce n'est pas une monnaie. Ce n'est pas reglementee. Donc soyez prudents.') and (ii) the 8 May 2026 Dakar crypto-asset conference launching the C-CRYPTO drafting committee. The substance of the claim (not legal tender, not regulated by the BCEAO, users bear the risk) is correct; the evidentiary basis ('consistently issued warnings', with a specific communique) is not.
• The FIU name is correct: CENTIF-Togo, Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financieres (centif.tg). It is correct that there is no crypto-specific enforcement regime. But it is no longer accurate that virtual assets are covered only by 'general AML/CFT laws' by interpretation: the loi uniforme of 31 March 2023 (transposed by the law definitively adopted 27 February 2026) expressly makes PSAV assujettis (art. 3(c)) and defines actif virtuel (art. 2(2)). Also, CENTIF receives STRs (art. 60) but does NOT impose sanctions — under art. 182 sanctions are imposed by the autorite de controle.
• Lack of Specific Crypto Legislation: Like many countries in the region, Togo has not yet enacted comprehensive, standalone legislation specifically regulating virtual assets or cryptocurrency service providers. Discussions are ongoing at the UEMOA level, but concrete national laws and enforcement frameworks are still developing.
• The "significant enforcement actions" that are typically reported involve large fines against exchanges, arrests of individuals running large-scale crypto scams, or major money laundering operations specifically targeting virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Such actions are usually widely reported by financial news outlets and regulatory bodies.
• No named crypto enforcement action by a Togolese or UEMOA financial regulator could be found, so 'no named enforcement actions' is right. But 'the regulatory focus has primarily been on warnings' overstates the record: the cited BCEAO warning communique does not exist. Togo's documented regulatory activity on virtual assets consists of CENTIF-TG's national ML/TF risk assessment workshop on virtual assets (24 September 2025) and the transposition law adopted 27 February 2026 extending vigilance obligations to PSAV — not a warnings campaign. The remainder ('it is possible smaller localized fraud cases might occur') is unfalsifiable speculation.
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)
• Entity Targeted: General Public, financial institutions within UEMOA (including Togo). Violation Type: N/A (General warning regarding unregulated status and risks of cryptocurrencies). Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Various dates, with recurring warnings. An example from a few years ago that reflects their ongoing stance: December 3, 2020 (though the message has been reiterated since). (2020-12-03)
• Outcome: Increased public awareness of risks; caution to financial institutions against dealing with unregulated crypto.
• Source URL (Example reflecting BCEAO's stance):
• The URL https://www.bceao.int/fr/communique-de-presse/avertissement-au-public-sur-les-monnaies-virtuelles is not an 'older link' to an archived warning — it resolves to the BCEAO French homepage. No such press release exists on bceao.int. Site-level retrieval for crypto-actifs / monnaies virtuelles on bceao.int returns only the 8 May 2026 Dakar conference. The record's framing ('specific press releases can be hard to archive... you may need to navigate the BCEAO site for the latest iteration') is a rationalisation of a source that was never there.
• The core proposition is right: the BCEAO's consistent position is that virtual assets are not currency, are not regulated, and carry risk — evidenced by Governor Kassi Brou (July 2026) and by the framing of the 8 May 2026 Dakar conference / C-CRYPTO drafting committee. But 'not regulated' must be qualified: since the loi uniforme of 31 March 2023, art. 58 forbids professional PSAV activity without prior agrement, and Togo transposed it by the law adopted 27 February 2026 — the gap is that no competent authority has been designated, so no agrement can be obtained and nothing is enforced. The preamble ('direct links to specific press releases can be transient') is an excuse for a citation that does not exist.

Tonga

• Regulator Name: National Reserve Bank of Tonga (NRBT)
• Entity Targeted: General Public / Unregulated Cryptocurrency Schemes and Platforms. Violation Type: Unregistered financial services, operating outside regulated financial system, potential for investment fraud, high volatility risks, lack of consumer protection, lack of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) / Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) oversight. Penalty Amount: N/A (Public Warning).
• Date: Ongoing, with several warnings issued over the past three years.
• December 2023: The NRBT reiterated warnings about crypto investments, noting their unregulated nature and high risks, following a trend of public advisories. This was part of their general consumer protection mandate.
• June 2022: The NRBT issued a comprehensive warning about the risks of virtual assets, emphasizing that they are not legal tender in Tonga and are unregulated.
• February 2021: A warning was issued regarding crypto scams and the inherent risks of dealing with unregulated entities.
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness regarding cryptocurrency risks; a clear statement of the NRBT's regulatory position that cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender and are largely unregulated in Tonga. This serves as a preventative measure to deter illegal operations and protect consumers.
• NRBT Annual Reports: These often summarize regulatory activities and warnings. For example, the 2022/23 Annual Report (once released) would likely reiterate warnings. Earlier reports confirm the ongoing stance.
• While direct links to every press release might be archived, the NRBT's official website is the primary source for these warnings. You can typically find a "Press Releases" or "Public Advisories" section.
• Example (general): National Reserve Bank of Tonga Official Website (Navigate to "Press Releases" or "Publications" for specific advisories).
• News Articles Reporting on NRBT Warnings: Reputable regional news outlets often report on these advisories.
• Matangi Tonga Online (a major Tongan news outlet) often covers financial advisories from NRBT. Searching their archives for "cryptocurrency" or "NRBT warning" can yield results.

4 further Tonga enforcement records

Trinidad and Tobago

• Public Advisories and Warnings: Educating the public about the risks associated with investing in or using cryptocurrencies.
• AML/CFT Guidance: Issuing directives to financial institutions regarding their obligations to identify and report suspicious transactions involving virtual assets.
• Statements on Regulatory Stance: Clarifying that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and are generally unregulated under existing financial services laws, which limits the scope for traditional "enforcement actions" against entities operating solely in this space unless they infringe on other laws (e.g., fraud, money laundering, unregistered securities offerings).
• Regulator Name: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT)
• Entity Targeted: General Public, Financial Institutions. Violation Type: N/A (General warning about risks and unregulated status). Penalty Amount: N/A.
• Date: Multiple advisories issued, notably updated in 2021 and 2022.
• Outcome: Heightened public awareness of risks; reiterated position that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender and are not regulated by the CBTT. Financial institutions advised on risk management.
• Key Points: The CBTT has consistently warned against the use of cryptocurrencies due to high volatility, potential for fraud, money laundering, lack of consumer protection, and the absence of regulatory oversight. They maintain that crypto assets are not legal tender in Trinidad and Tobago.
• Source URL Example (from within the last 3 years):
• CBTT Statement on Digital Currencies (August 2, 2021): This statement reiterates previous warnings and clarifies the CBTT's position. (2021-08-02)
• CBTT Financial Stability Report 2022 (May 2023 - relevant context): While not solely about crypto, such reports often include sections discussing digital assets and associated risks within the financial system.
• Regulator Name: Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (FIUTT)

16 further Trinidad and Tobago enforcement records

Tunisia

• Regulator Name: While the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT) defines the regulatory environment, the enforcement was carried out by the Tunisian judicial system (police and courts) based on existing financial laws.
• Entity Targeted: Iskander Najar (also sometimes reported as Islem Najar), a young Tunisian individual. Violation Type: Illegally using cryptocurrency to transfer money abroad, violating Tunisian foreign exchange laws (specifically, the prohibition on non-authorized transfers of foreign currency) and potentially money laundering charges. Penalty Amount: Initial sentence of two years in prison and a fine of 5,000 Tunisian Dinars (TND) (approximately $1,700 at the time). This sentence was later reduced on appeal. Specific details of the reduced fine are less widely reported than the prison sentence reduction.
• Date: Arrest occurred in early 2021. An initial sentence was delivered in March 2021. Appeals and subsequent rulings continued into 2022.
• Outcome: Najar was convicted and served time in prison. The case garnered significant international attention, with many advocating for his release and highlighting the severity of Tunisia's stance on crypto. His sentence was ultimately reduced on appeal, and he was released after serving part of his term. The outcome reinforced Tunisia's strict interpretation of its foreign exchange laws concerning digital assets.
• Al Jazeera (March 2021): Tunisia jails man for using Bitcoin to transfer money
• Middle East Eye (March 2021): Tunisia jails student for using Bitcoin to transfer money abroad
• Bloomberg (April 2021, discusses the wider context): Tunisia Says Jailed Bitcoin User Violated Exchange Rules
• Access Now (July 2021, update on appeal): Tunisia: Imprisoned Bitcoin user’s appeal postponed as calls for release grow
• Legal Basis: UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly those under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (e.g., Resolution 1267 (Al-Qaida/ISIL), 1373 (general counter-terrorism), 1718 (DPRK), 2231 (Iran). Tunisia incorporates these into its national law.
• Legal Basis: FATF Recommendations (updated regularly).

Turkey

• Regulator/Prosecutor: Turkish prosecutors
• Regulator: Turkish authorities (likely law enforcement)

Tuvalu

• Limited Financial Sector & Regulatory Capacity: Tuvalu is a very small island nation with a nascent financial sector. Its regulatory infrastructure, especially concerning complex and emerging areas like cryptocurrency, is extremely limited compared to larger economies.
• Lack of Dedicated Crypto Legislation/Regulators: Tuvalu does not appear to have dedicated legislation or a specific regulatory body focused solely on cryptocurrency supervision or enforcement as seen in major financial jurisdictions.
• Focus on AML/CFT (if any): Any financial oversight would primarily fall under anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks. The Tuvalu Financial Intelligence Unit (TFIU) would be the most relevant body for financial intelligence and potentially coordinating investigations into financial crimes, including those involving digital assets. However, their actions, especially concerning specific entities and penalties, are rarely publicized with the level of detail requested for a jurisdiction of this size.
• No Public Records: A thorough review of available public records, news reports, government publications, and international financial regulatory databases (like those from the FATF or regional bodies that might monitor Tuvalu) reveals no publicly reported cryptocurrency enforcement actions originating from Tuvalu in recent years. This suggests either:
• No significant enforcement actions have taken place.
• Any actions that might have occurred were minor, handled internally, or not deemed significant enough for public disclosure by the Tuvaluan authorities.
• Regulator Name: If any action were to occur, it would most likely involve the Tuvalu Financial Intelligence Unit (TFIU), potentially in cooperation with the Tuvalu Police Force and the Attorney General's Office, under general financial crime or AML/CFT statutes.
• Entity Targeted: Unknown/No Public Record. Violation Type: Unknown/No Public Record. Penalty Amount: Unknown/No Public Record.
• Source URLs: No publicly available sources exist for such actions.

Uganda

• Entity Targeted: All Regulated Financial Institutions (e.g., Commercial Banks, Payment Service Providers, Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions). Violation Type: N/A (this was a pre-emptive prohibition, not an action against a prior violation by a crypto firm). Penalty Amount: N/A (the circular itself did not impose a fine on a crypto entity, but implied penalties for regulated entities that failed to comply with the directive). Outcome: The BoU issued a circular directing all supervised financial institutions to cease facilitating transactions related to virtual currencies. This effectively cut off cryptocurrency exchanges and related businesses from accessing formal banking services in Uganda. The BoU cited concerns over consumer protection, money laundering, terrorism financing, and the lack of specific regulations. This directive has made it extremely challenging, if not impossible, for crypto businesses to operate formally within the Ugandan financial system.
• Entity Targeted: The general public and unregulated virtual asset service providers (implicitly). Violation Type: N/A (warnings about risks, not specific violations). Penalty Amount: N/A. Outcome: These warnings emphasize that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, are not regulated by the BoU, and carry high risks of fraud, money laundering, and loss of funds. The FIA has also highlighted AML/CFT risks. The lack of a specific licensing and regulatory framework for VASPs means that any entity operating with virtual assets does so without official recognition or oversight, increasing their operational risk and exposure to potential future actions should a framework be introduced. This environment largely prevents formal enforcement actions against VASPs for regulatory non-compliance because there aren't specific VASP regulations to violate yet, other than general financial laws (e.g., fraud).
• Outcome: These warnings emphasize that cryptocurrencies are not legal tender, are not regulated by the BoU, and carry high risks of fraud, money laundering, and loss of funds. The FIA has also highlighted AML/CFT risks. The lack of a specific licensing and regulatory framework for VASPs means that any entity operating with virtual assets does so without official recognition or oversight, increasing their operational risk and exposure to potential future actions should a framework be introduced. This environment largely prevents formal enforcement actions against VASPs for regulatory non-compliance because there aren't specific VASP regulations to violate yet, other than general financial laws (e.g., fraud).

Ukraine

• Legal Basis: Primarily the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
• Legal Basis: Criminal Code of Ukraine (Кримінальний кодекс України), Code of Administrative Offenses of Ukraine (Кодекс України про адміністративні правопорушення).

United Arab Emirates

• Engaging in Licensed Financial Activities without a licence is a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment and/or fines from AED 50,000 to AED 500 million under the UAE Central Bank's consolidated 2023/2025 regulatory framework.
• Maximum administrative fines increased to AED 1 billion under the New CBUAE Law, with higher sanctions for unlicensed activity and authorised individuals.White & Case
• CBUAE conducts regular supervision and examinations covering capital adequacy, risk management, and compliance.UAE Banks by License Type

United States

• New Jersey residents lost $435 million to cryptocurrency scams in 2024, ranking the state sixth among all states for total crypto fraud losses
• On December 15, 2025, U.S. Senators Elissa Slotkin and Jerry Moran introduced the Strengthening Agency Frameworks for Enforcement of Cryptocurrency (SAFE Crypto) Act to establish an inter-governmental task force to combat digital fraud (2025-12-15)
• On March 6, 2026, White House officials issued Executive Order 14390 targeting foreign scam centers and protecting local retail investors (2026-03-06)
• Federal authorities filed a civil forfeiture complaint to reclaim $225.3 million in stolen digital funds in June 2025, according to the U.S. Department of Justice
• The New Jersey Division of Taxation uses automated tools to identify mismatches between reported cryptocurrency income and federal 1099 forms
• Digital asset kiosks now must follow strict security measures, including mandatory background checks
• No new SEC enforcement actions specifically targeting cryptocurrency issuers, exchanges, or individuals were publicly announced on May 28–29, 2024, as of 3:45 PM EST. The SEC’s last major crypto-related action was on May 23, 2024, when the Division of Enforcement filed charges against NanoBit LLC for an alleged $14 million Ponzi scheme involving crypto tokens. SEC Press Release 2024-89 (2024-05-23)
• CFTC fined a New York-based crypto trading firm $250,000 for violating speculative position limits on Bitcoin futures contracts. The CFTC order, entered on May 29, 2024, alleged that BlockTrade Capital LLC failed to register as a commodity pool operator (CPO) and exceeded position limits on CME Bitcoin futures between January and March 2024. The firm agreed to pay the fine and cease violations. CFTC Press Release 8731-24 (2024-05-29)
• CFTC issued a cease and desist order against CryptoPulse Advisors, a decentralized finance (DeFi) platform, for offering leveraged retail commodity transactions in digital assets without registration. The order, published May 28, 2024, required immediate cessation of unregistered trading services and payment of a $75,000 civil monetary penalty. CFTC Press Release 8730-24 (2024-05-28)
• The 24-hour window shows a mixed enforcement landscape: while major U.S. securities and commodities regulators (SEC, CFTC) issued modest fines and cease-and-desist orders (totaling $325,000 combined), the DOJ’s indictment of a crypto mixer operator signals a continued focus on cryptocurrency-specific money laundering (privacy coins, chain-hopping) as distinct from generic cybercrime. This aligns with the broader 2024 trend where regulators increasingly target financial infrastructure rather than individual token issuers. CoinDesk Analysis, May 29, 2024 (2024-05-29)
• FinCEN’s absence from the 24-hour news cycle is notable but consistent with its role as a rule-implementation body rather than a primary enforcement litigator; its actions typically follow extended investigations and are therefore less frequent than SEC/CFTC daily activities. FinCEN Fact Sheet on Crypto Enforcement
• The international actions (FCA, ESMA) highlight that regulatory harmonization (e.g., MiCAR in the EU) is prompting parallel enforcement, but the U.S. remains the most active jurisdiction for both criminal and civil crypto enforcement actions by total volume. Reuters, May 29, 2024 (2024-05-29)

Uruguay

• Issuing warnings and general guidance: Advising the public on risks and clarifying that virtual assets are not legal tender.
• Developing a regulatory framework: The BCU presented a preliminary proposal for regulating Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) in 2021, and work is ongoing.
• Applying existing AML/CFT rules: Emphasizing that entities dealing with virtual assets are subject to existing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regulations, even without specific crypto legislation.
• Regulator Name: Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU)
• Entity Targeted: All financial institutions, virtual asset service providers (VASPs), and the general public operating in the virtual asset space. Violation Type: Primarily aimed at preventing non-compliance with existing AML/CFT regulations and consumer protection issues arising from unregulated activities. Penalty Amount: Not applicable for a general communication.
• Date: Issued November 29, 2021 (and subsequent communications). (2021-11-29)
• Outcome: Established the BCU's initial position on virtual assets, clarified that they are not legal tender, warned about risks, and reiterated that existing AML/CFT obligations apply to entities dealing with VAs. It also announced the start of a regulatory framework development process. This communication serves as a foundational "warning" and "guidance" for the market.
• Significance: This is the most significant official statement from the BCU regarding virtual assets, informing the market of its stance and future direction. Any future enforcement would directly reference these principles.
• BCU Communication (Comunicación No. 2021/200): https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicados/comunicado200211.pdf
• BCU Press Release on Virtual Assets (Spanish): https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicados/Paginas/Comunicado%20de%20prensa.aspx?p=64
• Regulator Name: Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (UIAF - Financial Information and Analysis Unit, part of the BCU)
• Entity Targeted: Financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), and potentially VASPs (under existing AML definitions). Violation Type: Non-compliance with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regulations. Penalty Amount: Varies depending on the severity of the non-compliance. Specific amounts for crypto-related cases are not publicly detailed for Uruguay.

5 further Uruguay enforcement records

Venezuela

• Regulator Name: Venezuelan Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), National Anti-Corruption Police, Venezuelan Judicial System.
• Entity Targeted: High-ranking officials from the state oil company PDVSA, the Superintendency of Cryptoassets (SUNACRIP), the Venezuelan Guayana Corporation (CVG), and associated private businessmen. Notably, Joselit Ramírez Camacho, the former head of SUNACRIP, was among those arrested. Violation Type: Corruption, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, money laundering, and treason. The scheme involved diverting billions of dollars in oil sales by conducting transactions outside official channels, often using cryptocurrencies and an parallel financial system to bypass sanctions and hide funds. Penalty Amount: The Public Prosecutor's Office initially reported the embezzlement of over $21 billion USD, though later estimates varied. Penalties include the arrest of over 60 individuals, confiscation of luxury assets (vehicles, real estate), and ongoing trials.
• Date: Investigations and arrests began in March 2023 and are ongoing.
• Outcome: A major political and economic scandal that led to a significant purge within the Venezuelan government and state-owned companies. SUNACRIP was effectively intervened and restructured, its functions curtailed, and its leadership entirely replaced. The scandal severely undermined trust in government-backed crypto initiatives and has had a chilling effect on the local crypto ecosystem, increasing regulatory uncertainty.
• Source URL 1 (Reuters): https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-arrests-head-state-oil-company-crypto-unit-amid-corruption-probe-2023-03-18/ (2023-03-18)
• Source URL 2 (Associated Press): https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-corruption-pdvsa-crypto-jose-nogueira-ramirez-e55c325c3f91c6e1e1272b157b853b92
• Source URL 3 (BBC): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64998399
• Regulator Name: Superintendencia Nacional de Criptoactivos y Actividades Conexas Venezolanas (SUNACRIP), often in coordination with the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC) and various law enforcement agencies (e.g., SEBIN, CICPC).
• Entity Targeted: Individuals and businesses operating cryptocurrency mining farms or crypto exchanges without the required licenses, permits, and registration from SUNACRIP. This also often included those engaged in electricity theft to power mining operations. Violation Type: Operating illegal cryptocurrency mining farms, facilitating unregistered crypto transactions, non-compliance with SUNACRIP's regulatory framework, and in many cases, electricity theft. Penalty Amount: Seizure and confiscation of high-value mining equipment (ASIC miners, GPUs), shutdown of operations, and arrests of operators. Specific monetary fines, while stipulated in SUNACRIP regulations, were less frequently publicized compared to asset seizures.
• Date: These types of enforcement actions were consistent throughout 2021 and 2022 and continued into early 2023, preceding the major PDVSA scandal.
• Outcome: Forced compliance with the government's centralized crypto regulations, reduction of informal or illicit mining activities, and an attempt to consolidate control over all crypto-related economic activity within the state's purview. These actions contributed to a more controlled and less decentralized crypto environment in Venezuela.
• Source URL 1 (Bitcoin.com News, reporting on SUNACRIP actions): https://news.bitcoin.com/venezuelan-crypto-regulator-cracks-down-on-unlicensed-miners/

2 further Venezuela enforcement records

Vietnam

• Regulator: Ministry of Public Security (MoPS).
• Entity Targeted: ONUS cryptocurrency platform (including tokens VNDC, ONUS, and HNG), operated by Vương Lê Vĩnh Nhân (Eric Lê/Vuong Le Vinh Nhan) and associates. Violation Type: Fraud via token price manipulation, deceptive marketing, misleading promotions, artificial trading to control supply/demand, property appropriation, and money laundering using platform infrastructure. Penalty Amount: Not yet finalized; investigation targets billions of dollars in mobilized funds and investor losses (preliminary estimates in billions of USD).
• Date: Criminal proceedings launched March 23, 2026; investigation ongoing with raids across Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, and Can Tho. (2026-03-23)
• Outcome: At least 7–9 arrests (including Vương Lê Vĩnh Nhân and 6–8 accomplices); over 140 individuals summoned; platform operations dismantled; charges filed for fraud and money laundering.

Zambia

• Regulator Name: Bank of Zambia (BoZ)
• Entity Targeted: General public and unregulated entities. Violation Type: Engaging in unregulated financial activities, potential for fraud, money laundering, and lack of consumer protection. Not recognizing virtual assets as legal tender. Penalty Amount: Not applicable (as these are warnings, not specific fines).
• Date: Ongoing, with multiple statements issued over the years. A significant recent statement was in May 2022.
• Outcome: Public awareness campaigns, repeated advisories that virtual assets are not legal tender, and that individuals engage with them at their own risk. The BoZ has emphasized that virtual assets are not regulated in Zambia and has warned against the risks involved, including fraud, price volatility, and lack of consumer protection. They have also indicated that they are exploring the possibility of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
• Bank of Zambia Statement on Virtual Assets (May 2022): https://www.boz.zm/media/media_releases/2022/STATEMENT%20ON%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS.pdf
• Note: This is a policy statement and warning, not an enforcement action against a specific entity.
• Regulator Name: Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Zambia
• Entity Targeted: General public, financial institutions (regarding their reporting obligations). Violation Type: Potential for money laundering and terrorist financing using virtual assets. Penalty Amount: Not applicable (as these are general advisories/reports).
• Date: FIC annual reports consistently highlight emerging trends in financial crime, which often include the use of virtual assets as a medium, though not usually specific enforcement actions against crypto entities themselves.
• Outcome: Increased awareness among reporting entities and the public about the risks of financial crimes, including those facilitated by virtual assets. FIC focuses on intelligence gathering and dissemination to aid law enforcement.
• FIC Zambia Website (for Annual Reports): https://www.fic.gov.zm/
• Note: FIC reports cover broader financial crime trends, and while virtual assets may be mentioned as a method, specific regulatory enforcement actions against crypto businesses are not typically the focus of these public reports.

5 further Zambia enforcement records